Stalin's 19 August 1939 speech: Promoting European conflict to weaken Germany for future Soviet expansion. Forgery?

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Stalin's 19 August 1939 speech: Promoting European conflict to weaken Germany for future Soviet expansion. Forgery?

Postby Lamprecht » 1 year 4 days ago (Thu Jan 16, 2020 9:21 pm)

A brief overview of the alleged speech can be found on Wikipedia:'s_ ... ugust_1939
Stalin's speech of 19 August 1939

A speech was allegedly given by Joseph Stalin, on 19 August 1939, to members of the Politburo, wherein he supposedly described the strategy of the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II. According to the strategy, promoting conflicts in Europe would be beneficial for the Soviet agenda and could provide future territorial expansions.

The historicity of the speech is still the subject of academic debate. Plausible textual evidence of this speech found in various reputable archives has been academically studied and published, however no formal first-hand evidence of a Politburo meeting held on 19 August 1939 or the delivery of the quoted speech has yet been proven. The Russian version of the speech[1] can be found at the Center for Historic Documents of the former Special Archives of the USSR.[2] Speeches given in secret were common at the time, the Politburo being a closed and secretive body.
In the source material available to historians, Stalin is represented as expressing an expectation that the war would be the best opportunity to weaken both the Western nations and Nazi Germany, and make Germany suitable for "Sovietization". There is also expectation of eventual territorial expansion to the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland, with the approval of either the Western powers or Germany.

Historians who have studied these documents have suggested that if such a speech took place, which is usually considered plausible but not proven, then this view may have formed the basis for the Nazi-Soviet pact of non-aggression signed in 1939, known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed just four days later on 23 August 1939.

The full speech can be found here, but apparently there are slightly different versions:

Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 19 August 1939, reconstructed from renderings in Novyi Mir, Moscow, and Revue de Droit International, Geneva or ... plete.html

Carl O. Nordling seems to think it was legitimate:

Did Stalin deliver his alleged speech of 19 August 1939? or ... talin.html

Irving also has an article on his website also suggesting the speech really hapened:

Stalin's Aggressive War Plans Disclosed - Thomas Titura or ... plans.html

Any other info on this?


Operation Barbarossa Was A Preventive Attack

Aggressive Soviets violated numerous treaties with neighboring countries

When the USSR invaded Poland, Britain was silent
"There is a principle which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principle is contempt prior to investigation."
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Re: Stalin's 19 August 1939 speech: Promoting European conflict to weaken Germany for future Soviet expansion. Forgery?

Postby HMSendeavour » 11 months 3 weeks ago (Mon Jan 27, 2020 10:53 am)

I read about this speech a few months back when I was really into reading about Barbarossa.

The Irving article is a comment on the book by Albert Weeks. I would recommend reading Weeks book as he addresses the speech. I did have an epub but epubs don't work anymore and unfortunately I do not have a pdf or the physical book to quote.

I addressed the speech here viewtopic.php?f=20&t=7999&start=135#p94254

As far as I know, the speech is confirmed.

Mark Solonin addresses the speech here: he might also address it in other articles. Whether you think his comments on it are worth posting here Lamprecht is up to you.

The idea that creating trouble in Europe to foster global revolution is Communist thought that goes back to Lenin and is proof that the Soviets weren't peaceful. As if that were even a question.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference

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Re: Stalin's 19 August 1939 speech: Promoting European conflict to weaken Germany for future Soviet expansion. Forgery?

Postby HMSendeavour » 3 weeks 3 days ago (Sun Dec 27, 2020 8:05 am)

This speech is summarily ignored on the basis of it allegedly being a forgery because there were no official minutes taken, or because they claimed there was no speech held on that date. What's funny to me is that gistorians will accept this, but not do the same when it comes to the alleged "incriminating" Hitler speeches and conferences that not only have in some cases, no official minutes, but no official markings, no known origin, have been denounced by those at the meetings, or the speeches have been revised and shortened.

Here is the fully speech given six days prior to signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact on August 23rd:

J. V Stalin's secret speech to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, August 19, 1939

"The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance treaty with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off of Poland and seek a 'modus vivendi' with the Western Powers. War would thus be prevented but future events could take a serious turn for the USSR. If we accept Germany's proposal to conclude with it a nonaggression pact, Germany will then attack Poland and Europe will be thrown into serious acts of unrest and disorder. Under these circumstances we will have many chances of remaining out of the conflict while being able to hope for our own timely entrance into war.

