See Hektor's post here on Buchenwald:viewtopic.php?f=2&t=12524#p92762
Buchenwald—A Dumb Dumb Portrayal Of Evilhttps://codoh.com/library/document/1529/
The US Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) filmed the Dachau camp, showing pipes leading to a "gas chamber" which is now claimed to not have been real. This video was played during the David Cole & Bradley Smith appearance on the Donahue show. You can find both of these on YouTube.
Wikipedia has an article on the existence of a Psych Warfare Division during WWII:
Psychological Warfare Divisionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psycholog ... e_Division
Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Alfred Hitchcock's First Horror Moviehttps://codoh.com/library/document/3195/
Alfred Hitchcock was persuaded by Sidney Bernstein to leave Hollywood to assist on project "F3080." F3080 was the name given to a project to compile a documentary film on German atrocities. The project originated in February 1945 in the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force). Hitchcock was recorded expressing his primary concern that "we should try to prevent people thinking that any of this was faked."
F3080, the propaganda film !viewtopic.php?t=2479
Organization of the United States Propaganda Effort During World War II
By Frank Prosser & SGM Herbert A. Friedman (Ret.) https://archive.is/mySbA
Allied military propaganda in the European theatre:
Beginning in October 1942, as the joint North African Operation Torch was about to begin, General Dwight Eisenhower, at the time one of the few military leaders sympathetic to psychological warfare, became concerned with the problems of coordinating the activities of the U.S. OWI and OSS, the British Political Warfare Executive and Ministry of Information, and the British and American Army and Navy intelligence services. Eisenhower established the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of the Allied Forces Headquarters (PWB/AFHQ) as a joint U.S. and British operation in the North African theatre. This set a precedent for other Allied joint ventures. Colonel Charles B. Hazeltine organized PWB in three sections: combat propaganda units attached to front-line forces, occupation units that worked in newly captured territory, and base units that coordinated propaganda efforts of the Allied Forces Headquarters with those of London and Washington. Following the North African operation, PWB coordination of propaganda was extended to the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy and other actions in the Mediterranean theatre.
PWB was a model for the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD or PWD/SHAEF), established in 1943 by Eisenhower at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in London during the preparations for the cross-Channel invasion of mainland Europe in June 1944. PWD had an important role in the production and dissemination of white propaganda in the northwestern European theatre until the end of the war. In northwestern Europe, PWD incorporated the activities of PWB (with PWB units attached to each of the armies). Elsewhere, PWB continued its operations under a less complex structure. Both PWB and PWD reported to American generals.
The Psychological Warfare Division, the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare, and the Psywar School at Fort Riley, 1950-1951
by Jared M. Tracy, PhD https://archive.is/9i2re
In October 1950, the Army Navy Air Force Journal reported that “while plans for psychological warfare in a future emergency have been in progress for the past five years . . . they were undoubtedly speeded up because of the Korean crisis.”1 However, the claim of progress in planning for psychological warfare after World War II was a gross exaggeration. As a capability, psychological warfare (Psywar) was nearly non-existent after WWII. Only the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) had any real capability in the radio broadcasting arena. Brigadier General (BG) Robert A. McClure, the Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) during WWII, had advocated for Psywar with an aggressive letter-writing campaign since 1946, but saw little result for his efforts...
BG McClure’s WWII experience as head of censorship, publicity, and psychological warfare, and his postwar experience as chief of information control and re-education in Germany, made him the obvious candidate to rebuild the U.S. Army’s Psywar capability...
Initially, BG McClure had few resources to accomplish these critical tasks other than the lessons of WWII. For organization, troop strength, and equipment for Psywar units, he referenced T/O&E 30-47, dated 15 December 1943 and amended on 22 June 1944. These documents established the template for the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC) and provided for twenty officers and one hundred-forty enlisted soldiers (including linguists, radio operators and engineers, printers, loudspeaker announcers, and others), twenty-four trucks ranging in size from quarter-ton to two and a half-tons, two Davidson Duplicator Presses, SCR-696 and SCR-698 Radio Sets, four AN/UIQ-1 Public Address Sets, and other mission-essential equipment.3 This T/O&E provided Psywar planners the starting point from which to man and equip new units...
Although the Army had inactivated all of its Psywar units after WWII, the U.S. Army Reserve had demonstrated better foresight.