Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"
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Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"
COMPLETE HITLER SPEECH 26 SEPTEMBER 1938 ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SPORTPALAST, BERLIN
http://archive.is/NFajW or http://web.archive.org/web/201602121846 ... lessed.htm
He also links the original German text there.
The fact is that on 26 September 1938, days before the "Munich Agreement" Adolf Hitler said that Sudetenland was his "final territorial demand in Europe." This speech was broadcast to dozens of countries and thousands of people, it was no secret. This is often cited by warmongers that Hitler was "untrustworthy."
That is the word they use: "Untrustworthy" -- and, therefore, it was morally justified for Britain and France to declare war on Germany. But it is common sense that politicians are, for the most part, paid actors, liars, and showman. Lying is part of their job description. They are not "trustworthy" in the sense that every word they say they believe is true -- neither Churchill, Stalin, nor FDR could be called "trustworthy" at all by that standard for example. One could instead argue that Hitler could be trusted to do what he thought was good for Germany first, and Europe second.
Anyway, the typical argument goes: Hitler's 26 September 1938 "Final territorial demand in Europe" statement was a lie because of what happened in March 1939 in Czechoslovakia and/or September 1939 in Poland. I will add recommended links on these subjects below.
Other less common arguments brought up include:
- 20 March 1939 - Joachim von Ribbentrop delivered an oral ultimatum to Lithuania, demanding it cede Memel to Germany
- 21 March 1939 - Hitler demanded the return of Danzig to Germany
How would one respond to this claim?
Why did Germany annex all of Czechoslovakia? / Anschluss of the Sudeten Regions
'Why Germany Invaded Poland', by John Wear / 'peaceful Poland' debunked
The Munich Agreement / correct and fair
Roosevelt's Road To War
Aggressive Soviets violated numerous treaties with neighboring countries
Re: Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"
and, on page 9 of the above link I was referenced:1.) After the Anschluss and Sudetenland, the Germans living in Memel got upheated and demanded themselves to return to the Reich. It was situation which developed itself.
2.) Danzig wasn't under polish rule it was a free city and the negotiations started in 1938. I think it was after the Sudetencrisis
Recommended Thread: https://rodoh.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=3498
Hitler said that the Sudetenland was his last territorial demand, he proved himself to be a liar a few months later.
You seem to cling on to a statement by Hitler in a speech in Berlin on 26 September 1938 where he declared that the Sudetenland was "the last territorial demand I have to make in Europe".
1. Nowhere in the actual Munich Agreement document does it actually say that the Sudetenland would be the last German acquisition.
2. You have to at look the historical context, because Hitler thought there wouldn't have to be anymore demanding. After peace was maintained over Czechoslovakia the Germans looked to Poland and were NEGOTIATING over Danzig, not DEMANDING. Hitler thought the Poles would accept Germany's reasonable offer and he wouldn't have to demand anything.
3. The reasoning for Germany's march into Czechoslovakia was to shut down Soviet influence and seize Soviet armaments according to Goring. Also, according to Goring is that president Hacha HIMSELF called for a meeting with German leadership on how to deal with the aftermath of what remained of the Czechoslovak state.
Re: Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"
It's really an unimportant speech that does little to actually make Hitler into a "liar".
The fact of the matter is that Hitler really made no demands, and Poland/Danzig was an underlying issue that was gauged in 1934 when the German-Polish Agreement was signed, I do not think that's in dispute, and there were no German demands, only terms. And if terms specifying INTERESTS are somehow demands then everyone is guilty of making "demands".
The quote doesn't consider the immediate follow-up context of the period.
In my article noting issues about Czechoslovakia http://redpillaction.subvert.pw/?p=416 I expanded on a case already made here on CODOH:
Did Hitler Invalidate the Munich Agreement? Perhaps not.
Hitler is accused of breaking his word after the Sudetenland was returned to Germany. Hitler had promised Chamberlain that when this problem is solved, Germany has no further territorial claims in Europe. In his speech of September 26, 1938 he stated that he also told Chamberlain that as soon as the Czechs settle their differences with the rest of their minorities peacefully, that he is no longer interested in this Czechoslovakia. He concluded: “We do not even want any Czechs”I have little more to add. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for his efforts. I have assured him that the German Volk desires nothing but peace. Yet, I have also told him that I cannot retreat behind the lines drawn by our patience. I have assured him further that, and this I repeat here before you, once this issue has been resolved, there will no longer be any further territorial problems for Germany in Europe!
I have assured him further that I will take no more interest in the Czechoslovakian state once that country has resolved its internal problems, that is once the Czechs have dealt with the other minorities there in a peaceful manner and not by means of oppression. And I will guarantee this for him! We do not want any Czechs at all.
– Adolf Hitler quoted in Domarus, The Complete Hitler, pp. 1192
The Czech government was not able to come to terms with their minorities, the Slovaks wanted out. We are told that Hitler encouraged them. This is not so. On March 13,1939, the British foreign office official Roberts submitted an ‘Assessment on the Slovakian crisis and the implications for the British government’ (I translated this from German text). He wrote about the unsatisfactory situation in Slovakia (The Czechs were terrorizing them) but stated that he has found no evidence that Germany was involved, quite to the contrary. The British Foreign Office Memo stated:Both the official Czech broadcast and [Czecho-Slovakia’s Foreign Minister] Dr. Chvalkowsky maintained that there was no evidence that such propaganda had been inspired from the Reich or by the German minority in Czecho-Slovakia…
Udo Walendy, Who Started the Second World War? (Castle Hill Publishers, 2014), Pp. 127
As the Crisis in Prague reached it’s boiling point, the British ambassador in Berlin, Henderson, irrespective of anyone else recommended to the Czech Envoy, Mastny, for the Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkowsky to come to Berlin. the resulting fact of all this is that “Hitler acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich”
On March 14, Slovakia declared its independence, Hitler had a meeting with Dr. Tiso, the Slovak President, prior to this (as mentioned, a long story). Following this – and by now it had become obvious that the Czechs would not be able to come to terms with their minorities, therefore Hitler did not break his word – President Hacha asked for a ‘personal meeting’ with Hitler, via his foreign minister Chvalkovský who had been in repeated contact with Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister.
The meeting took place on March 14. At the same time Chamberlin told Henderson to let the German government know that the British government would not interfere in matters other governments were directly involved in. Henderson immediately visited the German foreign office (Wilhelmstraße) to tell them about the English government’s disinterest re. the negotiations between Hitler and Hacha.
I expanded and added footnotes to this original short excerpt made by the user "neugierig" (see his post here: viewtopic.php?f=20&t=8342#p63205)
The key phrase in the September 26 speech is this:
And I further assured him that at the moment that Czechoslovakia has solved her other problems, that is, when the Czechs have reconciled themselves with their other minorities, the Czech State no longer interests me and that, if you please, I give him the guarantee: We do not want any Czechs.
But equally I want now to declare before the German people that as regards the Sudeten German problem, my patience is now exhausted.
Hitler was DONE with them until Slovakia came to Hitler for support, Hitler knew he had to take Czechia, after all it had a 1000 year German history (see Walendy, Castle Hill Edition) and there was nothing left for the Czech remnant besides becoming apart of Germany or used by the Soviets. Hitler simply did what he had to do.
Keep in mind that it was his "last territorial demand in europe" he'd wanted to solve the Danzig problem prior to this. And think about it, what "territorial demand" did Hitler make on Austria? None. He went into that country not expecting annexation, and the events leading up to the Anschluss were not precipitated by Hitler. So what other demand could Hitler be referring to? Danzig and the Polish Corridor. That's the only OTHER demand he ever made. Even the Munich agreement came about not by Hitler, but by the British and their pressure on the Czechs including the prodding of Mussolini.
The problem is that Hitler's victories are viewed on the basis of "demands" ex post facto, when the lead up to events doesn't show Hitler demanding anything whatsoever. It's a fiction of post-war histography that needed Hitler to be the prime pusher and puller, bring them to a head at the behest and bewilderment of the British who were just "giving Hitler what he wanted" even though everything Hitler wanted but didn't demand was totally justified and vindicated regardless if he HAD been the instigator.
Even without this undeniable moral foundation, would it be a lie? Again, Hitler had already sought out discussions over Poland I believe when he signed the pact with Pilsudski. It just simply isn't a lie. So what other demands did Hitler have? None that weren't already known, even if the Polish question wasn't brought up prior to 1939.
There's another quote from a Hitler speech in reply to the British outrage that he could "break" the Munich agreement. I just cannot remember for the life of me where; but Hitler basically says that the Czechs failed to secure their minorities and the entire position of that state had changed in it's geopolitical circumstances thereby abrogating the Munich agreement itself over time. This I find to be extremely accurate. Once Slovakia had seceded the Czechoslovak state preserved under the Munich agreement no longer existed. I don't even think that the Munich agreement accounted for these things anyway, did it actually put any pressure on Hitler? Kind of appeared to me to be a courteous understanding and not some kind of binding law.
The situation in Poland was different too. The German grievance over Danzig as anyone who isn't totally uninformed knows, wasn't a design on Poland, it was for the Free City and nothing else. I guess that's a technicality but still rather important and worthy of consideration.
The real argument against this stupid 26th September speech used by the orthodox narrative pushers, is the moral one.
WHO CARES that Hitler invaded Poland? Nobody can deny the moral veracity of his claims on Danzig. The Allies had their boiling point of when war would be acceptable and so did Hitler. It's out of balance to demand unreasonable expectations of Hitler, that he should somehow avoid war at any cost while the Allies get a freehand to declare war whenever they please because Hitler didn't (ironically) appease them.