"The experience of the past 20 years shows that in peacetime it is impossible to maintain a Communist movement throughout Europe that would be strong enough so that a Bolshevik party could seize power. A dictatorship by this party becomes possible only as the result of a big war. We are making our choice and it is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send the Anglo-French delegations back home. The first advantage we will get will be the destruction of Poland up to the very approaches to Warsaw, including Ukrainian Galicia.

"Germany has given us full leeway in the Baltic Countries and has no objection to returning Bessarabia to the USSR. Germany is also prepared to yield on giving us a sphere of influence in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The question of Yugoslavia still remains open.... At the same time we must anticipate what will ensue from the destruction of Germany in war as well as from a German victory. If it is destroyed, the sovietization of Germany follows inevitably and a Communist government will be established. We must not forget that a sovietized Germany would face great danger if such sovietization occured after the defeat of Germany in a short war. England and France would be powerful enough to seize Berlin and destroy a Soviet Germany. We would not be able to come to the aid of our Bolshevik comrades in Germany.

"Therefore, our task consists in helping Germany wage war for as long as possible with the aim in view that England and France would be in no condition to defeat a sovietized Germany. While hewing to a policy of neutrality and while waiting for its hour to come, the USSR will lend aid to today's Germany and supply it with raw materials and foodstuffs. Of course, it follows that we will not allow such shipments to jeopardize our economy or weaken our armed might.

"At the same time we must conduct active Communist propaganda especially as directed at the Anglo-French bloc and primarily in France. We must be prepared for the fact that in France in wartime the Communist Party there must abandon legal activities and go underground. We realize that such work will require an enormous sacrifice in lives. However, we have no doubts about our French comrades. Above all their task will be to break up and demoralize the French army and police. If this preparatory work is completed in a satisfactory way, the security of Soviet Germany is assured. This will likewise ensure the sovietization of France.

"To realize these plans it is necessary that war last as long as possible and that all efforts should be made, whether in Western Europe or the Balkans, to see that this happens.

"Let us look now at the second possibility - namely, that Germany becomes the victor. Some propose that this turn of events would present us with a serious danger. There is some truth to this notion. But it would be erroneous to believe that such a danger is as near and as great as they assume. If Germany achieves victory in the war, it will emerge from it in such a depleted state that to start a conflict with the USSR will take at very least 10 years.
"Germany's main task would then be to keep a watch on the defeated England and France to prevent their restoration. On the other hand, a victorious Germany would have at its disposal a large territory. Over the course of many decades, Germany would be preoccupied with the 'exploitation' of these territories and establishing in them the German order, Obviously, Germany would be too preoccupied to move against us. There is still another factor that enhances our security. In the defeated France, the French Communist Party would be very strong. A Communist revolution would follow inevitably. We would exploit this in order to come to the aid of France and win it over as an ally. Later these peoples who fell under the "protection" of a victorious Germany likewise would become our allies. We would have a large arena in which to develop the world revolution.

"Comrades! It is in the interests of the USSR, the Land of the Toilers, that war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. Everything must be done so that the war lasts as long as possible in order that both sides become exhausted. Namely for this reason we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany and use it so that once this war is declared, it will last for a maximum amount of time. We must step up our propaganda within the combatant-countries so that they are prepared for that time when the war ends."

Source: From the central collection of Historical Documents of the former "Special Archive of the USSR", Folder 7, Set 1, Doc. 1223. It is reproduced from Dimitrov's diary in T. S. Bushuyev, "Proklinaya-Poprobuite Ponyat"' ("Curse It but Try to Understand"), a review of two books by Viktor Suvorov, Novyi Mir, no. 12 (1994), pp. 232-33.

Also see: Archive:

Joachim Hoffmann discussed the veracity of this speech in his book 'Stalin's War of Extermination' where I think he made a good case for its legitimacy:

The speech by Stalin of August 19, 1939, was obtained by the French Havas agency from Moscow by way of Geneva from an “absolutely reliable source.” It was published as early as 1939 in volume 17 of the Revue Du Droit International.6 Remarkably, the authenticity of the speech is disputed with extraordinary zeal by Stalinist propagandists and their blind adherents right up to the present day. However, in an interview under the hypocritical headline “A Mendacious Report from the Havas Agency” in the official party newspaper Pravda on November 30, 1939, Stalin himself denied the speech.The mere fact that Stalin felt personally and immediately compelled to publish an official denial reveals the extent to which he felt he had tipped his hand.7 Only in extraordinary cases did Stalin ever allow himself to consent to personal interviews.

