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Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

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Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Scotsman » Wed Jun 05, 2013 11:49 am

Hey all, as I said in my earlier post in the General board, I am somewhat new as a Revisionist reader, though I have been aware of the 'Denial' position since 2005 - which was actually responsible for making my political views take a 'right turn'. (specifically, when I found out about Holocaust Denial laws) But for a long time, I only noted the Denial position but did not really go one way or the other. Lately I have become a believer in the revisionist take on WW2 generally.

One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.

I was hoping there would be more deconstruction of 'Generalplan Ost' in revisionist literature, but there wasn't a whole lot out there, and just a little bit on this website. Is there a definitive take on it written by any revisionists, be it an article, book, etc? It features so prominently in 'what if Hitler had won the war' scenarios of impending doom that I feel it is more important than maybe some realize.
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Hektor » Thu Jun 06, 2013 10:38 am

Staff like this, doesn't get that much Revisionist attention, since
In my opinion the "Generalplan Ost" seems to be highly overrated. Leaving skepticism over authenticity of sources aside. It makes sense that there were proposals on how to deal with a new order after the war. The notion that "Hitler started war to conquer 'Lebensraum' and ultimately the world" I consider a myth. Personally I'd rather go in line with actually practice. And there countries were occupied as a war measure. But there is lots that doesn't fit the fantasy image generally portrayed. For instance were Germans from the East resettled into areas arondated to Germany as a measure of consolidation and population exchange. That doesn't fit into the imperialist image of Lebensraum.
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby hermod » Fri Jun 07, 2013 9:08 pm

Scotsman wrote:One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.


Would there have been so many Slavs fighting on the Reich's side if the Nazis had really been perpetrating a genocide of 30 million Slavs at that time? Wouldn't Hitler have stopped his repatriation operation of all ethnic Germans living outside the Reich's borders (the "Heim Ins Reich" -Home in the Reich- operation) if he had been planning to populate those areas with Germans after victory?

Image
German "Heim Ins Reich" propaganda poster.

The word "Lebensraum" is often misinterpretated. In January 1939, after uniting the Austrian, Sudenten and German brothers in a German Reich, Hitler said that the process of the formation of the German nation - the German "Lebensraum" - had reached its conclusion (see speech below). One would have expected Hitler to prepare his people for a "Lebensraum war" to come at that time, but that's not what he did. In 1938 and 1939 Hitler also offered to guarantee the Polish borders established at Versailles* and so proposed to renounce the lost German "Lebensraum" in Poland once and for all. Do "land-eaters" planning wars for living space act that way? In Mein Kampf Hitler talked about potential "Lebensraum" in Russia. That's true. But he wrote that because he thought that the Soviet Union was about to collapse and dislocate on its own (because the jews - leading Russia at that time - were a "ferment of decomposition" according to Hitler's words). If that had happened, Germany and other big Powers would have seized parts of the dislocated Soviet cake. But that doesn't mean that Hitler wanted a war for "Lebensraum" with the mighty Soviet Union 17 years after writing Mein Kampf.



*
« The fact is that the only real offer of security which Poland received in 1938 and 1939 emanated from Hitler. He offered to guarantee the boundaries laid down in the Versailles Treaty against every other country. Even the Weimar Republic had not for a moment taken this into consideration. Whatever one may think of Hitler’s government or foreign policy, no doubt exists on this point; his proposals to Poland in 1938/39 were reasonable and just and the most moderate of all which he made during the six years of his efforts to revise the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means. » – Professor Harry Elmer Barnes, prominent American historian.

« Poland’s decision of August 30, 1939 that was the basis for general mobilization marked a turning point in the history of Europe. It forced Hitler to wage war at a time when he hoped to gain further unbloody victories. » – Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Polish General and Government-in-Exile’s commander-in-chief, August 31, 1943.

"Of all the Germans, Believe it or not, Hitler is the most moderate as far as Danzig and the Corridor are concerned." - Sir, Neville Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, 16th August, 1939.