Nah, I'm not buying that shit sandwich. That blind adherence to the status quo and the Allied actions as justified only work because the alternative is vindication of Hitler which isn't allowed under any circumstances.
If anyone of us had to return to 1939 without knowledge of the Holocaust story there would only be arguments over the same national interest power politics the world has seen time and time again. It's a coercion tactic that relies on the hindsight of the Holocaust to enforce the uncritical populace to accept that Hitler is wrong and bad because he is Hitler.
Hitler also said:
‘I’m not here to ensure peace in Europe; I’m here to make Germany great again. If that can be done peacefully, well and good. If not, we’ll have to do it differently.’
Source: David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002),Pp. 89
For anyone, in my view, to claim this is somehow unreasonable for Hitler then they're disingenuous in how they objectively view nations and the goals of those Nations. There's no reason why the goals of the British, French or Poles were MORE justified than Hitler's, in fact, objectively it's the other way around.
Also, what did Hitler "lie" about?
The Poles threatened war in March 1939 breaking their peace agreement with Hitler first mobilizing against Germany:
On 20 July 1939, the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły, stated in an official communiqué of the Polish telegraph agency:“Danzig is essential to Poland. Whoever controls Danzig controls our economic life…
An occupation of Danzig by Germany would remind us of the partitions of Poland. For this reason I ordered a mobilisation four months ago when the German Chancellor renewed his demands concerning Danzig and Pomorze [i.e. the Corridor]. Please believe me when I say that this mobilisation was no mere demonstration. We were ready for war then in case of necessity... even should she [Poland] have to fight alone and without allies.”
Udo Walendy, Who Started the Second World War? (Castle Hill Publishing, 2014), Pp. 187
And they did so AGAIN on August 30-31 1939 (as I showed here: viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12870&p=94674#p94674 ). Rhonhof also mentions this Polish breach in his book:
And from the site of C.W. Porter:
The Soviets blamed Katyn on the Germans in 1940 prior to Barbarossa thereby breaking the spirit of the peace agreement between them. I don't think anyone could disagree with that. This is true even if we accepted that Hitler attacked for no reason, and who the fuck cares? Nobody will get me to say "boo hoo the poor Soviets!".
And this excuse given in a speech is the last bit of evidence to "prove" Hitler's duplicity. Even if true (as it can only be taken alone) it's rather weak evidence wise being totally reliant on the ignorance of context and the rocky waves of European geopolitics at that time where the situation could change at any moment.
And did the Allies on lie? Their entire war was supposedly fought for Poland and against "totalitarianism" both aims they proved to be nothing more than excuses to attack Germany because as we all know, a free Poland never arose from the war, and the Allies were deeply ALLIED with the totalitarian Soviets allowing them to gobble up half of Europe. Thanks to the Germans we're lucky it was just that much. So much for the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union and the truth loving, peace loving western Allies.
Re: Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"
Hitler, however, felt cheated out of his war in spite of his ostensible triumph. He flouted the terms of the agreement and pursued the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
This link makes a variety of very obviously tenacious lies and half truths that read as more propaganda than reality. They manage, in their hysterical lyricism to lie as you might expect. In the same link they show their put on display their sophistry for all to see by providing the Munich agreement in full as it was signed on September 29th 1938:
The Munich Agreement, September 29, 1938
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:
(1) The evacuation will begin on October 1st.
(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by October 10th, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.
(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.
(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on October 1st. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order: the territory marked number I on the 1st and 2nd of October, the territory marked number II on the 2nd and 3rd of October, the territory marked number III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October, the territory marked number IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.
(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3) will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.
(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite.
(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.
(8) The Czechoslovak Government will, within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement, release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.
Source of English translation: “Agreement signed at Munich Between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy” (September 29, 1938). In United States Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy: From the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1957-1964. Series D (1937-1945), Germany and Czechoslovakia, Volume 2: 1937-1938. Document Number 675, pp. 1014-16. (English translation accredited to U.S. Department of State Division of Language Services)
Source of German text: “Abkommen zwischen Deutschland, dem Vereinigten Königreich, Frankreich und Italien, getroffen in München, am 29. September 1938.” In Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945. Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale, MCMLVI. Series D: 1937-1945. Volume II: Deutschland und die Tschechoslowakei (1937-1938). Document number 675, pp. 812-14.
I wonder, what terms did Hitler "flout" in this agreement? And where does the state of Czechoslovakia get guaranteed by anyone at any time anywhere in here? Hitler, we're told, "broke" the Munich agreement. But.....Unless I'm reading it wrong, there's nothing in here for Hitler to have broken. Therefore, what we're seeing, is a very transparent lie. A lie so conspicuous, it's nearly hard to believe that anyone could lie like this and get away with it for more than 85 years.
Of this agreement, and Hitler's September 26th 1938 speech (before the Munich agreement was agreed and signed by the way), C.W. Porter illuminates thoroughly:
CENSORED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS - ADOLF HITLER or: The Fine Art of Quoting Out of Context
Note that in this version, all reference to Hitler's territorial concessions, peace proposals, disarmament proposals -- his two years wasted at Geneva making peace offers to a world that was not interested -- are here deleted. Thus, having omitted all reference to everything that could establish the speaker's credibility, by the time the reader gets to his threats against the so-called state of "Czechoslovakia", the reader is no longer prepared to believe them! Oh, there's just Hitler making threats all over the place for no reason at all.
No nation ever guaranteed the continued and perpetual integrity of the Czechoslovakian state. The Munich accords were generally-worded agreements promising to solve future problems peacefully, a promise which was in fact actually kept by Hitler.
For example, as for Poland, Hitler never made any territorial demands on Poland: on the contrary, he offered to guarantee the 1919 borders with Poland. The Poles replied that this was ''insult to their honour and a threat to their independence''. Danzig was never a part of Poland, and was not part of Poland in 1939: it was a so-called ''free city'' under the nominal control of the League of Nations (see Letter 13).
His "broken promises" were the result of changing circumstances and broken promises or provocations by other people.
David L. Hoggan describes the manner in which the spirit of the so-called "Munich accords" was in fact violated, not by Hitler, but by Neville Chamberlain, within 2 days of his arrival home in England, a fact which embittered Hitler and the German people.
Under international law, any time a nation splits into 2 or more parts as a result of secession, all international treaties between those now-independent statelets and other nations must be re-negotiated. Thus, if the Confederacy had been permitted to secede from the USA, all treaties between the USA and France, England, Spain, Mexico and other nations would have ceased to apply. English diplomats would have had to negotiate one treaty between England and the USA, for example, and another between England and the Confederacy, and so on and so forth. This is obvious.
Thus, "Czechoslovakia" ceased to exist upon the secessation of the Slovaks and any international agreements with them or the Czechs would have ceased to apply, if they had ever existed.
All of these areas had been part of the Autro-Hungarian Empire for 900 years, and had fought in the Austro-Hungarian Armies. At Versailles, a few Czechs with American citizenship showed up and acted as if they had won the war, produced a few fake maps and claimed the right to dictate terms! Yet it was obvious that these states could only survive as trade partners of Germany and Austria!
As protectorates of Germany -- what bits were left, instead of having been returned to Poland, Hungary, the Ukraine and wherever else their citizens were stolen from -- the Czechs and Slovaks continued to use their own currencies, paid no import-export duties on their trade with Germany, never did German military service and were never bombed. They were also covered by the highly generous German social security system, which was highly popular. All in all, they did very well out of the situation.
The artificial Czech slave-state was set up solely to be able to bomb Germany in the event of war, and the Skoda armaments factory was one of the most important in the world. The Czechs were the only pro-Soviet nationality in Eastern Europe, with 25 airports built by the Soviets, an obvious threat to German security.
It is obvious that the situation, as it developed later, was inevitable. For further information see Not Guilty at Nuremberg. See also The War that Had Many Fathers by Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof. (It is interesting to note that at least 100,000 Ruthenians emigrated from Czechoslovakia to Canada, and inundated the Canadian and British Parliaments with exactly the same complaints that the Germans were making, at the same time, for about ten years. The Poles hated the Czechs so much that they cooperated with the Germans to regain the Polish territory of Teschen, which was honourably handed over to them by the Germans! See Schultze-Rhonhof's DVD in German,1939: Der Krieg, der viele Väter hatten.) Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed by David L. Hoggan (soon to be republished in English), and many similar works.
Hitler’s political career lasted 25 years, during which time he wrote two 500-page books and made at least 5,000 speeches (warning: the mendaciously-labelled "speech" of "39.08.22" on the site linked to here -- and even marked with an asterisk, as if it were the most important of the lot -- is a dishonest translation of a famous forgery, L-3, while the speech labelled "38.09.26" has been mendaciously "edited" to distort the meaning. Over half of the latter speech is missing, even though it is not even very long: about 45 minutes. The first half of the speech throws a different light on everything, including the war, and, in my view, vindicates Hitler almost entirely -- but they can't be bothered to quote it. OK. I'll translate it myself, transcribed off tape. And what's more, I'll provide the full German text). Hitler's speeches have been collected in two or even three different 4-volume sets of books; his sentence structure is long and complex (for another selection, click here or here). There are also thousands of issues of official National Socialist newspapers over a 20-year period. Yet the only quotations ever cited to prove Hitler's wickedness consist of 3 short paragraphs (or even single sentences) taken out of context from MEIN KAMPF (the “Big Lie”, “15,000 Jews held under poison gas”, “a maggot exposed to the light”), 2 short sentences taken out of context from the above-mentioned September 26th 1938 speech on Czechoslovakia (“My last territorial demand”, “We don’t want any Czechs”) and a single sentence taken out of context from a January 30th 1939 speech on Poland (“the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe”). All the rest are from proven forgeries (L-3, the Hossbach protocol, Hermann Rauschning) and a few notes from other people (“The victor in war will not be asked whether he told the truth”, from Ra-27), etc.. One must assume that all the other -- quite voluminous -- material is either exculpatory or innocuous, as indeed it appears to be. The term "Lebensraum" was used, as often as not, in relation to a demand for the return of German colonies, a demand put forward to be accepted or, most likely, dropped, as part of a peaceful political settlement with Great Britain.