Viktor Suvorov has proved that the authorities of the Soviet Union, such as members of the Central Committee, marshals, generals, professors, academicians, historians, and ideologists, have wracked their brains, and, with truly ardent zeal, have attempted to prove for fifty years that no meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee ever took place on this particular August 19 at all. The whole tissue of lies finally collapsed on January 16, 1993 in a single day, when Stalin’s biographer Professor Volkogonov confirmed in Izvestia “that a meeting had indeed taken place on the date in question, and that he himself had held the minutes in his hands.”

The historian Ms. T. S. Bushueva, during the course of a scholarly evaluation of Viktor Suvorov’s books, which had been distributed in editions of millions of copies, found the text of the speech by Stalin. The speech, which had long been known, was discovered in the secret depths of the former Special Archives of the USSR, apparently prepared by a member of the Comintern. She made it available to the Russian public for the first time in the periodical Novyi Mir in December 1994.9 This epoch-making speech by Stalin is also contained in the published edition of the minutes of he conference of the “Memorial” society held on April 16, 1995, in Novosibirsk. It has been analyzed and commented upon in detail by the historians T.S. Bushueva and I. V. Pavlova, as well as by Professor V. L. Doroshenko.

6. When on July 16,1996,in the daily newspaper Die Welt, Carl Gustaf Ströhm published a strikingly accurate report on the contents of the speech given by Stalin on August 19, 1939,the international apologists for Stalin immediately considered themselves provoked. It was the task of one of their spokesmen, Gabriel Gorodetsky, to rescue the endangered Stalinist version in the new era. Gorodetsky is the Director of the Cummings-Institute for Russian History at the University of Tel Aviv and was also one of the organizers of the conference held between January 31 and February 3, 1995, in Moscow. In the columns of Die Welt on August 31, 1996, Gorodetsky launched a counterattack in which he claimed that the speech by Stalin of August 19, 1939, was a falsification by the French secret service, but in so doing, he became immediately mired in so many contradictions that his arguments were destroyed. For example, he referred to December 23, 1939, as the exact date of the French falsification, forgetting that Stalin published his official denial in Pravda on November 30, 1939,i.e., twenty three days before the text of the speech by Stalin would therefore have to have been known to the French secret service at a much earlier time. Another momentous blunder that entirely destroys Gorodetsky’s credibility is that he claims that the secret additional protocol was only discussed for the first time at the end of September 1939 during Ribbentrop’s second visit to Moscow. Whereas a facsimile of the full text of the “Sckretnyj Dopolnitel’nyj Protokol” (Secret Additional Protocol) on territorial annexation, signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 23, 1939, had even been printed by Wemer Maser in Der Wortbruch, pp. 48f. Gorodetsky confuses the Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, with the Secret Additional Protocol to the Border and Friendship Treaty of September 28, 1939, which, for an expert, is rather astonishing and is hardly excusable. The desperate situation of the Stalin apologists today and the methods to which they resort in their confusion were also revealed by H.-E. Volkmann, who appeared in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit on June 3,1997 as “Research Director of the Military History Research Office of the Bundeswehr,” In this capacity, he published a full-page article on the “Legend of the Preventive War” with an attack on the former Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Heinz Trettner. In doing so, he merely demonstrated that he is not familiar with the very numerous German and Soviet source documents, or with the international research situation. His shabby argumentation is an attempt to show that Hitler planned aggression, which, of course, is no longer a problem in contemporary research. Academically, the real question relates to the war of conquest prepared by Stalin that Hitler pre-empted rather by accident. Volkmann’s rather incompetent article raises the question of whether the article is an attempt to mislead on ideological grounds, or whether it is quite simply the result of ignorance. Volkmann, who trivializes the Lenin-Stalin system of despotism at every opportunity, is also mentioned by Rüdiger Proske, Wider den Mißbrauch der Geschichte,pp.16,34, 61, as weil as Professor Dr. jur. Gerhard Eiselt,“Diehistorisch-politische Ausemdersctzung ”

Joachim Hoffmann, Stalin's War of Extermination (Castle Hill Publishers, Paperback Edition 2015), Pp. 28-29

Here is Stalin's reply in Pravda on November 30th, 1939:



Редактор «Правды» обратился к т. Сталину с вопросом: как относится т. Сталин к сообщению агентства Гавас о «речи Сталина», якобы произнесенной им «в Политбюро 19 августа», где проводилась якобы мысль о том, что «война должна продолжаться как можно дольше, чтобы истощить воюющие стороны».

