[Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

All aspects including lead-in to hostilities and results.

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[Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 11 months 2 weeks ago (Thu Aug 15, 2019 7:10 pm)

Informative documentary on Hitler's desire for peace during World War II, mostly a compilation of his own speeches


mirrors: https://www.bitchute.com/video/hoZ9iS8aF9cs/ or https://www.bitchute.com/video/vDaezW6kxFQY/ or https://archive.org/details/AdolfHitler ... son_201708

Here lie the accounts of Adolf Hitler's pleas to the world during the largest bloodshed in mankind's history, World War 2.

Adolf Hitler's most poignant orations which had been buried for almost a century are now available for the world to hear. Visit the voices of the past to bear witness their side of history. The unaltered Adolf Hitler, who tried incessantly to avoid the senseless war and its continuation. Star contrast to what the Western Allies and their pet Communist regime in the East had in plans for Europe and the rest of the world.

They said Adolf Hitler was a warmonger who wanted to rule the world and subjugate all non-Germanic people. They lied.

Mein Side Of The Story:
http://amzn.to/2uHemu4

The Images of Adolf Hitler That "They" Don't Want You To See: http://amzn.to/2eS8udz

The British Mad Dog: Debunking the Myth of Winston Churchill:
http://amzn.to/2uH1jst

The REAL Roosevelts: An Omitted History:
http://amzn.to/2eS61zX



The leaflet dropped by Germany during the war:
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Recommended:

'Why Germany Invaded Poland', by John Wear / 'peaceful Poland' debunked
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12331

Why did Hitler invade so many neutral European countries?
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12421

Hitler's Peace Offers Vs Unconditional Surrender
viewtopic.php?t=10192

Offer to clear Poland?
viewtopic.php?t=12044
"There is a principal which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principal is contempt prior to investigation."
-- Herbert Spencer

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 11 months 1 week ago (Mon Aug 26, 2019 4:24 pm)

Informative article here:

Highlights of P. J. Buchanan's Political History of Events during Second World War
https://archive.is/QxPoh

Check out the section "Negotiation Opportunities during the War"
Negotiation Opportunities during the War

5. September 1939 Taylor says that after the German attack on Poland, Mussolini called for a European five-power conference. Halifax and Chamberlain presented the proposal respectively in the upper house and the lower house. But influenced by the agitated mood of British voters, they demanded that a precondition for the conference must be that the German army should retreat to their original positions prior to the war. Then the Italians dropped the proposal and let history take its course. They knew that such a thing Hitler would never accept.

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The headline in the Arkansas Hope Star Newspaper 6. October 1939. Foto Hope Star Newspaper Archives.

6. October 1939 Following Ian Kershaw's "Fateful Choices", Hitler made a "peace offer" to Britain and France after Poland had surrendered; "It was turned down without hesitation".

13. May 1940 in his first address to the House as prime minister, Churchill declared: "You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word. It is victory, victory at all cost." Churchill was true to his word, it was he alone, who refused to consider any agreement to end the war at Dunkirk. It was also he who rejected Hitler's offer of peace in July 1940.

25. May 1940 Halifax's met the Italian ambassador in Britain, Giuseppe Bastianini. Italy had not yet entered the war. The conversation quickly came to a possible Italian mediation between the Allies and Germany.

Churchill's "Victory at all costs Speech" 13. of May 1940: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat." - "You ask, what is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark and lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy. You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory. Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. Let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for." Foto BBC archieve.

The following morning, Halifax reported on this conversation to the War Cabinet, saying that "in his opinion, they had to face the fact that it is not so much a matter of forcing a total defeat on Germany, but about securing the independence of our own empire and, if possible, the independence of France." Considering France's imminent fall and British forces' encirclement in Dunkirk, he believed that the United Kingdom should investigate the possibility of a negotiated settlement with Adolf Hitler, mediated by the still-neutral Italian leader Benito Mussolini. After pretending to have taken this idea into consideration, Churchill outperformed Halifax by - two days later - convening a meeting of a bigger parliamentary group, the twenty-five-man Outer Cabinet, arguing to continue the war and got support. Churchill claimed to have told the French Prime Minister, Reynaud, that Britain was not ready to "give in to anything. We would rather fight than be slaves for Germany."

Halifax's and Chamberlain's statements were highly diplomatic and indirect, while Churchill expressed himself bold and straightforward. It suggests that Winston Churchill stood on the politically secure ground of British democracy, the favour of voters - the vast majority of British voters were likely advocating giving the hated Germans a sound beating

English and French soldiers are waiting to be evacuated on the beach at Dunkirk. In only three weeks, the combined French and English armies had been beaten by the German panzers and Stuka bombers. Hitler held back his armor force in order not to ruin the possibility of peace negotiations. Churchill organized an emergency evacuation and proclaimed it a victory. Photo Wikipedia.

26. May 1940 the evacuation of the encircled British army from the port and beach of Dunkerque in northern France was initiated. It lasted until June 4. Hitler issued his stop order to his Panzers, letting the British army escape at Dunkirk.

He stated in his Testament of 26. February 1945: "Churchill was quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages."

Buchanan refers to Ian Kershaw: Even after Britain and France had declared war on Germany, Hitler confided to his inner circle: "If we on our side avoid all acts of war, the whole business will evaporate. As soon as we sink a ship and they have sizable casualties, the war party over there will gain strength." (Albert Speer Inside the Third Reich)

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The headline of Birmingham Gazette 19. March 1940. Many think that the Pope and the Vatican also worked for peace in Europe. Photo Pinterest.

10. June 1940 or about. In his postwar book, "The Other Side of the Hill" Liddel Harts relates a conversation Hitler had at Charleville, after Dunkirk, with general von Rundtstedt and two of his staff, Sondenstern and Blumentritt. The latter told Liddel Hart the conversation had come around to Great Britain: "He (Hitler) then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world - He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church - saying they were both essential elements of stability in the World. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the continent. The return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential and he would even offer to supply Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere - He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard compatible with her honour to accept."