Here is the full, unabridged English translation of the speech:
"BLESSED ARE THE PEACE-MAKERS": ADOLF HITLER" Full Speech of September 26, 1938
On 22 February, before the representatives of the Reichtstag, for the first time, I expressed a fundamental demand of an unalterable kind.
The entire nation listened to me at that time, and they understood!
One statesman did not share this understanding. He has been removed, and now my promise, that I made at that time, has been kept!
For the second time, I spoke before the Reichs Party Congress about this same demand.
And once again, the nation heard this demand.
Today, I appear before you once again and speak for the first time before the people itself, just as in the time of our great struggle, and you know what that means!
For the world, there should be no more doubt: now, it's no longer a Leader or a man, this time the entire German people is speaking!
If I am the speaker for this German people, then I know: in this second, the entire nation of millions of people agree with me, word for word. Affirm it and turn into an oath!
May the other statesmen examine whether that is also the case with them!
The question which concerns us most deeply in these last months and weeks is well known: It's not so much a question of Czechoslovakia, the problem is Mr. Benes!
This name unites everything that moves millions of people today, that makes them desperate or fills them with fanatical resolution.
But why could this question rise to such significance?
I want to repeat to you, my national comrades, very briefly once again the nature and aims of German foreign policy.
German foreign policy is, in contrast to the many other states ideologically established and conditioned. The ideology of this new Reich is built up upon the maintenance and ensuring the existence of our German people. We have no interest in oppressing other peoples; We want to be happy in our way, the others should be happy in their way! This attitude, required in practice by our ideology, results in a restriction of foreign policy.
Restrictions on German foreign policy
That means, our foreign policy objectives are not unlimited, they are not determined by accident, but are rather established in the resolution to serve everything in the German people, to maintain it in this world and to ensure its existence. What is the situation today? You know, that the slogan "self-determination of peoples" once filled the German people, as well as others, with a faith in supra-national assistance, and allowed it to relinquish the application of its own strength to the last.
You know that this trust from that time was betrayed in the most ignominious manner. The result was the Versailles Treaty! You all know the fearful results of this treaty! You can all remember how they stole our people's weapons and the way they mistreated this then defenceless people! You know the fearful fate which met us and which persecuted us for a decade and a half!
And you know: if Germany today is great, free and strong again, then it has only its own strength to thank for it! The outside contributed nothing to it. On the contrary, it attempted to blackmail us and oppress us, as long as it could, until finally the strength grew out of the German people itself, to put an end to this unworthy existence and once again to take the path worthy of a free and great nation.
We had hardly begun the restoration of German equality, when I suggested a series of agreements to the other countries, related, most of all, to disarmament, as the most visible symbol of the relinquishment of "Revanche".
Rejected peace proposals
My first proposal was: Germany demands equality, under all circumstances, but is prepared to relinquish all further means of defence and weapons, provided the other nations do the same, i.e., general disarmament, if necessary, right down to the last machine gun! This proposal was not even considered worth discussing.
I made a second proposal: Germany is ready to limit its army to 200,000 men, on the condition that the other States disarm to the same extent. That was rejected, too!
Although today we are now free and strong, we are not motivated by any hatred of other nations.
We don't bear a grudge; we know what happened; because we also know that the citizens of the other nations cannot be held responsible for it, rather, only a small unscrupulous clique of international profiteers and wheeler-dealers, who do not hesitate, if necessary, to allow entire nations to perish for their villainous interests.
We therefore nourish no hatred against the nations around us and have also proven it. The German love of peace is demonstrated by facts.
I made yet another proposal: Germany is prepared, provided the other nations agree, to relinquish all heavy weapons, so-called "attack" weapons: tanks, bombers, even, if necessary, all airplanes, as well as heavy and extra-heavy artillery. This, too, was rejected.
I went further, and now proposed an international agreement for all European countries for an army of 300,000 men. This proposal was rejected, too.
I made more proposals: the restriction of air fleets, the elimination of bombing; absolute prohibition of gas warfare, the protection of all areas not located in the line of battle, the elimination of at least of the heaviest artillery, the elimination of the heaviest tanks. This too was rejected. It was all in vain.
After making offer after offer to the world for two years, experiencing only rejection and repeated refused, I gave the order to upgrade our German armed forces to the strongest position which could possibly be achieved. And now I can admit it openly:
We have carried out an armaments program anyway, such as the world has never seen. I offered to remain defenceless, insofar as possible. But when they rejected that, I quit making half-way decisions. I am a National Socialist and an old German frontline soldier!
If they don't want a world without weapons, well, then, now, you, too, the German people, will possess weapons of their own!
In the last five years, I really rearmed. I spent billions on it, the German people ought to know that! I took care to ensure that a new army would be armed with the most modern weapons inexistence. I gave my friend Goring the order: build me an air force that will protect Germany against every conceivable attack.
We built up our armed forces into something which the German people can be proud of, and which the world will respect, if it ever makes its appearance.
We have created the best anti-aircraft defences, the best anti-tank defences, in the world. We worked on this day and night for the past five years.
It was impossible for me to reach an understanding regarding anything. I will speak of that a bit further on.
Despite all this, I continued to pursue the notion of armaments limitations and disarmament policy.
In actual fact, I implemented a practical peace policy in all these years. I approached all apparently insoluble problems with the iron determination to solve them peacefully, even at the risk of more or less serious German relinquishments.
I was a frontline soldier myself and I know how hard war is. I wanted to spare the German people all that. I therefore approached one problem after another with the firm intention of trying everything to enable a peaceful solution.
Relations with Poland
The most difficult problem that I met with was German-Polish relations. There was a danger that the notion of an "inherited enmity" might take hold our people as well as the Poles. I wanted to avoid this. I know exactly, that it wouldn't have been possible if Poland had had a democratic constitution at that time. The democracies, dripping with peace slogans, are the blood-thirstiest war mongers.
In Poland there wasn't any democracy, but, rather, one man [Pilsudsky]! With him, I succeeded in barely a year in reaching an agreement which absolutely eliminated the danger of a collision, for ten years, to start with.
We are all convinced that this agreement will bring about lasting satisfaction. We understand that we are two peoples, we must live side by side; neither one of them can eliminate the other. A state of 33 million people will always strive for an access to the sea. A path to an understanding had to be found here. It was found, and is being constantly built upon. The important thing is that both states all reasonable, thinking people, in both nations, are firmly determined further to improve their relationship.
That was a real act of peace, of more value than all the jabber-blabber in the League of Nations Palace in Geneva.
During this same time period, I attempted to bring about gradually good and durable relationships with other nations as well. We gave guarantees to the states in the West, and assured all our neighbours of the inviolability of their territory by Germany. That's not just talk. It is our holy resolution. We have no interest in violating the peace.
Our offers are also meeting with growing understanding. Gradually more and more people are freeing themselves from that blindness of Geneva, which, I would like to say, serves, not a policy of an obligation to ensure peace, but rather a policy of ensuring an obligation to go to war.
They are freeing themselves, and are beginning to see these problems in a sober way, they are ready for understanding and ready for peace.
Relations with England
I went further and offered my hand to England! I voluntarily waived all naval competition, to give the British a feeling of security. I didn't do that just because maybe I simply couldn't build any more ships -- let nobody fall victim to that delusion -- but solely for the purpose of ensuring a lasting peace between the two peoples. Of course, there is a prerequisite for all this:
It's not acceptable for one party to say: "I don't ever want to go to war again, and to show you I mean what I say, I voluntarily offer to limit my weapons to 35%" -- while the other party declares, "Well, I intend to go to war from time to time whenever I feel like it!" That's not right!
Such an agreement is only morally justifiable, when both peoples promise each other, hand in hand, that they never wish to go to war with each other, ever again. Germany has this determination. We all hope that those who gain the upper hand in England are of the same determination!
Relations with France
I went even further. Immediately after the return of the Saar district to Germany, which was decided by plebiscite, I declared that there would no further differences at all between us.
I said that the question of Alsace-Lorraine no longer exists for us. It is a border region. The people of that region have never really been asked for their opinion on this issue. We have the impression that the inhabitants of this province are happiest when nobody is fighting over them anymore.
We all want no war with France. We want nothing from France! Nothing at all! And when the Saar district was returned to Germany, thanks to the correct interpretation of the treaties with France -- I must confirm that here -- I gave my solemn assurance that all territorial differences between France and Germany have been eliminated.
Today I see no longer see any differences between us. We are two great peoples, who both want to live and work. And we'll live best when we work together!
Relations with Italy
After this unique and irrevocable waiver, I turned to another problem, which was easier to solve than the others, since here the same ideological basis formed the basic condition for an easier mutual understanding: the relationship between Germany and Italy. Certainly, the solution to this problem is only partly my doing, and partly the doing of that rare great man, whom the Italian people have the good luck to have as their leader.