« The last thing Hitler wanted was to produce another great war. His people, and particularly his generals, were profoundly fearful of any such risk — the experiences of World War One had scarred their minds. » – Sir. Basil Liddell Hart, The History of the Second World War.

« The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all. » – Professor AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 267.

« Even in 1939 the German army was not equipped for a prolonged war; and in 1940 the German land forces were inferior to the French in everything except leadership. » – Professor AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 104-5.
"The aim of our efforts is to organize a systematic massive Jewish evacuation from all the countries in which they live. – Zionist leader & Holohoax propagandist [through the Bergson Group's campaigns in America] Ze'ev Jabotinsky, 1936
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Scotsman » Fri Jun 07, 2013 10:59 pm

hermod wrote:
Scotsman wrote:One thing that caused me not to go one way or the other was Generaplan Ost, which I thought had documentation behind it. After searching this forum and elsewhere, I see it is another 'all documentation was destroyed' possible/probable fake. But there was the concept of Lebensraum, which does appear in Nazi literature.


Would there have been so many Slavs fighting on the Reich's side if the Nazis had really been perpetrating a genocide of 30 million Slavs at that time? Wouldn't Hitler have stopped his repatriation operation of all ethnic Germans living outside the Reich's borders (the "Heim Ins Reich" -Home in the Reich- operation) if he had been planning to populate those areas with Germans after victory?


Hold on, I wasn't saying I believed it, I merely put those forward as devil's advocate. Since I am largely in agreement with the revisionist position (though I have read less about Chelmno and some of the other camps), I was inclined to disbelieve Ost anyway because part of the Holocaust myth in included in the so called plan ("extermination of XX% of the Slavic nations"). But I was hoping there might have been a refutation of it in detail, but there doesn't seem to be.

The way I look at it is this; if Germany was able to pull off a victory, there would have to be a long cooling off period diplomatically to normalize international relations. It is not believable that they would have just start killing half the population of a country in the midst of a thaw.
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Hannover » Thu Jun 13, 2013 7:37 pm

Scotsman:
... I was inclined to disbelieve Ost anyway because part of the Holocaust myth in included in the so called plan ("extermination of XX% of the Slavic nations"). But I was hoping there might have been a refutation of it in detail, but there doesn't seem to be

How can there be a refutation in detail when there is no thorough, detailed proof given for the vague claims made about 'Generalplan Ost' and the absurd claim that the Germans wanted to 'exterminate' the Slavs? It's all just superficial, marketed propaganda.

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If it can't happen as alleged, then it didn't.
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Hektor » Wed Jun 26, 2013 9:46 am

If you can read German, here is how a bunch of main-streamers debates the issue:
http://www.geschichtsforum.de/f68/der-g ... post678503
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Mkk » Sat Jan 18, 2014 7:15 am

This is a thesis exploring some of the various plans for the GPO:

http://web.archive.org/web/200407220151 ... anung.html

For those who cannot speak German, here is a summary:

The 1996 MA thesis by Karsten Schulz "Nationalsozialistische Nachkriegskonzeptionen für die eroberten Gebiete Osteuropas vom Januar 1940 bis zum Januar 1943", presented at the Berlin Technical University Institute for Political Science, contains a detailed exposition of the various versions of the Generalplan Ost, as well as of other, competing plans for German rule over the conquered Soviet territories put forward by Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the German Labour Front, and some individuals.

It appears that there were six versions of the Generalplan Ost, which need to be carefully distinguished from each other in terms of what they actually propose. Four of them were prepared by the planning staff of the Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKF), headed by Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling. and two by the RSHA, specifically by Standartenführer Ehlich, head of Gruppe III B Volkstum of Abteilung III Sicherheitsdienst-Inland.

The six variants were:

1. The Generalplan of the RKF, dating from about January 1940. This is preserved in a document bearing the title "Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete", and deals only with the planned germanisation of the annexed western Polish territories (Danzig-Westpreußen, Wartheland, Zichenau, Suwalki, Ost-Oberschlesien).