This suggests that Hitler was prepared to be very flexible in possible peace negotiations with the UK.

25. June 1940 After the fall of France, tells Buchanan, Hitler telephoned Goebbels to lay out the terms of a deal with England. Britains empire was to be preserved, but Britain would return to Lord Salisbury's policy of "splendid isolation" from the power politics of Europe. Here is an entry from Goebbel's diary: "Der Fuhrer - believes that it (the British Empire) must be preserved if at all possible. For if it collapses, then we shall not inherit it, but foreign and even hostile powers take it over. But if England will have no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees. The Fuhrer, however, would be agreeable to peace on the following basis: England out of Europe, colonies and mandates returned. Reparations for what was stolen from us after the World War."

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German aircraft sent thousands of flyers over England, calling for peace. Hitler could not understand why the English would absolutely have war. Photo eBay.

Ribbentrop wrote that after Dunkirk Hitler was enthused with making a quick peace with England. Hitler outlined the peace terms he was prepared to offer the British: "It will only be a few points, and the first point is that nothing must be done between England and Germany which would in any way violate the prestige of Great Britain. Secondly, Great Britain must give us back one or two of our old colonies. That is the only thing we want."

19. July 1940 Hitler took the initiative to end the war after the fall of France in June 1940. In a victory speech on July 19, 1940, Hitler declared that it had never been his intention to destroy or even harm the British Empire. Hitler made a general peace offer in the following words: "In this hour I feel it is my duty before my conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on."

22. July 1940 Great Britain officially rejected Hitler's peace offer.

Alan Clarke, defense aid to Margaret Thatcher, believes that only Churchill's obsession with Hitler and "single-minded determination to keep the war going" prevented his accepting Germany's offer to end the war in 1940: "There were several occasions when a rational leader could have got, first reasonable, then excellent terms from Germany. Hitler actually offered peace in July 1940 before the Battle of Britain started. After the RAF victory, the German terms were still available, now weighed more in Britain's favor".

5. December 1940 Hitler voiced his puzzlement to the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin over Great Britain's refusal to accept his peace offers. Hitler felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blacked his eye in reply. Hitler said, "The survival of the British Empire is in Germany's interest too because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby".

14. August 1940 during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field marshals into the Reich Chancellery to impress upon them that victory over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire: "Germany is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible with Britain - but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus we must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait for a possible general election."

It was in all probability the ordinary Britons fascination with war and hatred of Germans that kept Winston Churchill in power through thick and thin. The German strategy of bombing British cities was unsuccessful, it only strengthened the voters' support for the war.

10. May 1941 Hitler's second in command, Rudolf Hess, landed with a parachute in Scotland. His plan was to contact the Duke of Hamilton, who was an influential member of the English-German Friendship Association.

Hess had studied geopolitics in his youth. He knew Hitler's plan to attack the Soviet Union and he knew that Germany could not win a two-front war. In the Spandau prison, he told the journalist Desmond Zwar that Germany could not win a war on two fronts: "I knew that what I had to say would have received his approval. Hitler had great respect for the English people."

In Scotland, Hess was quickly taken into Home Army's custody. The Duke of Hamilton, who was wing commander at a nearby military airfield, had a conversation with him the following day under four eyes. Rudolf Hess declared: "I am on a mission for humanity. Der Fuhrer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting."

After the war, Albert Speer discussed the purpose of the flight with Hess, who told him that: "the idea had been inspired to him by supernatural forces in a dream. We would guarantee England its empire, and in return, it should give us free hands in Europe."

The American journalist, Hubert Knickerbocker, who had met both Hitler and Hess, speculated that Hitler had sent Hess with a message to Winston Churchill about the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union and an offer of a negotiated peace or even an anti-Bolshevik partnership.

Following the meeting with Hess, Hamilton arranged a meeting with Churchill through the Foreign Ministry. They met in Ditchley where Churchill stayed for the weekend. They had some initial conversations that evening, and Hamilton followed Churchill back to London the next day, where both met with members of the War Cabinet.

Hitler feared that his allies, Italy and Japan, would perceive Hess' act as an attempt by Hitler to secretly initiate peace negotiations with the British, therefore he ordered the German press to characterize Hess as a lunatic who made the decision to fly to Scotland all alone, without Hitler's knowledge or approval. Hitler contacted Mussolini to reassure him.

Rudolf Hess was detained in British custody until the end of the war, where he was sent back to Germany to be brought to court in the Nurnberg process. He served his life sentence in the West German Spandau prison until his death, allegedly by suicide, as 93-year-old.

22. June 1941 Germany began Operation Barbarossa, which was the attack on the Soviet Union.

More on Hitler's peace plans:

https://hitlerspeaceplans.com/ (archived: https://archive.is/DjdI9)

Some newspaper clippings:

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EDIT:

Some clippings of peace proposals Hitler offered to Poland prior to the invasion are included here: viewtopic.php?t=7525&p=93464#p93464
Last edited by Webmaster on Tue Aug 27, 2019 9:38 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: [edits made by request of Lamprecht per PM - Webmaster]
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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 5 months 4 weeks ago (Mon Feb 03, 2020 8:45 pm)

Sefton Delmer, born in Berlin in 1904, with Lord Beaverbrook’s support, Daily Express correspondent of long standing, promoted in 1940 to be the leading correspondent for the British Information Secretary of State, Duff Cooper, and finally directed the German-language broadcasts of the BBC and the propaganda linked with it. About his first BBC radio broadcast Sefton Delmer wrote as follows:
For Hitler had chosen my first Friday – Friday July the 19th, 1940 – to make his triumphal Reichstag oration in celebration of his victory over France. More important still, he had chosen it as the occasion for his “final peace appeal” to Britain.