This relationship has long since left sphere of a purely economic or political expediency and has become a true and strong league of hearts by means of treaties and alliances. An axis has been formed here, represented by two peoples, who have bound themselves together ideologically and politically in a definitive and indissoluble friendship.
Here as well, I have implemented a final and unique step -- in the consciousness of the responsibility for my national comrades. I rid the world of a problem; for us, this problem no longer exists. As bitter as this may be to some: above all else, there stands, in the end, the overall interest of our people.
The whole work for peace, comrades, is not just an empty phrase, but rather this work has been concretised through facts, which no big-mouthed lie addict can deny!
The two last problems
Two problems remained. Here I had to express a proviso.
Ten million Germans found themselves outside the borders of the Reich, in two large settlement areas: Germans, who want to return to their homeland! This number of ten million is not just a bagatelle. That's a quarter of the entire population of France. And if France never gave up its claim to the few million Frenchmen in Alsace-Lorraine for forty years, than we had the right -- before God and the World -- to continue to assert our claim to these ten million Germans.
My comrades! There is a limit beyond which concession-making must stop, because otherwise it would become merely a pernicious weakness.
I would have no right to stand before German history if I simply and indifferently surrendered these ten million Germans.
I have already taken enough sacrifices upon myself as a result of relinquishing German claims. Here was the limit beyond which I could go no further!
How correct that was, has been proven by the plebiscite in Austria. The result at that time was a glowing recognition, an acknowledgement, such as the others would certainly never have hoped for.
We alone have experienced it: For democracies, a plebiscite is superfluous or even harmful the moment it doesn't lead to the results the democracies were hoping for.
Despite all this, this problem was solved, to the happiness of the entire great German people.
And now the last problem confronts us: a problem which must be solved, and which will be solved! It is the last territorial demand which I intend to make in Europe, but it is the demand which I will not abandon and which will, God willing, be fulfilled!
The lie of the "Czechoslovakian nation"
On the history of this problem: In 1918, under the slogan of the "self-determination of peoples", Central Europe was torn to bits and shuffled around by a few insane so-called "statesmen": without regard to the origins of the peoples, their national desires or economic necessities, Central Europe was atomised and arbitrarily jig-saw puzzled together again in so-called "New States". Czechoslovakia owes its very existence to this procedure!
The Czech state began with one single lie: The father of this lie was named Benes. This Mr. Benes appeared in Versailles and assured everyone, first ,that there was a Czechoslovakian nation. He had to invent this lie to make the meagre numbers of his own countrymen look bigger and therefore more important, justifying their pretensions.
And the Anglo-Saxon statesmen -- who have never been particularly well-travelled in geographical and racial-national matters -- never thought it necessary to investigate the truth or falsehood of this allegation on the part of Mr. Benes.
Because if they had, they would have immediately discovered that there is no such thing as a Czechoslovakian nation; there are only Czechs and Slovaks, and the Slovaks want nothing to do with the Czechs.
So these Czechs, under Mr Benes first of all, started out by annexing Slovakia. Since this state didn't seem viable to justify its existence, they simply grabbed three and half million Germans in violation of their right to self-determination and their desire for self-determination.
Since even this was not enough, they had to grab over a million Magyars, then Karpatho-Russians [Ruthenians or diaspora Ukrainians] and, finally, a few hundred thousand Poles.
That is the state which later called itself Czechoslovakia -- in violation of the right of self-determination of peoples, in violation of clear wish and will of the violated nations.
If I am speaking to you today, then I naturally feel the fate of all these oppressed peoples, I feel the fate of the Slovaks, the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Ukrainians.
Of course, I am the spokesman for the fate of my Germans only.
When Mr Benes at that time lied this state together, he solemnly promised to divide the country up on the Swiss "cantonal" model, since a few of the democratic statesmen had pangs of conscience, just the same.
We all know how Mr Benes dissolved this system of "cantons". He began a terror regime! the Germans attempted to protest against this arbitrary violation even at that time. They were shot down.
And then a war of extermination set in. In these years of the "peaceful" development of Czechoslovakia nearly 600,000 Germans left the country. This happened for a very simple reason: otherwise they would have starved!
The whole development of the country since 1913 up to 1938 shows one thing very clearly: Mr Benes was determined gradually to wipe out the German identity. And he has succeeded in doing so to a certain extent. He plunged innumerable people into the utmost misery.
He has succeeded in making millions of people shy and afraid. Under the continual practice of his terror, he has succeeded in depriving these people of a voice. Clarity as to the "international" tasks of this state became quite clear at the same time. No further attempt was made to hide it: this state was intended, if necessary, to be sent into action against Germany. A French Minister of Aviation, Pierre Cot, expressed this desire quite soberly: "We need this state", he said, "because German industry can be most easily bombed to destruction using this state as a base".
And this same state is being used by Bolshevism as its port of entry. It was Germany who sought contact with Bolshevism, but rather, Bolshevism used Czechoslovakia to dig a channel into Central Europe.
Now begins the most shameful part of the tale. This state, which is controlled by a minority only, forced its constituent nationalities to accept political policies which would one day compel them to shoot at men of their own blood in the adjacent countries.
Mr Benes demands of the Germans: "If I wage war against Germany, I'll make you shoot at Germans. And if you don't do that, then you'll be a traitor to Czechoslovakia, and I'll have you shot for that!"
He requires the Slovakian people to for objectives which are of no interest to them. The Slovakian people want peace -- not adventuring.
But Mr Benes succeeded in turning all these people into traitors: either against the country, Czechoslovakia, or traitors to their own people. Either they must betray their people, and must be prepared to shoot at their own national comrades, or Mr Benes says: "You're traitors, and you'll be shot for that".
Is there any greater shamelessness than to force foreign people to shoot at their own racial comrades, only because a degenerate, evil and criminal governmental regime demands it?
I can assure you here: when we occupied Austria, my first order was: "No Czech need, or even may, serve in the German army". I didn't place them in a position of a conflict of conscience.
But anybody that resists Mr Benes is destroyed, first, financially. This is a fact which cannot be lied away by the "democratic" "world apostles".
In this state run by Mr Benes, the results have been a nightmare for all the nationalities. I speak only the Germans .They have the highest mortality rate of all German ethnic groups, their child poverty rate is the highest, their unemployment is by far the highest. How long is something like this supposed to last?
For twenty years, the Germans in Czechoslovakia, and the German people in Germany, have just had to sit back and watch -- not because they ever accepted this situation, but because Germany was defenceless could not protect itself against its tormenters in the "democratic" world.
But, every time, anyplace, a traitor is even just imprisoned; every time a man who shouts abuse at the Reich Chancellery just because he doesn't like me personally, is taken into custody, there's a commotion in England, indignation in America.
But when hundreds of thousands of people are expelled, when tens of thousands of people are thrown into prison, and thousands of others are shot down, this doesn't bother our genius-brain "world democrats" in the least. We have learned a lot in these past years. And we have nothing but the deepest contempt for such people.
We see one single great power in Europe and one man at its head, who has an understanding of the plight of our people. He is -- I am pleased to say -- is my good friend, Benito Mussolini.
We will never forget what he has done in this time, and the attitude taken by the Italian people. And if a hour of comparable misery ever comes for Italy, I will stand before the German people and demand that we adopt the same attitude! And then, it won't be two states just defending themselves, but rather a block!
On 20 February of this year I declared in the Reichstag that there must be a change in the lives of the ten million Germans outside of our borders. Mr Benes understood this, too. So he implemented an even more radical oppression, inaugurating an even greater terror regime, with closures, prohibitions, confiscations, and so on. This started immediately, until the end came on 21 May.
TRANSLATOR'S NOTE ON HITLER'S COMMENT ABOUT THE EVENTS OF 21 MAY 1938:
On 21 May 1938, Benes issued a report, now generally acknowledged to have been entirely false, that the Germans had mobilised and were massed along the border ready to invade the country. See The Forced War by David L. Hoggan, chapter 5:
"The Czech leader took Schussnig as an example and indicated that the country, to force a solution, was much more impatient than Hitler. The Czech cabinet and the military leaders decided, on the afternoon of 20 May 1938, to order a partial mobilisation and to justify this act of provocation with the false justification that German troops were grouping together on the Czech border. It was hoped that the resulting excitement would bring the French and British over to the Czech side, before they could apply a policy of concessions in favour of the Sudeten Germans. The plot failed, although [Czech Foreign Minister Kamil] Krofta, on 27 May, and Benesch, on 1 June, had granted interviews in which they claimed that Czechoslovakia would have been capable of scoring a great victory over Germany. A controlled press campaign intended to create this impression began on 21 May 1938, and echoed all over the world."
Source, p. 146 (Chapter 5) of the German translation of THE FORCED WAR by David L. Hoggan, published in Frankfurt/Main in 1963 as DER ERZWUNGENE KRIEG. The rights to the English original are held by Mark Weber of the IHR, who claims he plans to republish it. I'll believe it when I see it.
Hoggan was also the author of at least 2 highly informative three- volume sets of books published in German under the titles (which retranslate back into English as THE BLIND CENTURY and THE AMERICAN DISASTER), which he could never get published in English, although he was an American history professor and an American citizen! He also wrote another book, published in German only, entitled DER UNNÖTIGE KRIEG 1939-45: GERMANY MUST PERISH (= THE UNNECESSARY WAR 1939-45: GERMANY MUST PERISH. The whereabouts of his next of kin and/or the original manuscripts is unknown. I have, and have read, all these books). - C.P.