2. Generalplan Ost of the RKF, dated 15 July 1941. The plan itself has not been found, and is known only from a covering minute from Meyer-Hetling to Himmler with the above date. Judging from material contained in the unpublished autobiography of Professor Meyer-Hetling, in addition to the annexed territories included in the Generalplan, it proposed German settlement in the east of the Generalgouvernement, thereby encircling the ethnic Polish population. The estimated settler requirement is 4.55 million persons over 30 years.

3. Generalplan Ost of the RSHA, dated toward the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. The plan itself has never been found, but its main points can be reconstructed from the detailed (and highly critical) commentary on it by Dr Erhard Wetzel of Rosenberg's Ostministerium, dated 27 April 1942.

This is the plan that is usually meant when the Generplan Ost is referred to in secondary literature. It is the plan that, judging from Wetzel's comments, proposed the resettlement in West Siberia of 31 million (including 5-6 million Jews) of the estimated 45 million non-German inhabitants of the specific areas designated for German settlement, over a period of 30 years. The plan calls for the settlement of 10 million Germans on the territory, consisting of Danzig- Westpreußen, Wartheland, Oberschlesien, Generalgouvernement, South Ostpreußen, Bialystok, the Baltic States, Ingermanland, Weißruthenien and some areas in Ukraine.

Wetzel is highly critical of the RSHA plan and clearly considers it infeasible, although he supports the concept of germanisation of territory and the deportation of population groups considered hostile to Germany. He proposes alternative actions, which are most probably to be regarded as representing the views of Rosenberg. There is no indication that this plan was ever given official approval in full by either Himmler or Hitler.

4. The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA. The existence of this plan can only be inferred indirectly; it is referred to in a letter of 12 June 1942 from Himmler to Ulrich Greifelt, head of the RKF. It also seems that certain of the comments made by Wetzel in April 1942 refer to this extended plan rather than the original RSHA plan.

The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA extended the area of proposed German settlement to the line Lake Ladoga - Valdai Heights - Briansk, and added as settlement areas Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilsk and parts of Vynnytsia.

5. The later Generalplan Ost of the RKF. This is known from a document of 71 pages dated 28 May 1942. In addition to the germanisation of the Polish territories annexed to the Reich, it proposes the establishment of three "borderlands" (Marken), Ingermanland, Narew-West Lithuania, and Gotengau (Crimea and Kherson province), and of 36 settlement bases, 14 in the GG, 14 in Ostland, and 8 in Ukraine. The period for the proposed resettlement is 25 years. The plan also gives a detailed estimate of the costs of the proposed ethnic German settlement, totals of 45.7 billion RM for the annexed Polish territories and 20.9 billion for the borderlands and bases, the greater part of which is to be raised by borrowing in the private capital market.

Nowhere does this plan talk of deporting any part of the existing non-German population to Siberia. Rather, it proposes the resettling of the population of land required for German settlement on alternative kolkhozes and sovkhozes within the area under German rule; the rationale for that mild treatment is stated to be the need to retain the cooperation of the native population. The previous method of "evacuation" is explicitly rejected. The desired level of germanisation will be reached when 50% of the population of the borderlands is ethnically German, and 25-30% of the population of the bases. The process of germanisation is estimated to take 25 to 30 years.

6. The "Generalsiedlungsplan" (global settlement plan) of the RKF. This is known from a preliminary draft dated 23 December 1942, written by Greifelt. There appears never to have been a final draft.

The plan defines a "Volksraum" with seven settlement areas: Luxemburg, Lorraine, Alsace, Upper Carinthia, Lower Styria, Bohemia-Moravia and the Incorporated Eastern Territories annexed from Poland. To that is added an "Ostsiedlungsraum" divided into six future Gaus, Litzmannstadt, Krakau, Lemberg, Lublin, Warschau und Bialystock. The Baltic area is increased through the addition of Pleskau (Pskov) and Ingermanland (the latter atributed to Estonia), but is not considered part of the "Ostsiedlungsraum", for unknown reasons.