“It almost causes me pain,” I heard him piously intone as I listened in on the radio in the BBC studio, “to think that I should have been selected by Providence to deal the final blow to the edifice which these men have already set tottering... Mr. Churchill ought for once to believe me, when I prophesy that a great empire will be destroyed which it was never my intention to destroy or even to harm... In this hour I feel it my duty before my conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Britain... I CAN SEE NO REASON WHY THIS WAR MUST GO ON!”

...Within an hour of Hitler having spoken I was on the air with my reply. And without a moment’s hesitation I turned his peace offer down. My colleagues at the BBC had approved of what I meant to say. That was enough authority for me.

“Herr Hitler,” I said in my smoothest and most deferential German, “you have on occasion in the past consulted me as to the mood of the British public. So permit me to render your excellency this little service once again tonight. Let me tell you what we here in Britain think of this appeal of yours to what you are pleased to call our reason and common sense. Herr Führer and Reichskanzler, we hurl it right back at you, right in your evil smelling teeth...”

...Duff Cooper rallied to my support with all his suave authority. He assured the House that my talk had the Cabinet’s full approval. And when the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax replied to Hitler a couple of days after me the sense of what he said was the same, although he used rather more restrained language.

- Sefton Delmer (1962) 'Black Boomerang', pp. 16-18. PDF (mirror)

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mirror: https://pic8.co/sh/G8KBOA.jpeg
"There is a principal which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principal is contempt prior to investigation."
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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 5 months 2 weeks ago (Sat Feb 15, 2020 10:42 pm)

The following is from:
Hitler's Sincere Peace Letter to French President
http://tomatobubble.com/id723.html or http://archive.is/Y6hLE


Hitler Note and Paris Communique (28 August 1939)
The text of Chancellor Hitler's letter to Premiere Daladier of France:

PDF: http://web.archive.org/web/201708290624 ... 951142.pdf

THE NEW YORK TIMES

August 28, 1939

Hitler Note and Paris Communique
The text of Chancellor Hitler's letter to Premiere Daladier of France:

Chancellor's Letter

[Commentary and images added]

HITLER:

My dear Minister President:

I understand the misgiving to which you give expression. I, too, have never overlooked the grave responsibilities which are imposed upon those who are in charge of the fate of nations. As an old front line fighter, I, like yourself, know the horrors of war. Guided by this attitude and experience, I have tried to remove all matters that might cause conflict between our two peoples.

I have quite frankly given one assurance to the French people, namely, that the return of the Saar would constitute the precondition for this. After its return I immediately and solemnly pronounced my renunciation of any further claims that might concern France. The German people approved of this, my attitude.

ANALYSIS:
Under the terms of the post-World War I Treaty of Versailles, the Saar region was to be occupied jointly by the United Kingdom and France for 15 years. The Saar's coal production was controlled by France. In 1935, a referendum was permitted and the people of the Saar region (which borders France) voted, by a margin of 91%, to return to Germany.
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After the Saar vote to happily reunify with the German fatherland was held as promised, Hitler declared that Germany's western borders were fixed.


HITLER:
As you could judge for yourself during your last visit here, the German people, in the knowledge of its own behavior held and holds no ill feelings, much less hatred, for its one-time brave opponent. On the contrary, the pacification of our western frontier led to an increasing sympathy. Certainly as far as the German people are concerned, a sympathy which, on many occasions, showed itself in a really demonstrative way.

ANALYSIS:
This is 100% true. Throughout the 1930's, neither in the German press nor among the happy German people, does one find any expression of animosity towards France or England. This is remarkable given what was done to the defenseless nation after World War I (territorial losses, crushing monetary reparations, hunger blockade, occupation, theft of resources, etc).

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1- After many years of humiliation and suffering, the German people under Hitler had obtained happiness. The last thing they or their government wanted was for another destructive war against France and England.

2- Former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George visited Hitler in 1936, and then wrote:
"There is for the first time since the war a general sense of security. The people are more cheerful. There is a greater sense of general gaiety of spirit throughout the land. It is a happier Germany. I saw it everywhere and Englishmen I met during my trip and who knew Germany well were very impressed with the change. The idea of a Germany intimidating Europe with a threat that its irresistible army might march across frontiers forms no part of (Hitler's) new vision." https://archive.is/5PwoA


HITLER:
The construction of the western fortifications, which swallowed and still swallow many millions (of Marks) at the same time constituted for Germany a document of acceptance and fixation of the final frontiers of the Reich. In doing so, the German people have renounced two provinces which once belonged to the German Reich, later were conquered again at the cost of much blood, and finally were defended with even more blood.

I believed that by this renunciation and this attitude every conceivable source of conflict between our two peoples that might lead to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918 had been done away with.

ANALYSIS:
Hitler makes a very logical point here. If someone builds an expensive fence along a certain line on his property, common sense tells us he has accepted that line as his property line, and everything on the other side as his neighbor's. By spending millions of marks on border fortifications at a certain location, Hitler's verbal renunciation of additional territory was supported by actual deeds as well.

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In order to diffuse any possible tension between France and Germany, Hitler renounced any claim to the stolen provinces of Alsace-Lorraine and built Germany's defense fortifications behind the region.


HITLER:
This voluntary limitation of the German claims to life in the West, can, however, not be interpreted as an acceptance of all other phases of the Versailles dictate. I have really tried, year after year, to achieve the revision of at least the most impossible and unbearable provisions of this dictate by way of negotiation. This was impossible.

In this sense I have tried to remove from the world the most irrational provisions of the Versailles dictate. I have made an offer to the Polish government which shocked the German people. Nobody but myself could even dare go before the public with such an offer. It could therefore be made only once.