Тов. Сталин прислал следующий ответ:

«Это сообщение агентства Гавас, как и многие другие его сообщения, представляет вранье. Я, конечно, не могу знать, в каком именно кафешантане сфабриковано это вранье. Но как бы ни врали господа из агентства Гавас, они не могут отрицать того, что:

а) не Германия напала на Францию и Англию, а Франция и Англия напали на Германию, взяв на себя ответственность за нынешнюю войну;

б) после открытия военных действий Германия обратилась к Франции и Англии с мирными предложениями, а Советский Союз открыто поддержал мирные предложения Германии, ибо он считал и продолжает считать, что скорей шее окончание войны коренным образом облегчило бы положение всех стран и народов;

в) правящие круги Англии и Франции грубо отклонили как мирные предложения Германии, так и попытки Советского Союза добиться скорейшего окончания войны.

Таковы факты.

Что могут противопоставить этим фактам кафешантанные политики из агентства Гавас?»



The editor of Pravda turned to Comrade Stalin with a question: what is the attitude of Comrade Stalin to the report of the Havas news agency about “Stalin’s speech,” allegedly delivered by him “in the Politburo on August 19,” which allegedly held the idea that should continue for as long as possible to exhaust the belligerents. "

Comrade Stalin sent the following reply:

“This report from the Havas agency, like many of its other messages, is a lie. I, of course, cannot know in which cafe this lie was fabricated. But no matter how the gentlemen from the Havas agency lie, they cannot deny that:

a) not Germany attacked France and England, but France and England attacked Germany, taking responsibility for the current war;

b) after the start of hostilities, Germany turned to France and England with peace proposals, and the Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace proposals, for it believed and continues to believe that an early end of the war would radically alleviate the situation of all countries and peoples;

c) the ruling circles of Britain and France rudely rejected both the peace proposals of Germany and the attempts of the Soviet Union to achieve an early end to the war.

These are the facts.

What can the café-haired politicians from the Havas agency oppose to these facts? "

Pravda, November 30, 1939.

Stalins reply Pravda November 30 1939.jpg

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It's funny that Stalin does not refute the actual speech he made, he simply confirms the peaceful position of Hitler in his sincere offers to the Western allies.

Daniel W. Michaels also comments on the legitimacy of this speech in his review of Suvorov's 'Der Tag M' (M Day) published by the IHR:

Since the publication of "M Day," Russian scholars have dug up additional evidence from the former Soviet archives that further confirms the Suvorov thesis and obliges a radical rewriting of Second World War history.

While it is likely that many records have been removed and destroyed, some revealing papers are being unearthed. One of the most important of these long-suppressed documents is the complete text of Stalin's secret speech of August 19, 1939. For decades leading Soviet figures denied that Stalin ever delivered this address, even insisting that no Politburo meeting was held on that date. Others have dismissed this speech as a forgery.

Russian historian T. S. Bushuyeva found a version of the text among the secret files of the USSR Special Archives, and published it, together with commentary, in the prominent Russian journal Novy Mir (No. 12, 1994). German writer Wolfgang Strauss reports on this, and other recent findings by Russian historians, in the April 1996 issue of the German monthly Nation und Europa. To this reviewer's knowledge, no American historian has yet taken public notice of the speech text.

It should be kept in mind that this address was delivered just as Soviet officials were negotiating with British and French representatives about a possible military alliance with Britain and France, and as German and Soviet officials were discussing a possible non-aggression pact between their countries. Four days after this speech, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Stalin in the Kremlin to sign the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

In this speech, Stalin declared:

The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. War would be avoided, but down the road events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany's proposal and conclude a nonaggression pact with her, she will of course invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England in that war would be unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. Under those conditions, we would have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war.

The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough to seize power. The dictatorship of such a party will only become possible as the result of a major war.

Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send the Anglo-French mission home. Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia ...

Summing up, Wolfgang Strauss points out that Stalin strove for an all-European war, a war of exhaustion that would bring down Europe's states and system. Further, Stalin planned to enter the war on the ruins of "capitalist" Europe, and then dictate its Sovietization by military force. (The key term "Sovietizatsia" comes up repeatedly in his speech.)

While noting that this speech further confirms Stalin's aggressive intentions, the cautious Bushuyeva quotes Clausewitz to the effect that wars tend to assume their own directions and dimensions, regardless of what one side or the other might have planned or said.

Source: Archive:

In my previous post in this thread I linked to Mark Solonin's thoughts on this speech, I will quote it here:

It is much harder to assess the authenticity of texts #2 and #3. Number 2 is the so-called “Stalin’s speech at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on August 19, 1939.” It was published the first time by the French agency Havas on November 28, 1939. The variant that I’ve cited was published by the Russian historian T. Bushueva in 1994. This text is a three-times trophy document: Bushueva found it at the Center for Storage of Historical-Documentary Collections (formerly the Special Archive); it had belonged to the French General Staff which allegedly seized in from French Communists, then the Germans captured it from the French General Staff, and finally it had been taken from the Germans by the Red Army.