The plan proposes a future population of around 23.1 million persons in the settlement areas of the Volksraum and in the Ostsiedlungsraum, consisting of an existing ethnic German population of 5.3 million, a residual germanised native population of 5.4 million, and 12.4 million German immigrants. As the existing population is 36.3 million, of which 5.6 million are already German(Reich citizens, ethnic Germans, settlers) and 5.4 million are germanisable natives, the plan implies the deportation of around 25 million persons, although such a deportation is not explicitly mentioned.

The same applies to the Baltic area. Of a population of 7.2 million, of which hardly any are considered German, 2.1 million are considered germanisable; the remaining 5.1 million disappear. 3.1 million German settlers are required to bring the total population back up to 5.2 million.

Thus, the deportation of a total of around 30 million non-Germans out of the settlement areas of the Volksraum, the Ostsiedlungsraum and the Baltic area is implied in the plan.

On 12 January 1943, Himmler demanded the inclusion of the Baltic area, the Crimea and Tauria in the "Ostsiedlungsraum". However, the events surrounding the fall of Stalingrad put all further planning activity on hold.

With regard to the question of whether any of the above plans could have been implemented in reality if Germany had retained control of the conquered territories, the thesis has this to say:

Die Generalplanungen basieren auf erobertem Raum im Osten, setzen also einen gewonnenen Krieg oder wenigstens mit vermindertem militärischem Aufwand haltbare Gebietsgewinne voraus. Das war, vom Generalplan des Jahres 1940 abgesehen, nicht der Fall. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß die Planungen Utopien bleiben mußten. Ob sie tatsächlich realitätsferne Hirngespinste geblieben wären, wie Heiber meint #49, oder ob nach Wasser "zwingend angenommen werden [kann], daß für den Fall, daß das nationalsozialistische Deutschland siegreich geblieben wäre, die SS Heinrich Himmlers auch den 'GPO' - so utopisch er auch heute scheinen mag - in vollem Umfang realisiert hätte" #50, ist in solcher Absolutheit nicht zu entscheiden. Es ist eher zu vermuten, daß mit Veränderungen der Gesamtlage entsprechend weitere Modifikationen gefolgt wären.

My translation:

The global planning was based on conquered territory in the East, therefore they assume a victorious war or at least territorial gains able to be held with a reduced military expenditure. That was not the case, apart from the global plan of 1940. Thus, it is no wonder that the plans had to remain utopian. Whether they indeed would have remained pipedreams divorced from reality, as Heiber believes, or whether according to Wasser "it [can] be conclusively assumed that, in the case where National Socialist Germany had remained victorious, Heinrich Himmler's SS would have implemented the "GPO" also in its full extent - no matter how utopian it may appear today", canot be decided with absolute certainty. Rather it is to be supposed that, corresponding with changes in the total situaiton, further modifications would have occurred.


The Heiber referred to is Helmut Heiber, author of "Der Generalplan Ost", in: Vierteljahreshefte Für Zeitgeschichte, 6, 1958, pp. 281ff. Heiber was a very respected German historian connected to the prestigious Institut für Zeitgeschichte in MUnich; he died a couple of years ago.

If such an experienced historian as Heiber judges that the variants of the Generalplanost were all "realitätsferne Hirngespinste" (pipedreams divorced from reality) then his opinion should be given some weight, and not simply dismissed by some jumped up petty dictator on the Forum staff.


With regard to the question of whether any of the variants of the plan were officially approved and put into practice, the thesis concludes:
Es muß zur Kenntnis genommen werden, daß es keine endgültige, von Himmler akzeptierte Version gab, die eine Realisierung bereits hätte legitimieren können. Bis zum äußerst unwahrscheinlichen Beweis des Gegenteils durch einen entsprechenden Quellenfund muß also davon ausgegangen werden, daß die GPO die Planungsphase nie überschritten haben.