ANALYSIS:
The man is telling the truth, again! In its September 2nd issue, the New York Times will summarize the details of the generous offer that Germany made to aggressive Poland. Among other concessions, Hitler offered to give Poland a 1-mile wide highway running through German territory so that it would always have access to the Baltic Sea. Poland's answer was to increase the abuse of Germans who were stranded in Poland due to the post-World War I land grab.

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Western Prussia was stolen at gunpoint under threat of starvation after Germany was deceived and betrayed into unconditionally surrendering during World War I. The ridiculous Danzig Corridor handed the region to the newly-created state of Poland and cut off Eastern Prussia from the rest of the Reich. Germans trapped in the Corridor and the "free city" of Danzig (today Gdansk, Poland) were horribly abused and denied the right of self-determination.


HITLER:
I am deeply convinced that if, especially, England at that time had, instead of starting a wild campaign against Germany in the press and instead of launching rumors of a German mobilization, somehow talked the Poles into being reasonable, Europe today and for twenty-five years could enjoy a condition of deepest peace.

As things were, Polish public opinion was excited by a lie about German aggression. Clear decisions that the situation called for were made difficult for the Polish government. Above all, the government's ability to see the limitations of realistic possibilities was impaired by the guarantee promise that followed.

ANALYSIS:
Hitler was not the only one to accuse the British press of warmongering. Among others, Lord Beaverbrook, the biggest newspaper man in England, made this same observation in a pair of 1938 private letters.
Beaverbrook:
“There are 20,000 German Jews in England – in the professions, pursuing research. They all work against an accommodation with Germany.”

In a subsequent letter, Beaverbrook added:
“The Jews have got a big position in the press here... At last I am shaken. The Jews may drive us into war.”



HITLER:
The Polish government declined the proposals. Polish public opinion, convinced that England and France would now fight for Poland, began to make demands one might possibly stigmatize as laughable insanity were they not so tremendously dangerous. At that point an unbearable terror, a physical and economic persecution of the Germans although they numbered more than a million and a half began in the regions ceded by the Reich.

ANALYSIS:
In regard to Poland being propped up and encouraged to fight Germany, again, Hitler can be corroborated by an independent source. From Count Jerzey Potocki, Polish Ambassador to the United States, written privately in 1934:
"Above all, propaganda here is entirely in Jewish hands. When bearing public ignorance in mind, their propaganda is so effective that people have no real knowledge of the true state of affairs in Europe... President Roosevelt has been given the power... to create huge reserves in armaments for a future war which the Jews are deliberately heading for."


HITLER:
I do not want to speak of the atrocities that occurred. Suffice it to say that Danzig, too, was made increasingly conscious through continuous aggressive acts by Polish officials of the fact that apparently it was delivered over to the high-handedness of a power foreign to the national character of the city and its population.

ANALYSIS:
It's true, again! As the Polish government "looked the other way", Germans suffered extreme abuse at the hands of Bolshevik terror gangs. The September 3rd massacre at Bromberg, which propaganda historians have tried to mitigate, but cannot deny, gives a clear indication of the malevolent and envious hatred directed towards innocent Germans. At Bromberg, as many as 3000 Germans, including women and children were tied up, tortured, bludgeoned, mutilated, butchered or shot - and it wasn't the first time that such events took place in the Corridor.

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HITLER:
May I now take the liberty of putting a question to you, Herr Daladier: How would you act as a Frenchman if, through some unhappy issue of a brave struggle, one of your provinces severed by a corridor occupied by a foreign power? And if a big city - let us say Marseilles - were hindered from belonging to France and if Frenchmen living in this area were persecuted, beaten and maltreated, yes, murdered, in a bestial manner?

You are a Frenchman, Herr Daladier, and I therefore know how you would act. I am German, Herr Daladier. Do not doubt my sense of honor nor my consciousness of duty to act exactly like you. If, then, you had the misfortune that is ours, would you then, Herr Daladier, have any understanding that Germany was without cause to insist that the corridor through France remained, that the robbed territory must not be restored, and that the return of Marseilles be forbidden?

ANALYSIS:
The logic of Hitler's question to Daladier is impossible to refute, which is why propaganda historians have edited the existence of the Danzig Corridor, as well as the abuses and murders which took place within it, out of the history books and off of the TV crockumentaries.

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Daladier (left) meeting with Hitler in 1938 to peacefully diffuse the Sudetenland controversy.



HITLER:
Certainly I cannot imagine, Herr Daladier, that Germany would fight against you for this reason. For, I and all of us, have renounced Alsace-Lorraine in order to avoid further bloodshed. Much less would we shed blood in order to maintain an injustice that would as unbearable for you as it would be immaterial to us.

Possibly we, as old front fighters, can best understand each other in a number of fields. I ask you, however, do understand this also: That it is impossible for a nation of honor to renounce the claim of almost two million human beings and to them maltreated at its own borders. I have therefore set up a clear demand to Poland. Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany.

I see no way of persuading Poland, which feels herself as unassailable, now that she enjoys the protection of her guarantees, to accept a peaceful solution. If our two countries on that account should be destined to meet again on the field of battle, there would nevertheless be a difference in the motives. I, Herr Daladier, shall be leading my people in a fight to rectify a wrong, whereas the others would be fighting to preserve that wrong.

That is the more tragic since many important men, also among your own people, have recognized the insanity of the solutions then found (at Versailles) as also the possibility of maintaining it lastingly.

That our two peoples should enter a new, bloody war of destruction is painful not only for you, but also for me, Herr Daladier. As already observed, I see no possibility for us on our part to exert influence in the direction of reasonableness upon Poland for correcting a situation that is unbearable for the German people and the German Reich.

- Adolf Hitler

SUMMARY
Nearly 7 years into Hitler's reign, at a time when Europe was still at peace and Jews were living well and prospering in Hitler's Germany (it's true!), Hitler's logical, thoughtful and truthful attempt to avert disaster fell on deaf ears. Neither the French nor the British even attempted to refute Hitler's claims. Instead, just like modern day 'court historians,' they simply ignored the irrefutable points which Hitler expressed; and then babbled on about "the rights of Poland."