[END OF NOTE ON EVENTS OF 21 MAY 1938, back to Hitler]:
And you can't dispute, my racial comrades, that we displayed really unexampled patience on that day. The 21st of May was intolerable. I described the history of this day before the Reichstag.
An election -- which could no longer be postponed -- was finally to be held in Czechoslovakia. So Mr Benes invented a way to intimidate the Germans there: military occupation of the regions. He hopes to maintain this military occupation in the belief that no one would dare to stand up to him, as long as his bully boys were in the land. It was this bald-faced lie of 21 May, claiming that Germany had mobilised, which now had to be shored up, to camouflage and justify the Czech mobilisation.
You know what happened next: an infamous campaign of international incitement against Germany. Germany hadn't even mobilised one man! Germany hadn't even thought of settling this problem militarily. I still had the attitude that the Czechs, at the last minute, would realise that this tyranny could not be shored up any longer.
But Mr Benes believed that he could do anything he liked with Germany, backed up as he was by France and England. Nothing could happen to him, and above all: behind him, if all else failed, there was still Soviet Russia. This man's answer was a simple one: shootings, arrests, imprisonment, of everybody he didn't like for any reason.
This was the reason for my demand in Nuremberg. My demand was quite clear, but I not presented it before: that the time had come for the right of self-determination to enter into effect at last for these three and half million Germans -- almost twenty years after President Wilson's declarations [the 14 Points].
And again, Mr Benes gave his answer: more deaths, more imprisonments, more arrests! The
Germans began to flee.
Negotiations with Mr Chamberlain
And then came England. I told Mr Chamberlain what we considered to be the only possibility of a solution. It is the most natural thing in the world. I know that all these nationalities no longer wished to remain under this Mr Benes. Of course, primarily I'm only the spokesman for the Germans first of all, but now I have spoken for their behalf, giving them an assurance that I am no longer willing simply to sit back quietly without doing anything, while this madman in Prague believes he can simply mistreat three and a half million Germans.
And I left no doubt that from now on, German patience is finally at an end. I left no doubt in his mind about one thing: it is a feature of the German mentality to tolerate something, repeatedly, for a long time, but that sooner or later the time comes when it's time to stop!
And now England and France have finally issued the only possible demand to Czechoslovakia: he has been requested to release the German areas and assign them to the Reich.
Today we have exact reports of the talks conducted by Mr Benes at that time. In view of the French and British demand that he quit propping up the country without a change in the status of all those people, without an abandonment of Czech claims to the Sudetenland and an assignment of these areas to Germany, Mr Benes found a way out of this dilemma.
He indicated that he was willing to release these areas. That was his declaration, but did he do so? He didn't cede the areas, rather, he is now expelling the German populations!
And this is where all the playing around has got to stop! Mr Benes had hardly spoken, before he initiated a campaign of military subjugation -- but worse than ever -- all over again.
We see the horrendous figures: In one day, 10,000 refugees; the next day, 20,000; one day later, as many as 37,000; again, two days later, 11,000; then 62,000; then 76,000; now it's 90,000, 107,000, 137,000 and, today, 214,000! Entire stretches of land were depopulated. Localities were burnt down as they attempt to smoke the Germans with grenades and gas.
But Mr Benes sits in Prague and thinks: "Nothing can happen to me, after all I've got England and France backing me up!"
But now, my national comrades, I believe that the time has come when it's time to talk about paying the bill for all this.
When a person tolerates all this disgrace, all this misery, for twenty years -- as we have done -- then it cannot really be disputed that he is a peace-loving person. When a person has the patience that we showed on that day, one really cannot call him a war-monger. After all, in the end, Mr Benes has seven million Czechs behind him, but here stands a nation of over 75 million!
I have now presented a memorandum with a last and final German proposal to the British government. This memorandum contains nothing more than the realisation of what Mr Benes has already promised.
The content of this memorandum is very simple: every district which is German judging by its people and which wishes to be German, is to be ceded to Germany; of course, not just after Mr Benes has succeeded in expelling perhaps one or two million Germans, but rather, now, and I mean immediately.
I have drawn a border which is correct based on the materials related to the ethnic and language distribution, material which has been available for decades.
All the same, I am more fairer than Mr Benes, and do not wish to exploit the power that we possess. I therefore established the following principle from the very outset: this area is to be placed under German sovereignty, because it largely inhabited by Germans, but after that I will leave the establishment of the definitive border up to the vote of the national comrades who actually live there!
I have also established that a plebiscite should then be held in this region. And so that no one might say perhaps it was fair, I have decided to use the Saar plebiscite as the basis for this plebiscite.
I am now prepared, and was prepared, as far as I am concerned, to permit plebiscites all over the entire region. For this reason alone, Mr Benes turned to his friends. Now they want to permit plebiscites only in certain parts.
OK, I gave in here. I even agreed to allow the plebiscite to be overseen by international control commissions. I went even further, and agreed to allow a German-Czech commission to draw up the border. Mr Chamberlain thought an international commission should not be permitted. I agreed to that, as well. I even wished to withdraw the troops during this plebiscite period, and I declared myself prepared, today, to invite the British Legion, who offered to go into these areas and maintain peace and order. And then I was also ready to allow the final border to be established by an international commission composed of Germans and Czechs.
The content of this memorandum is nothing more than the practical implementation of everything that which Mr Benes had already promised, with, of course, more extensive international guarantees.
Mr Benes now says that this memorandum constitutes a "new situation". And what does this "new situation" consist of? It consists of that which Mr Benes has already promised, but this time, as an exception, it would be kept! That's Mr Benes' new situation.
How many things has this guy promised during his lifetime? And he never kept a single one! Now for the first time something is to be kept by him. Mr Benes says: we cannot withdraw from this area. Mr Benes has also understood the transfer of this region to mean that it was to be ceded to Germany in terms of legal title, but simply violated by the Czechs.
That's all finished now. I have now demanded that now -- after twenty years -- Mr Benes should finally be forced to keep to the truth. The region is to be transferred on 1 October.
Mr Benes is now placing his hopes on the world! And he and his diplomats make no effort to hide the fact. They declare: It is our hope that Chamberlain will be defeated, that Daladier will be replaced, that upsets will occur all over. They are setting their hopes on Soviet Russia, since he still believes that he will be able to evade the fulfilment of his obligations. And there I can only say one thing: Now come two men confronting each other. There is Mr Benes. And here am I!
We are two men of different types: while Mr Benes was shirking his duty travelling around the world during the greatest national struggle in history, I was doing my duty as a decent German soldier. And today I am standing opposite this man as the soldier of my people!
I have only one more thing to declare: I am grateful to Mr Chamberlain for all his efforts. I have assured him that the German people wishes nothing else than peace.
But I simply declared that we could not be pushed beyond the limits of our patience. I furthermore assured him -- and I repeat it here -- that the moment that Czechoslovakia solves its problems -- that is, when the Czechs solve all their conflicts with all their minorities -- peacefully, of course, instead of through oppression -- at that time I shall take no further interest in the Czech state. And I guarantee him that! We don't want any Czechs!
Germany's patience is at an end
Alone, similarly, I wish to declare before the German people that in relation to the Sudetenland Germans my patience is now at an end. I have made Mr Benes an offer which is nothing more than the fulfilment of what he himself has already promised. At this point, the decision is his: peace or war!
Either he accepts this offer or we will go in and take our freedom personally!
I have never been a coward. I'm marching ahead of my people as its first soldier, and behind me -- the world must know this -- there marches an entire nation -- a nation of people different from what they were in 1918!
It's true that an itinerant professor [Wilson] succeeded in infecting the German with the poison of democratic jabber at one time -- but the German people of today is no longer the people they were then! To us, such jabber-blabber is like wasp stings: we are immune to it now.
In this hour, the entire German people will understand me! It will understand that my will is their will, just as I see that their future and their fate is the underlying principle of everything I do!
And we want to reinforce this common will the way we possessed it during the Great Struggle, when I -- a simple, unknown soldier -- set out to conquer an Empire, and never doubted the certainty of final success and victory.
A group of brave men and brave women have gathered together around me. And they are following me.
And so I ask you, my German people, get in step behind me. Man for man, woman for woman. In this hour we wish to form a common will. If our will is stronger than misery and danger, then it will destroy misery and danger once and for all. We are determined! Mr Benes is free to choose!
Any fools who claim that Hitler "broke the Munich agreement", that the Czechoslovak state was given a guarantee, or that the Munich agreement was that guarantee and that Hitler promised, on his own accord, to guarantee the Czech-Slovak remnant; but for some reason decided to shoot himself in the foot and betray his own promise that needn't have been given 3 days BEFORE the Munich agreement was signed; either hasn't read the speech Hitler gave on September 26th, the Munich agreement, or is just lying. There is no evidence of calculated maliciousness or aggression on the part of Germany. None that wasn't well deserved due to the aggression of the Czechs in late May of 1938. That's for sure.
Chamberlain was obliged to deliver a strongly worded speech in Birmingham, demanding: ‘Is this in fact a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?’ About a week later, however, Chamberlain reassured Hitler through a third party that he quite sympathised with Germany’s move, even though he was unable to say so in public, as he was being exposed to intemperate attacks by the Churchill clique.