Ausgeblendet wird bei der Diskussion um Realisierbarkeit oder bereits erfolgte Teilumsetzungen weiterhin, daß Himmler "diesen Generalplan zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt auch dem Führer übergeben" #23 wollte, das heißt, dessen Zustimmung bedurfte oder wenigstens darauf Wert legte.

Gegenwärtig wird die Bedeutung der Generalpläne eher überschätzt.

My translation:

It must be borne in mind that there was no definitive version accepted by Himmler which could have legitimated an implementation. So we must proceed from the position that, failing the extremely unlikely proving of the opposite by means of an appropriate discovery of a source, the variants of the GPO never went beyond the planning stage.

The discussion about practicability or partial implementations that had already occurred continues to mask the fact that Himmler wanted "to hand this global plan over to the Führer at some point in time", ie he needed the latter's agreement or at least saw it as important.

These days the tendency is to overestimate the importance of the global plans.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=90383

So there were a number of different plans but none of them ever went outside the planning stages and should not be presented as a definite NS plan/intention.
"Truth is hate for those who hate the truth"- Auchwitz lies, p.13
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Re: Generalplan Ost in Revisionism

Postby Mkk » Sat Jan 18, 2014 7:15 am

This is a thesis exploring some of the various plans for the GPO:

http://web.archive.org/web/200407220151 ... anung.html

For those who cannot speak German, here is a summary:

The 1996 MA thesis by Karsten Schulz "Nationalsozialistische Nachkriegskonzeptionen für die eroberten Gebiete Osteuropas vom Januar 1940 bis zum Januar 1943", presented at the Berlin Technical University Institute for Political Science, contains a detailed exposition of the various versions of the Generalplan Ost, as well as of other, competing plans for German rule over the conquered Soviet territories put forward by Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the German Labour Front, and some individuals.

It appears that there were six versions of the Generalplan Ost, which need to be carefully distinguished from each other in terms of what they actually propose. Four of them were prepared by the planning staff of the Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (RKF), headed by Professor Konrad Meyer-Hetling. and two by the RSHA, specifically by Standartenführer Ehlich, head of Gruppe III B Volkstum of Abteilung III Sicherheitsdienst-Inland.

The six variants were:

1. The Generalplan of the RKF, dating from about January 1940. This is preserved in a document bearing the title "Planungsgrundlagen für den Aufbau der Ostgebiete", and deals only with the planned germanisation of the annexed western Polish territories (Danzig-Westpreußen, Wartheland, Zichenau, Suwalki, Ost-Oberschlesien).

2. Generalplan Ost of the RKF, dated 15 July 1941. The plan itself has not been found, and is known only from a covering minute from Meyer-Hetling to Himmler with the above date. Judging from material contained in the unpublished autobiography of Professor Meyer-Hetling, in addition to the annexed territories included in the Generalplan, it proposed German settlement in the east of the Generalgouvernement, thereby encircling the ethnic Polish population. The estimated settler requirement is 4.55 million persons over 30 years.

3. Generalplan Ost of the RSHA, dated toward the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. The plan itself has never been found, but its main points can be reconstructed from the detailed (and highly critical) commentary on it by Dr Erhard Wetzel of Rosenberg's Ostministerium, dated 27 April 1942.

This is the plan that is usually meant when the Generplan Ost is referred to in secondary literature. It is the plan that, judging from Wetzel's comments, proposed the resettlement in West Siberia of 31 million (including 5-6 million Jews) of the estimated 45 million non-German inhabitants of the specific areas designated for German settlement, over a period of 30 years. The plan calls for the settlement of 10 million Germans on the territory, consisting of Danzig- Westpreußen, Wartheland, Oberschlesien, Generalgouvernement, South Ostpreußen, Bialystok, the Baltic States, Ingermanland, Weißruthenien and some areas in Ukraine.