By now, the warmongering pressures on French President Daladier and British Prime Minister Chamberlain were too much to hold back. Thus emboldened, the militaristic and ultra-nationalist government of Poland allowed ultra-Nationalists and Jewish Bolshevik Partisans to escalate their border provocations of Germany; culminating with the September 1st German counter-attack against Poland, followed by the liberation of the Corridor and Danzig.

Britain and France declared war on Germany, yet did not lift a finger to help Poland. Having been played for 'chumps.' Poland was soon discarded by the Allies as Stalin's Soviet Union then invaded Poland from the east. While continuing to ignore Hitler's pleas for peace, the Allies will spend the next eight months plotting Scandinavian-based maneuvers and deploying a massive mechanized fighting force in northern France, in anticipation of invading Germany via "neutral" Belgium and Holland, sometime in the Spring of 1940.
The rest, as they say, is history.

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The delirious people of German Danzig greet Hitler as their liberator. Britain & France went to war and unleashed hell over this?!
"There is a principal which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principal is contempt prior to investigation."
-- Herbert Spencer

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Sean » 5 months 2 weeks ago (Wed Feb 19, 2020 6:10 pm)

A book on the subject: " What the World Rejected: Hitler’s Peace Offers 1933–1940" by Friedrich Stieve:

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/233 ... d-rejected

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Moderator » 5 months 1 week ago (Wed Feb 19, 2020 11:16 pm)

Sean:
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[Video] Hitler's Generous Peace Offers: David Irving

Postby Lamprecht » 3 weeks 6 days ago (Tue Jul 07, 2020 11:06 pm)

Hitler's Generous Peace Offers: David Irving https://bitchute.com/video/7K7oVc6hHH6T/



David Irving speaks about Hitler's peace offers & how the western "Allies" ignored them. Also suggested:

Starvation and the British / Western Blockade against Germany during World War II
viewtopic.php?p=97321#p97319
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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby HMSendeavour » 3 weeks 4 days ago (Thu Jul 09, 2020 1:00 pm)

There's an interesting photo here which seems to be taken from a secret british file, or folder regarding peace offers:

Image

It mentions, as you can see that Hitler's peace offers were occurring during and after the German-Polish war, and of course through 1940 and 1941. The fact that the Germans were seeking peace with Britain in September 1939 should be an astonishing blow to the orthodox narrative. Yet it's ignored entirely. Or if it's mentioned, it's brushed aside with a comment about how these offers cannot be trusted, or they're to drive a wedge between some country or another. Very lame excuses that are based on nothing but presumptions about Hitler's motives, which, when you look at the documentary evidence is quite clear. Peace with the west was Hitler's intention.

What you come to understand is that Hitler's attack against Poland was never the impetus for the beginning of a general war, let alone a world war.

At first glance Adam Tooze seems to conveniently do away with the idea that Hitler was out for peace and to avoid war in 1939. His omissions and distortions are perhaps convincing.

He writes:

If the huge rearmament drive of the 1930s and the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia were not enough to give Germany a substantial material advantage over its enemies, if their immediate effect was to drive Britain and France into abandoning their pacifism in favour of an aggressive strategy of containment and to force both Washington and Moscow to reconsider their positions in Europe, why did Hitler go to war in September 1939?

Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction (Penguin Books, 2008), Pp. 662


It's nice to see Tooze admit that the Allies were in fact waging their own aggressive strategies to stem the growing power of Germany, for why else would they feel threatened over Germany's re-acquiring of lost territory?

Tooze does ask a good question, why did Hitler go to war in 1939? I have my own answer to this, and it's a lot less speculative than Tooze's. Mine also isn't drenched in the preconceived idea that Hitler is guilty, as is Tooze, because to err from this holy writ is to become a heretic.

Tooze answers this question over pages 662-665, so I cannot quote it in full here, but I do implore everyone reading this to read these pages in full. I will only be quoting sections and outlining what his argument is.

Tooze rejects the idea as:

some historians choose to argue that Hitler simply miscalculated. He did not intend to precipitate a general European war, they insist. After his experience at Munich in 1938 he expected Britain and France to stand aside in Eastern Europe. It was not Hitler, but the Western powers who chose to turn Poland into a casus belli

Ibid.


By "some historians" he means Richard Overy, perhaps others too.

However, when you read the subsequent pages, you don't see him refute this stance, he only constructs a new one based on the presumption that Hitler indeed was thinking about all these events in the same way as Tooze did. There is of course no indication that Hitler at any point held the view Tooze attributes to him.

He says:

In August 1939, as in September 1938, Hitler was confronted with the near certainty that Britain and France would declare war. On the former occasion he had pulled back. In 1939 he chose not to. Why he plunged forward rather than pulling back is explain in this book through a novel synthesis of three distinct elements.

Ibid.


His 3 points are rather hard to discern. But his argument runs like this:

In 1939 Hitler was faced with a "persistent problem of the balance of payments"(p. 662) but that this wasn't, as has been stated before by the likes of Tim Mason the reason Hitler went to war in 1939, Mason described Hitler's decision for a world war being based on economic inevitability, a narrative which is discarded now. Tooze also discards it when he states that there was a problem with the payments but "this is not to say that the Third Reich was facing an economic crisis"(p.662-3), quite the opposite, that the economic controls Germany had put in place during the 1930s actually prevented an economic crisis which nearly occured in 1934, but due to this success in the domestic sphere the acceleration of armaments couldn't continue(p. 663) thus, those opposed to Germany, Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to continue their massive rearmament effort while Germany effectively couldn't produce more than had already been, and was being produced. According to Tooze "Hitler found himself facing a sharp deterioration in the balance of forces at a date far earlier than he had expected"(Ibid.), so Hitler took action. He got the Soviets on his side which allowed Germany to avoid a potential two front war, and it also ensure that the West couldn't blockade Germany as they had done in the previous war(Ibid.). Due to this, Tooze says that:

One can therefore construct a compelling economic-strategic rationale for Hitler's decision to go to war in September 1939. Given Germany's deteriorating economic position and the unexpectedly favourable shift in the diplomatic balance, Hitler had nothing to gain by waiting.