David Irving, Hitler's War and The War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 162-3
But in a letter to his sister on September 10th, 1939, Chamberlain admitted that he wanted to "bring to a head" the war in 1939, and only due to Mussolini proposing the Munich peace conference, Hitler and Göring going through intermediaries like Birger Dahlerus in an attempt to prevent war and savour peace, and finally, the French, British allies who just took too long to get ready to declare war, was said declaration delayed to September 3rd:
“The final long drawn-out agonies that preceded the actual declaration of war were as nearly unendurable as could be. We were anxious to bring things to a head, but there were three complications – the secret communications that were going on with Göring and Hitler through a neutral intermediary, the conference proposal of Mussolini, and the French anxiety to postpone the actual declaration as long as possible, until they could evacuate their women and children, and mobilise their armies. There was very little of this that we could say in public.”175
Neville Chamberlain, quoted in: Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II? (Castle Hill Publications, 2014), Pp. 430
Chamberlain, as has been argued in his defence in recent years, wasn't just a blind appeaser, but calculating when Britain should initiate hostilities against Germany. That he was "biding his time" is not an uncommon line of thinking you can find on this topic. John Charmley comes to mind:
Britain, after all, had no treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, and it could hardly be argued that it was a part of any Nazi drive to the West. If it was Hitler's ambitions that precipitated a crisis over the Sudetenland, it was Chamberlain's determination to get ahead of the game that ensured that Britain would become embroiled in it
Frank Mcdonough Ed., John Charmley, Chapter 10 in The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective (Continuum, 2011), Pp. 175
In fact, there was no Guarantee to Czechoslovakia for very GOOD reasons:
It was all very well to argue that Britain and France ought to guarantee Czechoslovakia, but no one could explain how aid would be delivered to her in the event of a German attack: moreover, as William Strang, the head of the Central department pointed out, giving such a guarantee would be to take the final decision for war and peace out of the hands of the British Government
Ibid., p. 176
And it was because of the actions taken by the British government that a war started in the first place, where it otherwise might have been avoided between Britain, France and Germany:
when it broke out in 1939, the war was between Germany and Britain and France – but that was because of actions taken by Chamberlain and his government, which made it impossible for Hitler to achieve his ambitions in the East without turning westwards first.
Ibid., p. 178
Charmely outright states that the first sign of war was due to the May Crisis:
The first sign on the road that would lead to this situation came in May 1938 when the rumours mounted that the Nazis were mobilizing troops near the Czech border.
Which as is known, and accepted by everyone, was started by Edward Benes.
Another enlightening comment:
Quite why Chamberlain and his government should have run this risk prematurely is hard to see, except in the light of the argument that Hitler was insatiable and unappeasable. But even with this there are two difficulties. In the first place, it was far from clear in early 1938 that Germany could not be satisfied. As Cadogan, who was by no means an optimist, wondered, was it ‘even now, too late to treat the Germans as human beings?’34 In the second place, it made assumptions about Hitler’s objectives for which there was insufficient evidence. As Halifax noted, Churchill seemed to be assuming that ‘When Germany has done this that and the other in Central Europe, she will in overwhelming might proceed to destroy France and ourselves. That is a conclusion which I do not believe myself to be necessarily well-founded . . .’35 It is easy to dismiss this as hopelessly naïve, but it ought to be recalled that within the year Halifax had begun to fear that Hitler’s ambitions were ‘Napoleonic’ in scope. Nor was this sentiment as self-evidently incorrect as the Churchillian paradigm suggests. There is certainly nothing in Mein Kampf about hostility to Britain or its Empire: quite the opposite. Hitler’s objectives were certainly malign: he wanted more lebensraum for the Aryan race; he wanted to combat and destroy the Communist menace; and he wanted to exterminate the lesser races, especially the Jews. But Hitler’s ambitions, as Baldwin and Halifax both saw, lay to the East
However, if Charmely believes it is "malign" to combat and destroy Communism, then consider me "malign". One could say the same thing about the desire, that all historians have, of combating and destroying National Socialism. They have no more justification to argue why that wouldn't be equally as malign. And as is also commonly accepted in the orthodox literature, the "extermination" of "lesser races" only came into being through the second world war itself, it was never a plan or idea that Hitler had prior to the war:
The political project that arose from his worldview did not yet [in 1920] consist of mass murder. Despite all the rhetoric of annihilation, "getting rid of the Jews" at that point meant expelling them from Germany. The so-called "Final Solution," meaning the systematic murder of Europe's Jews, did not enter into the plan until the beginning of World War II.
Volker Ullrich, German Hitler biographer quoted here: https://archive.vn/QQ8mL
Therefore, Charmley's argumentation of Hitler's malignity is further diminished.
A lesser known piece of evidence, is a private letter Hitler wrote to British journalist, and later "black propagandist" Sefton Delmer on September 30th 1931, in which he again explicitly states his desires that Germany and Britain might become allies:
Munich 2, Briennerstr. 45.
Munich, 30 September 1931
Dear Herr Delmer,
Greatly as I am honoured by your kind invitation that I should express my views concerning the present crisis in Britain, my misgivings about undertaking this task are no less great. I am afraid part of the British public might consider it presumptuous of me, were I as a German to put forward views in a British newspaper which in conformity with my knowledge and my conscience can only be a criticism of political measures and proceedings, approved up to now by a large part of the British people. I hope, however, that out of this crisis a new readiness will grow up in Britain to submit the past twelve years to a reappraisal. I should be happy, if as a result of this [reappraisal] the unhappy war-psychosis could be overcome on such a scale as to permit the realisation of the truly cordial relationship between the British and the German peoples so eagerly desired by myself and my movement For I believe that the crisis now breaking in on us can only be solved by the closest political collaboration of those nations who see in the re-establishment of a natural European balance of power the first precondition to dealing with those great world problems under which Britain too suffers today.
Once more therefore I beg you to desist from the invitation which so greatly honours me, and I remain
HMSendeavour wrote:Many would've heard it claimed that Czechoslovakia was guaranteed by the Munich agreement. This is completely untrue.
For example:Hitler, however, felt cheated out of his war in spite of his ostensible triumph. He flouted the terms of the agreement and pursued the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
This link makes a variety of very obviously tenacious lies and half truths that read as more propaganda than reality. They manage, in their hysterical lyricism to lie as you might expect. .....
Those historians inter-temporal ability of mind reading is astounding. I'm pretty certain that Adolf Hitler was quite happy that the issue was resolved without war.
The usual argument is that Hitler breached the Munich Argument by making Bohemia and Moravia a protectorate. Well, that had nothing to do with the Munich Agreement, now did it.
Hektor wrote:Those historians inter-temporal ability of mind reading is astounding. I'm pretty certain that Adolf Hitler was quite happy that the issue was resolved without war.
The usual argument is that Hitler breached the Munich Argument by making Bohemia and Moravia a protectorate. Well, that had nothing to do with the Munich Agreement, now did it.
Historians and academics in general rely on the ignorance of the general public. Their status, their funny hats and pieces of paper all justify what they say or write, and the public swallows it. This is to be expected, because generally people in power shouldn't be partisan political activists, but they invariably are and hide their activism behind a firewall of filtered academic citations, prestigious universities, and degrees. The degree, or PhD only becomes invalid when someone who has credentials starts saying the "wrong" things, then they're a "kook" or "pseudoscientist", which goes to show that credentialed elitism really means nothing at all.
Arthur Butz made a very good point about this:
A common complaint about this work has been that I am not a trained historian or history professor. It is, however, not unusual for people who are not academic historians to make contributions to historiography. The great American historian Francis Parkman was no history professor; he had only a brief academic appointment as Professor of Horticulture at Harvard. The late Arnaldo Momigliano urged wariness of academic historians and pointed out that none of the three leading nineteenth century historians of the ancient world was a history professor, e.g. Mommsen was a Professor of Law.2
However, such examples do not satisfactorily illustrate the fact that history has a closer relationship to popular culture than most other academic disciplines. This is easily clarified and proved. In the major book reviews (New York Times, New York Review, etc.) one can find reviews of, and advertisements for, many works on the leading edge of historical research, i.e. works not specifically written for popular readership. No such attention is given to leading edge works in electrical engineering and most other academic disciplines. Many intelligent laymen can read such historical works with comprehension. If many can read them, then some can write them. I could give reasons for this relatively popular status of serious history study, but it would carry us too far afield. In any case, there is no venality on the part of academic historians in approving of such popular promotion of their books.
Such observations show, however, that there is hypocrisy in the orthodox historians’ common implication, when denouncing Holocaust revisionism, that only people with their kinds of Ph.D. degrees are competent to deal with historical issues.
Arthur Butz, The Hoax of the Twentieth Century (Castle Hill Publishers, 2015), Pp. 9-10
When people say this nonsense about Hitler "breaking" the Munich agreement, it can only be out of ignorance of what the Munich agreement actually says - which is nothing at all really - or because they have actually read it as we would expect historians to have done, but they're lying about it. If it's not that, then they're terrible at historical research and shouldn't be trusted because they haven't bothered to read even the most basic of historical documents that they use to indict Hitler and his contemporaries.
The symbolism of the Munich Agreement as everyone knows, has become a rule of thumb for foreign policy in countries around the world. To smash those we don't like as to avoid some major war, which, as it happens by following this aggressive alternative to another "Munich Agreement" is just blatant war, except our countries, the "good guys" for the sake of Jews, get in the first shots and reserve the right to moral indignation and proclaim how righteous we are. The same dichotomy applies, we're "Democracies" therefore anything we do is the service of "good". Whether we do something bad or not is just ignored because it's for the "greater good". The Allies in WW2, and our nations as the legacy of the Allies, abide by the same "ends justify the means" mantra.