Wetzel is highly critical of the RSHA plan and clearly considers it infeasible, although he supports the concept of germanisation of territory and the deportation of population groups considered hostile to Germany. He proposes alternative actions, which are most probably to be regarded as representing the views of Rosenberg. There is no indication that this plan was ever given official approval in full by either Himmler or Hitler.

4. The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA. The existence of this plan can only be inferred indirectly; it is referred to in a letter of 12 June 1942 from Himmler to Ulrich Greifelt, head of the RKF. It also seems that certain of the comments made by Wetzel in April 1942 refer to this extended plan rather than the original RSHA plan.

The Gesamtplan Ost of the RSHA extended the area of proposed German settlement to the line Lake Ladoga - Valdai Heights - Briansk, and added as settlement areas Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilsk and parts of Vynnytsia.

5. The later Generalplan Ost of the RKF. This is known from a document of 71 pages dated 28 May 1942. In addition to the germanisation of the Polish territories annexed to the Reich, it proposes the establishment of three "borderlands" (Marken), Ingermanland, Narew-West Lithuania, and Gotengau (Crimea and Kherson province), and of 36 settlement bases, 14 in the GG, 14 in Ostland, and 8 in Ukraine. The period for the proposed resettlement is 25 years. The plan also gives a detailed estimate of the costs of the proposed ethnic German settlement, totals of 45.7 billion RM for the annexed Polish territories and 20.9 billion for the borderlands and bases, the greater part of which is to be raised by borrowing in the private capital market.

Nowhere does this plan talk of deporting any part of the existing non-German population to Siberia. Rather, it proposes the resettling of the population of land required for German settlement on alternative kolkhozes and sovkhozes within the area under German rule; the rationale for that mild treatment is stated to be the need to retain the cooperation of the native population. The previous method of "evacuation" is explicitly rejected. The desired level of germanisation will be reached when 50% of the population of the borderlands is ethnically German, and 25-30% of the population of the bases. The process of germanisation is estimated to take 25 to 30 years.

6. The "Generalsiedlungsplan" (global settlement plan) of the RKF. This is known from a preliminary draft dated 23 December 1942, written by Greifelt. There appears never to have been a final draft.

The plan defines a "Volksraum" with seven settlement areas: Luxemburg, Lorraine, Alsace, Upper Carinthia, Lower Styria, Bohemia-Moravia and the Incorporated Eastern Territories annexed from Poland. To that is added an "Ostsiedlungsraum" divided into six future Gaus, Litzmannstadt, Krakau, Lemberg, Lublin, Warschau und Bialystock. The Baltic area is increased through the addition of Pleskau (Pskov) and Ingermanland (the latter atributed to Estonia), but is not considered part of the "Ostsiedlungsraum", for unknown reasons.

The plan proposes a future population of around 23.1 million persons in the settlement areas of the Volksraum and in the Ostsiedlungsraum, consisting of an existing ethnic German population of 5.3 million, a residual germanised native population of 5.4 million, and 12.4 million German immigrants. As the existing population is 36.3 million, of which 5.6 million are already German(Reich citizens, ethnic Germans, settlers) and 5.4 million are germanisable natives, the plan implies the deportation of around 25 million persons, although such a deportation is not explicitly mentioned.

The same applies to the Baltic area. Of a population of 7.2 million, of which hardly any are considered German, 2.1 million are considered germanisable; the remaining 5.1 million disappear. 3.1 million German settlers are required to bring the total population back up to 5.2 million.

Thus, the deportation of a total of around 30 million non-Germans out of the settlement areas of the Volksraum, the Ostsiedlungsraum and the Baltic area is implied in the plan.

On 12 January 1943, Himmler demanded the inclusion of the Baltic area, the Crimea and Tauria in the "Ostsiedlungsraum". However, the events surrounding the fall of Stalingrad put all further planning activity on hold.