Ibid.


He goes on to state that Hitler believed that "war with the Western powers was inevitable" and goes on to prove this by "invoking ideology"(Ibid.), making the claim from pages 664-5 that Hitler shielded from the East, directed his gaze at the Jewish establishment in the west, behind Roosevelt, behind Churchill etc. whom he felt were encircling Germany. As tooze puts it:

it was obvious that it was Jewish elements in Washington, London and Paris, bent implacably on the destruction of Nazi Germany, that were tightening the international encirclement. And it was this paranoid sense of menace that precipitated Hitler's decision to launch his strike against Poland and then against the Western coalition that continued to stand obstinately in his way.

Ibid. 664


And for this reason Hitler believed that war with the West was inevitable because he would need to attack all of world Jewry of whatever. I can see the point he's making, but I feel as if he fails to make it. The connection is just weak because there's no indication that implies he thought it was inevitable, as his peace offers show.

I think Tooze is right in what he describes although he leaves out a bunch of stuff in this summary of his, and I just flat out think his conclusion is wrong.

Let me explain.

If the reasons he uses does explain why Hitler went to war, then it was based ultimately on the actions of the Allies who were encircling Hitler, as Tooze actually admits by saying:

Whilst Roosevelt led the rhetorical assault against Hitler and encouraged Britain, France and Poland in their resistance to Nazi expansionism

Ibid.


Hitler therefore probably wouldn't have sought a war in the West under the impression that it was "inevitable" as Tooze states, if the West simply weren't aggressively opposing Hitler's revisionism in Eastern Europe and potential expansion against the Soviet Union. A war in the west could've been avoided by allying with Germany, or simply not getting involved. This becomes very clear because Tooze admits Hitler's intention was to ally with Britain:

in light of the fact that Hitler was departing so flagrantly from the programme outlined in Mein Kampf. In that book, dictated in a prison cell in Landsberg fifteen years earlier, Hitler had called for an Anglo-German alliance against the Judaeo-Bolshevik threat. In 1939 he went to war with fronts reversed: in alliance with Stalin against Britain.

Ibid. Pp. 663-64


and

It was fundamental to his strategic conception in the 1920s and early 1930s that he would be able to secure a dominant position for Germany in Europe without coming into conflict with Britain. Indeed, reversing Stresemann's logic, Hitler believed that Britain would come to view Germany as an ally in the competition that it was bound to face from the United States.

Ibid. Pp. 9


So what reason, in hindsight could the West have had for denying Hitler's peace offers? None. They simply just didn't want to accept them because they were resolved on war, and eventually Hitler had to resolve on war as well. This flies in the face when you take into account the peace offers, the idea that Hitler wanted a war in the west or even a general war.

Consider Hitler's plan for the invasion of Poland "Case White", which specifically was directed at avoiding conflict with the west and isolating the war to Poland:

Although Germany would continue trying to avoid a conflict with Poland, the preamble to "Operation White" stated that Poland would be destroyed if she changed her policy. Military preparations had to be complete and plans ready for action by September 1st, 1939. The task of diplomacy was to isolate Poland.

Sidney Aster, ‘1939’ The Making of the Second World War (Andre Deutsch, 1974), Pp. 194


However:

It is to be emphasised that he had still not issued any actual instruction for war. This new OKW directive on ‘White’, issued on April 3, merely outlined a political situation which might make an attack on Poland necessary on or after September 1. Meanwhile, the OKW ruled, friction with Poland was to be avoided, a difficult injunction since the Poles had certainly not behaved kindly toward their own ethnic German minority.

David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 166


Hitler was even more explicit about avoiding a general war, especially with the West:

Hitler stated once again that Danzig was not his ultimate objective – that would be to secure Lebensraum in the east to feed Germany’s eighty million inhabitants. ‘If fate forces us to fight in the west,’ Hitler told them, ‘it will be just as well if first we possess more in the east.’ This was why he had decided to ‘take on Poland at the first suitable opportunity.’

His immediate purpose now, he explained, would be to isolate Poland. ‘It is of crucial importance that we succeed in isolating her.

The only surviving note is one by Colonel Schmundt, but it lists as present officers – including Göring and Warlimont – who were not there and contains various anachronisms. Halder, questioned in mid-1945, well remembered Hitler’s assurances that he would keep the western powers out of ‘White’: ‘I would have to be a complete idiot to slither into a world war – like the nincompoops of 1914 – over the wretched Polish Corridor.’

Ibid. Pp. 176-77


and on another occasion on March 13th 1939 while embroiled in discussion with Ribbentrop and Goebbels over the position of Britain on the issue of Prague, Hitler was in strict disagreement with Ribbentrop on the idea that conflict with England was inevitable, Goebbels in his diary stated that Hitler "does not consider it unavoidable" (Rudolf von Ribbentrop, My Father Joachim von Ribbentrop: Hitler's Foreign Minister Experiences and Memoirs (Pen & Sword Military, 2019), Pp. 173.)

So to summarize my view, I think Tooze was right when he said that Hitler had nothing to gain by waiting. He couldn't afford to wait, no matter if he had 5 months or 5 years, in the end Poland and the West could always afford to wait much longer than Hitler. To start a war with Poland in 1939, which was justified due to the nature of Germany's grievance and her upper hand in her moral claims to take back land that belonged to Germany and incorporate people whom wanted to be annexed into the Reich, while also defending yourself from any possible attacks from the west, in the hopes of not actually having to fight them, but sue for peace, was Hitler's best option. The responsibility falls onto the West because they didn't accept Hitler's hand freely given to them.

