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To: "rupert " <[email protected]>
Subject: RE: Stalin's Secret War
Date: Mon, 6 Oct 2003 18:59:27 +0100
Thank you for your interesting communication. As you will have seen from my book, my belief then was that the evidence indicates that Stalin had no intention of attacking Germany in 1939-41. On the contrary. Of course since then the Soviet archives have been opened, which greatly improves our knowledge. I have followed developments with interest, though confessedly not exhaustively, and I have yet to see anything which would lead me to modify me view.
However I endorse entirelyyour overall assessment of Stalin's guilt, as also Western double standards over Communist crimes.
From: rupert - [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 05 October 2003 00:50
To: [email protected]
Subject: Stalin's Secret War
Dear Mr Tolstoy
I've been reading your 1981 book, Stalin's Secret War. I thought you may be interested in a paper written by the demographer Walter N. Sanning, author of The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry (1983), published by the Holocaust-Revisionist Institute of Historical Review. The paper is called 'Soviet Scorched-Earth Warfare: Facts and Consequences' (1986), and is to be found at:
Sanning sketches out the thesis that, as per Nazi claims, the USSR was preparing to invade Western Europe before Hitler's attack in June 1941. Before and during the war, the USSR had deported 25 to 30 million Soviet citizens (including 5 million from the Ukraine) to factories and labour camps in the Urals and Siberia, where they were set to work producing materiel for the Soviet war effort. Millions died there - of disease, hunger, cold and overwork - or en route. Sanning estimates that around 10 to 15 million people died in the first few years. This explains the enormous Soviet civilian death toll. (He puts the death toll of Soviet servicemen at 13 million, civilians at 19 million).
As well as this, the USSR adopted a scorched-earth policy in the Occupied Eastern Territories, which destroyed everything of economic, military and even cultural value.
Vital railway links which could have brought food to the region were destroyed. The destruction in the Ukraine was so catastrophic that it induced a famine - which was Stalin's intention. But contrary to Soviet propaganda, the occupying German army plowed an enormous amount of aid into the region, sacrificing a staggering 1% of German Gross National Product.
Stalin had mobilised for his intended strike on Europe a massive army of 5 million (already starving) soldiers, of whom 2-3 million were captured by the Germans, mostly in the Ukraine. Because of German unpreparedness for the war, the famine in the Occupied Eastern Territories, and the destruction caused by the retreating Red Army, the Germans were unable to feed their prisoners - most of whom starved to death.
Not much attention is paid in the West to allegations of German atrocities in the Eastern Territories these days. But in my own experience, Russians still very much believe in the old Stalinist party line on the war: that Germany attacked a peace-loving USSR simply out of a desire for territorial aggrandisement, and starved to death millions of Ukrainians and prisoners of war out of a demonic hatred for the Slavs. Hopefully, the dissemination of revisionism like Sanning's will do more to reconcile Russians and Germans.
On May 5, Stalin delivered two secret speeches at a Kremlin
banquet to a thousand officers graduating from Moscow’s staff colleges.
Among the officials who passed through the Kremlin’s Trinity Gate that
evening were Molotov, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, Kalinin, and Lavrenti Beria;
there were also two generals and one major who later fell into German
hands and independently described the speeches to German interrogators
with a high degree of unanimity.*
Had Schulenburg – who heard merely that Stalin had delivered a fortyminute
speech – been there, perhaps even his optimism about the Soviet
Union’s designs would have been dispelled. Stalin launched into a sober
account of the need to prepare for war with Germany:
'New tank models, the Mark I and III, are on their way; these are excellent
tanks, whose armour can withstand 76-millimetre shells. In the near
future there will also be a new tank graced with my own name. . . Our
war plan is ready, we have built the airﬁelds and landing grounds, and the
front-line aircraft are already there. Everything has been done by way of
clearing out the rear areas: all the foreign elements have been removed.
It follows that over the next two months we can begin the ﬁght with
Germany. . . We have to take our revenge for Bulgaria and Finland.