With regard to the question of whether any of the above plans could have been implemented in reality if Germany had retained control of the conquered territories, the thesis has this to say:

Die Generalplanungen basieren auf erobertem Raum im Osten, setzen also einen gewonnenen Krieg oder wenigstens mit vermindertem militärischem Aufwand haltbare Gebietsgewinne voraus. Das war, vom Generalplan des Jahres 1940 abgesehen, nicht der Fall. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, daß die Planungen Utopien bleiben mußten. Ob sie tatsächlich realitätsferne Hirngespinste geblieben wären, wie Heiber meint #49, oder ob nach Wasser "zwingend angenommen werden [kann], daß für den Fall, daß das nationalsozialistische Deutschland siegreich geblieben wäre, die SS Heinrich Himmlers auch den 'GPO' - so utopisch er auch heute scheinen mag - in vollem Umfang realisiert hätte" #50, ist in solcher Absolutheit nicht zu entscheiden. Es ist eher zu vermuten, daß mit Veränderungen der Gesamtlage entsprechend weitere Modifikationen gefolgt wären.

My translation:

The global planning was based on conquered territory in the East, therefore they assume a victorious war or at least territorial gains able to be held with a reduced military expenditure. That was not the case, apart from the global plan of 1940. Thus, it is no wonder that the plans had to remain utopian. Whether they indeed would have remained pipedreams divorced from reality, as Heiber believes, or whether according to Wasser "it [can] be conclusively assumed that, in the case where National Socialist Germany had remained victorious, Heinrich Himmler's SS would have implemented the "GPO" also in its full extent - no matter how utopian it may appear today", canot be decided with absolute certainty. Rather it is to be supposed that, corresponding with changes in the total situaiton, further modifications would have occurred.


The Heiber referred to is Helmut Heiber, author of "Der Generalplan Ost", in: Vierteljahreshefte Für Zeitgeschichte, 6, 1958, pp. 281ff. Heiber was a very respected German historian connected to the prestigious Institut für Zeitgeschichte in MUnich; he died a couple of years ago.

If such an experienced historian as Heiber judges that the variants of the Generalplanost were all "realitätsferne Hirngespinste" (pipedreams divorced from reality) then his opinion should be given some weight, and not simply dismissed by some jumped up petty dictator on the Forum staff.


With regard to the question of whether any of the variants of the plan were officially approved and put into practice, the thesis concludes:
Es muß zur Kenntnis genommen werden, daß es keine endgültige, von Himmler akzeptierte Version gab, die eine Realisierung bereits hätte legitimieren können. Bis zum äußerst unwahrscheinlichen Beweis des Gegenteils durch einen entsprechenden Quellenfund muß also davon ausgegangen werden, daß die GPO die Planungsphase nie überschritten haben.

Ausgeblendet wird bei der Diskussion um Realisierbarkeit oder bereits erfolgte Teilumsetzungen weiterhin, daß Himmler "diesen Generalplan zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkt auch dem Führer übergeben" #23 wollte, das heißt, dessen Zustimmung bedurfte oder wenigstens darauf Wert legte.

Gegenwärtig wird die Bedeutung der Generalpläne eher überschätzt.

My translation:

It must be borne in mind that there was no definitive version accepted by Himmler which could have legitimated an implementation. So we must proceed from the position that, failing the extremely unlikely proving of the opposite by means of an appropriate discovery of a source, the variants of the GPO never went beyond the planning stage.

The discussion about practicability or partial implementations that had already occurred continues to mask the fact that Himmler wanted "to hand this global plan over to the Führer at some point in time", ie he needed the latter's agreement or at least saw it as important.

These days the tendency is to overestimate the importance of the global plans.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=6&t=90383

So there were a number of different plans but none of them ever went outside the planning stages and should not be presented as a definite NS plan/intention.
"Truth is hate for those who hate the truth"- Auchwitz lies, p.13
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