For Tooze to state that Hitler must come into conflict with the west because he saw them as run by Jews I think oversteps the mark, for one thing it's totally true that Jews were heavily involved. One need only to look at the names of the men surrounding Roosevelt to know that they were Jewish. It's been established.

You'll notice that Tooze is careful with his words, saying that Hitler was "risking" war with the West, which is of course accurate, as he would have preferred to avoid it. But it was a risk worth taking, rather than not taking it at all and being encircled by powers whom are stronger than you, effectively rendering Germany subservient to all the large powers surrounding her. It doesn't seem fair that Germany should have to deal with such circumstances when they could easily be avoided by securing herself from the east.

The point is that Hitler attacked Poland not expecting a general war, but thinking he could actually avoid one.

This is clear too, by Hitler's reaction to the declaration of war issued by Britain and France, which also backs up what Tooze stated about Hitler's writings in Mein Kampf:

Of all mornings, this was the one that Schmidt, in bed only a few hours, overslept. Rushing by taxi to the Foreign Office, he saw Henderson enter the building and himself raced into a side entrance. He was standing, somewhat breathless, in Ribbentrop’s office as the hour of nine struck and Henderson was announced. The ambassador shook hands but declined Schmidt’s invitation to sit down. “I regret that on the instructions of my government,” he said with deep emotion, “I have to hand you an ultimatum for the German government.” He read out the statement, which called for war unless Germany gave assurances that all troops would be withdrawn from Poland by eleven o’clock, British Summer Time.

Henderson extended the document. “I am sincerely sorry,” he said, “that I must hand such a document to you in particular as you have always been most anxious to help.” While Henderson would not be remembered for astuteness, retaining as he did a naïve conception of the Führer to the end, he had succeeded in outshouting him and staring down Ribbentrop on successive evenings, feats worthy of some applause.

In a few minutes Schmidt was at the chancellery. He made his way with some difficulty through the crowd gathered outside of the Führer’s office. To anxious questions on his mission, he said cryptically, “Classroom dismissed.” Hitler was at his desk; Ribbentrop stood by the window. Both turned expectantly as Schmidt entered. He slowly translated the British ultimatum. At last Hitler turned to Ribbentrop and abruptly said, “What now?” “I assume,” said Ribbentrop quietly, “that the French will hand in a similar ultimatum within the hour.”

Schmidt was engulfed in the anteroom by eager questions but once he revealed that England was declaring war in two hours there was complete silence. Finally Göring said, “If we lose this war, then God have mercy on us!” Everywhere Schmidt saw grave faces. Even the usually ebullient Goebbels stood in a corner, downcast and self-absorbed.

[...]

Hitler was already preparing to leave the chancellery with his entourage to board a special train bound for the fighting front. Nine minutes before it left Berlin, the Führer sent off a message to the ally who had failed to support him in his greatest crisis. Unlike the telegram to Moscow, this one to Mussolini was sent in the clear and was replete with dramatic phrases. He was aware, said Hitler, that this was “a struggle of life and death” but he had chosen to wage war with “deliberation,” and his faith remained as “firm as a rock.” As the Führer’s train pulled out of the station at exactly 9 P.M. he did not show the confidence of this letter. One secretary, Gerda Daranowsky, noticed he was very quiet, pale and thoughtful; never before had she seen him like that. And another, Christa Schröder, overheard him say to Hess: “Now, all my work crumbles. I wrote my book for nothing.”


John Toland, Adolf Hitler: The Definitive Biography, (Anchor Books, paperback edition, 1992), pp. 575-576


Hitler's reaction, and that of all his colleagues to the British and French declaration of war are not the reactions of people who got what they wanted. This very obvious fact is ignored constantly, and it cannot be squared with this idea that in 1939 Hitler achieved the conflict with the west that he somehow desired. No. It proves that he wanted to avoid that conflict, that he only risked war in 1939 because he didn't believe that Britain or France would do anything. This is something Overy, Irving, Watt, Hitchens and Rudolf von Ribbentrop all point out. Hitler was of the belief that he could attack Poland and avoid Britain declaring war. In fact, he only attacked Poland because that's what he thought, because he had nothing to gain by waiting (in the worst scenario) but primarily because he didn't expect a general war, let alone world war at all whatsoever.

Goebbels on September 1st 1939 wrote in his diary:

Coulondre und Henderson suchen Lipski zu bewegen, auf eigene Faust zum Führer zu gehen. Aber er ist stundenweise unauffindbar. Polen will also offenbar die Sache hinzie hen. Mittags gibt der Führer Befehl zum Angriff in der Nacht gegen 5th. Es scheint, daß damit die Würfel endgültig gefallen sind. Göring ist noch skeptisch. Der Führer glaubt noch nicht daran, daß England eingreifen wird.

Coulondre and Henderson try to get Lipski to go to the guide on his own. But he's untraceable by the hour. So it looks like Poland is going to drag this thing out. At noon the Führer gives the order to attack at night around 5am. It seems that the die is finally cast. Goering is still skeptical. The Fuhrer does not yet believe that England will intervene.

Joseph Goebbels, Tagebücher 1924 -1945, Pp. 1322-1323


Confirming that as late as September 1st, the day Germany attacked Poland, Hitler still thought Britain wouldn't do anything. Even going so far as to point out that Poland was probably trying to avoid sending anyone to Berlin, yet still claiming to want to see the German proposals (if you read the entire entry, Goebbels says Lipski "wanted to see the German proposals" yet didn't show up, on purpose presumably).