Hitler never broke any agreement, but they need people to believe that Hitler went around breaking agreements, violating his own words, all to ensure that he cannot be seen as trustworthy. So, the orthodox historians can proclaim that any "peace with Hitler" while, from hindsight it most obviously would've been sincere, however, at the time, couldn't be seen as sincere because Hitler compulsively lied, and due to this, wasn't a trustworthy partner to make deals with. What's the evidence? He broke the Munich Agreement they shout! He attacked Russia they exclaim! And that's it. They have literally nothing else to paint Hitler as a liar with. However, historians, for the sake of their historical dogma insist that Hitler couldn't be trusted to make peace with the west; John Keegan comes to mind in this regard.
The point is to make sure that there was no alternative to the Holocaust. If there was, then the Allies would share the blame for having not concluded peace with Hitler and thus avoided the Holocaust. So, the easiest thing to do is insist that Hitler couldn't be trusted, that peace couldn't be reached and it never should've been. These historians have such raging hate boners for National Socialist Germany, that they would prefer her to have been annihilated whether by aggressive war from the west or east, or by the intransigent Allied policy of "Unconditional Surrender" (see for example, the comments made by Partisan "Historian" Andrew Roberts: https://forum.codoh.com/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12662&p=97467#p97467). The thought that there could've been an outcome in which the Third Reich survived is so revolting to them, that they have to follow their own kind of alternative history scenarios, insist that it's true, all to avoid the public perception that the Second World War didn't have to be fought, and 50 million lives lost. It's convenient because they can just lay all the blame on dead men like Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering, and Goebbels, but also on Germany. Who, after all, would defend them? The Holocaust narrative ensured that nobody would. And to defend their belief about "The Good War" they have to victimise and romanticise the Soviet Union!
Brendan Simms, at the beginning of his recent Hitler biography straight up said that nothing Hitler said could be trusted without the interpretive words of historians! How convenient. The Historians now reserve the right for themselves to act as arbiters of Hitler's words, as like, the kings messenger. I'm reminded of that scene from one of the Lord of the Rings films, where this king has been warped into a docile captive of a poisonous and treacherous messenger who works for Sauron, he warps the kings mind and words to make it seem as if the knights of Rohan are traitors because they wish to fight Sauron. Kind of a weird reference, but it's the best I can do right now.
Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons on 15 March 1939 there has been no breach of the Munich Convention. The the British Government is no longer bound by its commitment to Czechoslovakia because "the state whose borders we intended to guarantee from within and thus came to an end" (Friend II Doc. 4).
Annelies von Ribbentrop, Verschwörung gegen den Frieden (Druffel Verlag, Zweite erweiterte Auflage 1963) Pp. 304
In our opinion the situation has radically altered since the Slovak Diet declared the independence of Slovakia. The effect of this declaration put an end by internal disruption to the State whose frontiers we had proposed to guarantee and, accordingly, the condition of affairs described by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Dominions, which was always regarded by us as being only of a transitory nature has now ceased to exist, and His Majesty's Government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation.
The central tragic thing I would put in a sentence which I observed in, I believe, one of the evening papers, and which was reported to be included in a proclamation or pronouncement of some sort by Herr Goebbels, to whom was attributed the statement issued in Berlin: "The State of Czecho-Slovakia has ceased to exist." That is the central tragic thing. It does not require any very technical or precise advice from anybody else for the Prime Minister to make the point—if I may say so, the obvious point—that in that situation it was indeed impossible to suppose that a guarantee to maintain the State of Czecho-Slovakia could have any meaning at all.
I was reading through a paper authored by Francis Neilson, what struck me was his highly illuminative, but brief, treatment on the Czech situation prior to the war. He addressed the claim that Hitler had "broken" the Munich Agreement:
FOR SOME DAYS before it was announced in the House, the press let loose a torrent of denunciation and described the act of Hitler and his troops as a violation of the pledges he had given at Munich. Who was to stamp that charge as untrue? The document signed by Hitler and Chamberlain on September 30, 1938, at Munich is clear upon that point. The last paragraph-the important one, reads as follows:
We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe." (Italics mine)
Francis Neilson, Some Political Issues in the Background of World War II, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Jul., 1959) ,Pp. 387
This struck me as odd, because this line is not contained within the Munich agreement at all, and there was no guarantee given to Czechoslovakia as to the maintenance of her borders. One might wish to point to the Annex of the Munich Agreement:
His MAJESTY's GOVERNMENT in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II (1949), Pp. 628
But this International Guarantee never came about, and in any case, the dissolution of the Czech remnant didn't come about because of aggression, it occurred because the minority problem wasn't solved until the Slovaks got their own independence. A conflict between the two majorities of Czecho-Slovakia is what dragged Hitler into the middle of their qualm, and into a position he could use to Germany's benefit.
I found the source Neilson quoted, and what surprised me was that it isn't apart of the Munich Agreement at all. It was part of a statement drafted the day after.
On September 30th 1938, before leaving Germany, Chamberlain suggested to Hitler that they publish a statement, signed by the two of them that would show mutual willingness for improved Anglo-German relations:
Now, he would not keep Herr Hitler any longer, but he wished to say that he thought it would be a pity if this meeting passed off with nothing more than the settlement of the Czech question, which had been agreed upon yesterday. What he had in mind was to suggest to Herr Hitler that it would be helpful to both countries and to the world in general if they could issue some statement which showed the agreement between them on the desirability of better Anglo-German relations, leading to a greater European stability. Accordingly, he had ventured to draft a short statement which he would now ask Herr Hitler to read and to consider whether he would be disposed to issue such a statement over the signatures of himself and the Prime Minister he ejaculated at intervals 'Ja! Ja!' and when it was finished he said he would certainly agree to sign this document. When did the Prime Minister wish to do so?
The Prime Minister: Immediately.
Herr Hitler: Then let us sign.
At this point, they both rose, went to a writing table and, without any further words, appended their signatures to the document (copy attached as Appendix), of which the Prime Minister handed Herr Hitler one copy to keep and retained the other
[size=85]Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II (1949), Pp. 640
The result of this conversation was this document, the one quoted by Neilson:
"We, the German Führer and Chancellor, and the British Prime Minister, have had a further meeting today and are agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German relations is of the first importance for our two countries and for Europe.
We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.
We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be the method adopted to deal with any other questions that may concern our two countries, and we are determined to continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference, and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe."
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume II (1949), Pp. 640
The trend seems to be to treat this document as if it were apart of the Munich agreement, which it isn't. This document is it's own supplement to Anglo-German relations, not to Czechoslovakia or any other country, nor does it claim that Germany has to guarantee the borders of any nation in Europe once the Munich agreement was signed. The phrase "any other questions" is vague, and thus not definitive of any kind of agreement that is written out with specifics in mind. It's nothing but a piece of paper that has the intended purpose to show the goodwill between two nations.
Of this document Neilson went on to write:
The problems of the minorities in the State that was called Czechoslovakia were not terminated at Munich. There was no possible way then of hitting upon a solution, for while they were discussing these affairs in Bavaria, difficulties were increasing in the Czech State, and neither Hitler nor Chamberlain could tell what would have to be done to save Bohemia from chaos. They did not know that Benes was then contemplating resignation. He gave up his job on October 5, 1938. The Poles, the Hungarians and the Slovaks were reincorporating the sequestered territory and their peoples. Therefore, the words "any other questions" could refer neither to Czechoslovakia nor Danzig and the Corridor. It might be said that "any other questions" referred to the Polish problem, but such a notion disregards the pledge that Hitler made over and over again to bring the sequestered people back into the Reich. He could not under any circumstances have promised Chamberlain to abandon his projects.
Francis Neilson, Some Political Issues in the Background of World War II, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Jul., 1959) ,Pp. 387
Regardless, when Czecho-Slovakia broke apart entirely in March 1939, Hitler still had the piece of mind to inform Britain about the current situation as it unfolded.
Hitler's occupation of what was left of Czechoslovakia gave him (Churchill) the very best pretext for rousing public opinion, which had been firmly fixed on keeping the peace. The cry went out, "Hitler has broken his pledge given to Chamberlain." Without consulting the British Government, he had violated the Munich Agreement, in which he had promised to submit a new crisis to the consideration of both governments.
The truth about what was taking place in Czechoslovakia during the winter never reached the British public. Indeed, most of the stories that appeared in the war press were not true.
The report that Hitler had acted entirely on his own in this matter is quite untrue. The British documents show that Sir Nevile Henderson was informed of everything that took place. His dispatch to. Halifax in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume IV (1951), No. 256, is conclusive proof of the correct diplomatic procedure. There is, also, in the same volume the dispatch of Mr. Newton
from Prague to the British Foreign Office (No. 262). We learn from them:. . . The Czecho-Slovak President declared that in order to serve this purpose, and in order to secure final pacification, he placed the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich.
The Führer accepted this declaration and expressed his determination to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and to guarantee to it an autonomous development of its national life in accordance with its particular characteristics.
Ibid., p. 384-385
Thus Hitler did in fact keep Britain "consulted", and could not have therefore violated the statement of good will between Germany and Britain that was signed on September 30th 1938.
When it came time in March 1939 for Hitler to meet with Hacha, it was so out of the blue that time didn't even allow for Hitler to communicate with Henderson. Hitler was caught off guard and surprised at the latest developments that were occurring in Czecho-Slovakia. Thus Neilson proposes the question, what was Hitler to have done? He was trust in a situation that altered the position of Czecho-Slovakia in Europe via natural developments. Even if it were true that the Germans were sewing division in Czechoslovakia in order to get the Slovaks to secede, this wouldn't matter because division would've had to be pre-existing for the Germans to have exploited it. When it comes down to it, Jozef Tiso came to Hitler looking for German support, not the other way around. Hitler having been put in this position was straightforward, he told Tiso that it was up to him whether Slovakia seceded, and he would have Germany's support if he decided to do so. Thus the Slovaks declared their independence.