The partisan movement painstakingly built up throughout Europe, Stalin
continued, would assume a vast scale and would paralyse the German
army’s supplies. By the end of the ﬁrst year Germany would have exhausted
her limited stockpiles of scarce raw materials. ‘Germany may be able to
build aircraft and tanks, but she will lack the warriors themselves.’ Stalin
emphasised: ‘There is no such thing as an invincible army, whatever the
country of its allegiance.’*
A lavish banquet followed, with drinking far into the night. One of the
generals, the director of the famous Frunze military academy, was toasting
Stalin’s genius for ‘preserving the peace’ of Europe when Stalin irritably
waved for him to stop, tottered to his feet, and delivered a second speech of
'During the years of the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union we
were able to make good use of the [‘peaceloving’] slogan while we expanded
the Soviet Union’s frontiers to the north and west.
But now we must discard this slogan for the reactionary and narrowminded
slogan that it is, as it will not serve to win us one more square
inch of territory. It is time to stop chewing that particular cud, Comrade
Chosin: stop being a simpleton! The era of forcible expansion has begun
for the Soviet Union.'
Raising his glass, Stalin announced a new and different toast: ‘Long live
the active policy of aggression of the Soviet nation!’*
* These speeches by Stalin are mentioned in the Russian-language memoirs of Marshal
Zhukov but not in the English and German editions. Ullstein, publisher of the German
edition of Hitler’s War, deleted every reference to these speeches. The speeches’ contents
have since been conﬁrmed by historians working in the former Soviet archives.
Stalins Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy 1939-1941 (Soviet grand strategy 1939-1941)
Author : ALBERT WEEKS
Format : Paperback
ISBN : 0742521923
Publisher : Rowman & Littlefield
Publication Date (AUS) : July 2003
Pages : 216
Imprint : Rowman and Littlefield
Usually ships within 24 hours
Web Price AUD$48.95
On June 22, 1941, just less than two years after signing the Nazi-Soviet Agreements, Adolf Hitler's German army invaded the Soviet Union. The attack hardly came as a surprise to Josef Stalin; in fact, history has long held that Stalin spent the two intervening years building up his defences against a Nazi attack. With the gradual declassifying of former Soviet documents, though, historians are learning more and more about Stalin's grand plan during the years 1939-1941.Longtime Soviet expert Albert L. Weeks has studied the newly released information and come to a different conclusion about the Soviet Union's pre-war buildup: that it was not a precaution against German invasion at all. In fact, Weeks argues, the evidence now suggests Soviet mobilisation was aimed at an eventual invasion of Nazi Germany. The Soviets were quietly biding their time between 1939 and 1941, allowing the capitalist powers to destroy one another, all the while preparing for their own Westward march. Stalin, Weeks shows, wasn't waiting for a Nazi attack; Hitler simply beat him to the punch.
Table of Contents
Soviet expansionist ideology - propaganda or blueprint?
Pre-war diplomacy and the Comintern
The Soviets' pro-German posture
Nazi-Soviet Agreements (1939-40)
Stalin prepares for what kind of war
Stalin's response to "Barbarossa"
Stalin's response to "Barbarossa" part II
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Turpitz wrote:* These speeches by Stalin are mentioned in the Russian-language memoirs of Marshal Zhukov but not in the English and German editions. Ullstein, publisher of the German edition of Hitler’s War, deleted every reference to these speeches. The speeches’ contents have since been conﬁrmed by historians working in the former Soviet archives.
This last statement by Mr. Irving is open to dispute. The versions of the speeches which have come to light in recent years are more ambiguous than he allows.
"Permit me to make a correction. A peace policy keeps our nation at peace. A peace policy is a good thing. At one time or another we have followed a line based on defense. Up to now we have not re-equipped our army nor supplied it with modern weapons.
"But now that our army is undergoing reconstruction and we have become strong, it is necessary to shift from defense to offense.
"In providing the defense of our country, we must act in an offensist [nastupatel' nym] way. Our military policy must change from defense to waging offensive actions. We must endow our indoctrination, our propaganda and agitation, and our press with an offensist spirit. The Red Army is a modern army - a modern army that is an offensist army [nastupatel'naya armiya]."
NOTE: This is from A. N. Yakovlev, ed., 1941 god. Dokumenty (Moscow: Mezhdunarodmw Fond "Demokratiya," 1998).
Taken in conjunction with the text of Mr. Stalin's main speech that day, as reproduced in the published diaries of Mr. Dimitrov, we see no particular evidence for the proposition that a decision for an impending attack on Germany had been taken.
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