No one ever saw a genuine transcript of “Stalin’s speech from August 19”; there is no solid basis to assert that such a speech was delivered. In the "Politburo’s Special files” (or, to put it more precisely, in something that RGASPI offered to the public under that name), only one resolution refers to the date August 19, and the issue it pertains to is utterly unimportant (it treats a draft deferment for workers building the Akmolinsk-Kartaly railroad). It looks strange enough. In 1939 the Politburo was issuing on average (including holidays and weekends) eight resolutions a day. August, 1939 was a very busy time: they would be reviewing about 20 matters a day (one should take into account that there were very few meetings, as such: the decisions that Stalin made in a narrow circle of “comrades” selected by him were simply registered as “Politburo resolutions”). Is it really true that on August 19 the Politburo limited itself to reviewing only one issue of the third degree of importance?

It’s hardly worth arguing that the “French document” (let’s call it that) is not a verbatim report, but rather a paraphrasing of something distorted by multiple translation. The translation of what, exactly, is still to be determined, but the obvious semantic similarity to Dimitrov’s transcript jumps out at the reader, as they say.

In my opinion, document #3 (the “Czech document”) is much more interesting and authentic. This is a report by a group of Czech anti-fascists about the meeting that they had in October, 1939 with A. Alexandrov, head of the Central-European Department of the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The document was passed to the US General Consulate in Prague and then lay happily in the State Department’s archive all the way until 1978, when J. Kalvoda, an American historian of Czech descent, first published it. The main advantage of the “Czech document” is the exactly registered dates: the text was received by the General Counselor in Prague on November 17, 1939 and translated into English on November 20. This is a very important moment: the document that almost word for word repeats the formulations in the so-called “Stalin’s speech” was composed BEFORE Havas’ publication on November 28.

Source: Archive:

The question seems to be about where the French received the speech from originally, because it's not found in any Russian archives, or referred to in any Russian documents.

However, according to V. L. Doroshenko the text of the speech did originate with Stalin, although Hoffmann does not tell us how Doroshenko came to this conclusion. His book is cited, but is unfortunately only available in Russian:

“The question is,” as Dr. Pavlova wrote to the author on August 7, 1996, “did Stalin prepare for a war of aggression, and did he accordingly make a speech on August 19, 1939? ... A study of the minutes of the Politburo of 1939-1941 provides additional justification for an affirmative answer to the question.” Professor Doroshenko also grasped this point while summarizing his research results and said: “Analysis has shown that the text, regardless of any possible distortion, originates from Stalin, and must be considered one of the most important documents in the history of the Second World War.”10 That Stalin, as will be ascertained, will be transformed into the principal warmonger must be conclusively acknowledged on the basis of all the following circumstances, and the whole chain of subsequent events.11 According to Viktor Suvorov, August 19, 1939, was the date upon which Stalin started the Second World War (since this was the day Stalin ordered a surprise attack against the Japanese 6m Army at Khalkhin Gol), Professor Lev Kopelev made a similar statement on December 24, 1994; his phraseology is different, but no less clear: “In 1939, the World War was continued by the Hitlerite and Stalinist realms... on a new and monstrousscale.”12

Joachim Hoffmann, Stalin's War of Extermination (Castle Hill Publishers, Paperback Edition 2015), Pp. 29-30

However, Doroshenko co-authored a paper with R.C. Raak entitled 'Not a myth: Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939' which points out that the Stalin speech of August 17, matches up with the conditions of the Secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in such a way as to cast doubt on whether it could've been faked because it aligned with protocols that hadn't been implemented when the speech was made public:

The decisive case in substantiating his negative attitude towards the existing text of Stalin's speech is the following argument: the number of incorrect and frankly absurd provisions ” {260} . In fact, there are such documents. Moreover, Sluch also addresses the main one of them - to interpret the provisions of the message of the Havas agency. Obviously, a professional researcher would be expected to draw the necessary conclusions from this.

The report of the Havas agency, circulated on November 28, 1939, contains all the main provisions of the secret additional protocol to the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union of August 23, 1939 (doc. No. 5). The publication in the open press, almost immediately, of the content of that conspiracy between Stalin and Hitler, which the Soviet leadership denied for 50 years, is a direct confirmation of the authenticity of the Havas news agency.

V. L. Doroshenko, K. V. Pavlova, R. Ch. Raak, Not a myth: Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, see: Archive:

Check out the Metapedia page as well:

Speech of August 19, 1939 (Josef Stalin)
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference

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