All Hitler did, when confronted with these developments, was pursue the foreign policy that best suited Germany. He couldn't be expected to do anything else. The other players in the European scene cannot be ignored so Hitler's detractors can pile on him as if these outside forces, with their own interests did not exist.
When Hitler was appealed to by Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkovsky, he had no other course of communicating with the British Government than through Sir Nevile Henderson. That conforms with the routine work of the embassy, and it should be patent to any reader who goes to the trouble of looking through a book of dispatches. But it takes time to transmit information from an embassy to the Foreign Office of another State.
According to the story in The Failure of a Mission, Hitler must have been taken by surprise when Hacha determined to go from Prague to Berlin. This is quite plain because Hitler had an engagement in Vienna, and Goring was going to San Remo for a rest. In the circumstances, there was no opportunity, according to the time sheet in several reports of what took place that week, for Henderson to communicate with London. Indeed, he himself admits that he went to bed and was surprised at the news when he read the papers the next morning.
But suppose that he had sent word to the Foreign Office at Downing Street. It would have been some time before the Prime Minister could be reached, and more time would have been wasted in waiting for the House to meet; time wasted in dispatching back to Berlin; and time wasted again in communicating the British reply to Ribbentrop.
It is just as well to review the events that arose quickly one after another, if we are to understand why there were protests against the action Hitler took in going to Prague. No one asked the question as to what would have happened in that almost dismantled State if Chamberlain had said that the appeal of Dr. Hacha was to be rejected. Was chaos to be desired? The reader may comb the literature on this grave matter in vain for a suggestion as to what the British would have done if their government had been in the situation that Hitler was.
Ibid., p. 386-387
No matter how you look at it, the lie that Hitler "broke" the Munich agreement remains shattered, even when considering this other document which has no real relevance on it's own, beyond being blown up by war mongers in Britain to get the public riled up for war.
Neilson also offers some interesting information regarding mobilizations.
The Czechoslovakian army had been mobilized on September 23rd [...] in accordance with the Franco-Russian Treaty of 1892, which declared that mobilization was a declaration of war.
Ibid., p. 385, 392
In lead articles that were given a wide spread in the British press the assertion was made that Hitler had broken his promise, made at the Sportpalast in Berlin on 26 September 1938, not to make any further territorial claims in Europe. It was declared that he had not kept his previously given word and, subsequently, he was no longer to be trusted. No mention was made, however, about Chamberlain going back on his word that he had given to Hitler on 30 September 1938, with regard to the British-German friendship declaration, when he was informing Mussolini during the period of 11 and 14 January 1939 that he was considering using military action against Hitler – weeks before Hitler took any steps against Czecho-Slovakia.
Peter H. Nicoll, Englands Krieg gegen Deutschland (Tübingen: Verlag der Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung, 1963), Pp. 66; also see: Rolf Kosiek und Olaf Rose (ed.), Der Grosse Wendig: Richtigstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte: Band 1 (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 2006), Pp. 591ff.
Broken promises were the 'order of the day', England hadn't fulfilled some thirty promises she'd made regarding questions relating (mostly) to the middle east between 1915 and 1923 (Der Gross Wendig, bd. 1, p. 591-592.). And of course we cannot forget that the British had broken their promise to Poland in 1939 by not coming to her aid, and in-fact, knowing beforehand that she was unable to aid Poland yet still making an agreement with her to the effect that if Poland was 'threatened' she could count on British support. This blunder arguably had the biggest repercussion of all, as it led directly to the outbreak of the Second World War by bolstering Polish obstinance to reasonable German offers, no matter how "demanding" those proposed solutions were alleged to have been.
So to pretend that if Hitler had broken a promise, that it implies the other powers had not is disingenuous, to make it a unique criticism is even more so. Now this isn't to say breaking promises is okay, because of course it isn't. But in the case of Germany, if a promise was broken, it was fairly obvious that it would be, because by no means had Germany's territorial problems been solved. The point is simply to illustrate that the other powers certainly had no room to judge considering their own vast track records of broken promises.
HMSendeavour wrote:A request for the return of Danzig, which Germany had made regularly since 1919, could reasonably be understood as no "further" territorial claim. The same can be said of Memelland, which Lithuania had illegally and violently seized in 1923. In fact, Danzig and Memel were the two areas in which HITLER made internal reservations when he made his promise (of September 26, 1938, H. W.) ”.
Rolf Kosiek und Olaf Rose (ed.), Der Grosse Wendig: Richtigstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte: Band 1 (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 2006), Pp. 592.
Therefore Hitler did not change his mind, nor did he "break" his word.
Thanks for this, a fascinating and quite convincing point indeed.
Responding however to your last post in the thread you reference:
"In lead articles that were given a wide spread in the British press the assertion was made that Hitler had broken his promise, made at the Sportpalast in Berlin on 26 September 1938, not to make any further territorial claims in Europe. It was declared that he had not kept his previously given word and, subsequently, he was no longer to be trusted. "
Did Hitler ever publicly clarify here (the difference between 'new' claims and 'existing' ones), given so many thought he was a liar and untrustworthy? This was certainly an important factor in France/England siding with Poland.
Reason: [Post moved into appropriate thread - Webmaster]
zapper wrote:Did Hitler ever publicly clarify here (the difference between 'new' claims and 'existing' ones), given so many thought he was a liar and untrustworthy? This was certainly an important factor in France/England siding with Poland.
Not specifically that I can recall. But it doesn't matter.
The reason it doesn't matter though, is because Britain's attitude to Germany turning Bohemia and Moravia into a protectorate was that it was none of their business, and something which was probably going to happen sooner or later anyway (IIRC). But instead, to defend their own interests, they changed their minds and turned the Czech affair in March 1939 into a moral casus belli against Germany, citing her alleged "aggression" in order to stop her gaining further territorial advantages in Europe, no matter how morally justified Hitler was in his claims.
However, I do vaguely recollect Hitler saying something in a speech (which alludes me at the moment) that the situation since Munich had changed, and due to the dramatic shift on the continent with Slovakia declaring its independence, the Czechoslovakia that existed during the time the Munich agreement was signed ceased to exist, thus irreparably changing the whole situation. In this respect Hitler was entirely correct, Czechia was a husk which was in danger of being swallowed up by the Hungarians, and so when Hitler received Hacha in Berlin, he essentially told him that his choice was between Hungary and Germany, he had to choose who it was he'd side with. Hitler held all of the cards and Hacha came to Berlin hat in hand, Hitler was under no obligation to guarantee the corpse of the Czech state, especially considering it wouldn't have served the interests of Germany to do so. That people today expect Hitler to have done this is unreasonable and disingenuous, it defies logic. The intention of people to lambast Hitler for inducing Hacha into signing over Czechia to Germany is purely to justify their own anti-Hitler mania, not because what Hitler did is really unique for the time, or particularly noteworthy. As usual, the identifier of what makes an action wrong is whether it was Hitler and "the Nazis" doing X or Y thing, not the thing itself.
The reason it doesn't matter though, is because Britain's attitude to Germany turning Bohemia and Moravia into a protectorate was that it was none of their business, and something which was probably going to happen sooner or later anyway (IIRC).
Well I was talking more about the demand for Danzig/Corridor, which as you say was present since 1919.
But the issue with B&M is interesting, can you provide a link to some more info about it? The orthodox interpretation, as you likely well know, is that he was brought into Berlin by the Nazis and basically coerced into signing away his country under threat of invasion.
HMSendeavour wrote:zapper wrote:Did Hitler ever publicly clarify here (the difference between 'new' claims and 'existing' ones), given so many thought he was a liar and untrustworthy? This was certainly an important factor in France/England siding with Poland.
Not specifically that I can recall. But it doesn't matter.
The reason it doesn't matter though, is because Britain's attitude to Germany turning Bohemia and Moravia into a protectorate was that it was none of their business, and something which was probably going to happen sooner or later anyway (IIRC). But instead, to defend their own interests, they changed their minds and turned the Czech affair in March 1939 into a moral casus belli against Germany, citing her alleged "aggression" in order to stop her gaining further territorial advantages in Europe, no matter how morally justified Hitler was in his claims........
I'm always cringing, when I see how any word from Hitler is put onto the diamond scale.
The Sudetenland was incorporated into Greater Germany, because it was a totally German area. Concerning the Protectorate, this wasn't incorporated into Germany, but as the name said a protectorate. And a territory that belonged to Germany from Roman Times.
Concerning "territorial demands", the 16 points still stipulated under point 2:
(2) The Polish Corridor shall decide for itself whether It desires to belong to Germany or Poland, for which a plebiscite, shall be held, Polish police, military and other authorities must leave the Corridor at the shortest possible notice except Gdynia, which unconditionally remains Polish. The exact German-Polish frontier between Gdynia and Germany must be determined by agreement between Berlin and Warsaw.
You see, a plebiscite is proposed, something that is highly democratic, and not just another 'territorial demand'
The sixteen points were a reasonable proposal to settle German-Polish disputes and conflicts for good. Only those that wanted conflict and war could find them unacceptable.
I wonder if the British or French would have been that amicable, if Northumbria or the Provence was cut of from their country.
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