We can conclude with some evidence that Hitler thought that even if he attacked Poland it would be okay because the British had been consistent until that point, and they wouldn't want to fight a war and they would conclude peace. Hitler, more than anything thought that it was totally insane for the British to care about Poland, something he felt laid so far outside their sphere of interest that it was nothing more than an attempt to force Germany to back down (see: Manvell & Fraenkel, Hess, pp. 80-81)

This only makes Hitler's attempt at offering peace even more sincere, as Toland expounds upon the peace offer shortly after September 1st 1939:

The Führer is prepared to move out of Poland and to offer reparation damages provided that we receive Danzig and a road through the Corridor, if England will act as mediator in the German-Polish conflict. You are empowered by the Führer to submit this proposal to the British cabinet and initiate negotiations immediately.”

Hesse was flabbergasted. Had a specter of things to come finally dawned on the Führer at the last moment? Or was it just a charade to see how far the British would compromise with the sword of war dangling overhead? Hesse asked Ribbentrop to repeat the offer. He did, adding, “So there will be no misunderstanding, point out again that you are acting on the express instructions of Hitler and that this is no private action of mine.”

Ibid. Pp. 573


For further details, I would recommend reading the letters sent by the German General Nikolaus von Vormann to his wife in 1939, in which he confirms many inconvenient facts: http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/Vormann/letters_1939.html

Although I cannot find it, I do recall Tooze, or someone else making the claim that Hitler's apprehension to go ahead with the attack on Poland by delaying the Wehrmacht was done, not because Hitler wanted to make peace via buying more time to negotiate, or because he thought he could avoid war with Poland, but to "drive a wedge between the British and the French". This claim, which i've seen, is untrue. When historians refer to Hitler's delayed mobilisations they usually (from my reading) never tell you how many times Hitler actually suspended the armed forces from marching, they will say he did it once, perhaps twice, the truth is that Hitler suspended the order to invade 3 times.

David Irving dispels the myth of wedge driving:

for the first two weeks of October 1939, Hitler unquestionably wavered between continuing the fight and making peace with the remaining belligerents on the best terms he could get. The fact that he had ordered the Wehrmacht to get ready for ‘Operation Yellow’ (Fall Gelb, the attack on France and the Low Countries) in no way detracts from the reality of his peace offensive. Germany would have needed at least fifty years to digest the new territories and carry out the enforced settlement programmes planned by Heinrich Himmler to fortify the German blood in the east.

Thus Hitler’s peace feelers toward London were sincere – not just a ploy to drive a wedge between Britain and France. Weizsäcker wrote early in October: ‘The attempt to wind up the war now is for real. I myself put the chances at twenty percent, [Hitler] at fifty percent; his desire is 100 percent. If he obtained peace . . . it would eliminate the awkward decision as to how to reduce Britain by military means.’ Early in September Göring had hinted to the British through Birger Dahlerus that Germany would be willing to restore sovereignty to a Poland shorn of the old German provinces excised from the Fatherland at the end of the Great War; there would also be a reduction in German armaments. The British response had been a cautious readiness to listen to the detailed German proposals. Hitler told Dahlerus in Berlin late on September 26 that if the British still wanted to salvage anything of Poland, they would have to make haste, and now he could do nothing without consulting his Russian friends. Dahlerus left for London at once.

David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2002), Pp. 240-241


Having said this, it also seriously calls into question Tooze's idea that Hitler was driving to war in 1939 to come into conflict with the West sooner rather than later.

On Hitler's orders to suspend the order to invade Poland 3 times, you can read this in Toland's book. I will refrain from posting about it right now as this post is very long. There's more that could be said, but in truth I am, now at 4 in the morning losing my ability to think and string together anything worthwhile.

Lastly of all, see this new find regarding peace offers and war guilt:

412681538.jpg
At the very beginning of his book, Richard Lamb outright blames Poland for the war in 1939:
Britain only declared war on Germany in September 1939 because Chamberlain's hands were tied by his ill-considered guarantee to Poland the previous March. The Poles, not the British, called Hitler's bluff, and triggered off the war by refusing to sent at the eleventh hour a plenipotentiary to Berlin to negotiate the immediate surrender of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to Hitler. Then Goering established contact with Downing Street and made strenuous efforts to preserve peace. Even after Hitler invaded Poland, Chamberlain and the Foreign Secretary, Halifax, were anxious to make terms with Hitler provided the remainder of Poland was left intact; but the Commons overruled them.

[...]

After Dunkirk, with Churchill firmly in the saddle, there was no chance of a negotiated peace with Hitler; the Prime Minister issued the edict that there was to be 'absolute silence' and no parley through neutral countries even with well-known bona fide anti-Nazis. He was later equally rigid about 'unconditional surrender'.

Richard Lamb, The Ghosts of Peace 1935-1945 (Michael Russell Ltd, 1987), Pp. ix-x
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 3 weeks 4 days ago (Thu Jul 09, 2020 5:24 pm)

HMSendeavour wrote:There's an interesting photo here which seems to be taken from a secret british file, or folder regarding peace offers:

Image

It mentions, as you can see that Hitler's peace offers were occurring during and after the German-Polish war, and of course through 1940 and 1941. The fact that the Germans were seeking peace with Britain in September 1939 should be an astonishing blow to the orthodox narrative. Yet it's ignored entirely. Or if it's mentioned, it's brushed aside with a comment about how these offers cannot be trusted, or they're to drive a wedge between some country or another. Very lame excuses that are based on nothing but presumptions about Hitler's motives, which, when you look at the documentary evidence is quite clear. Peace with the west was Hitler's intention.

What you come to understand is that Hitler's attack against Poland was never the impetus for the beginning of a general war, let alone a world war.

Yes it is clear that he did not want war with Britain, he wanted an alliance with them against communism: something he wrote about in detail in Chapter 4 of Mein Kampf.

But I found a full version of that document, or rather that specific page. There is more to it for sure, is this the only page we have? It starts on #2, #5 is not finished. The first paragraph before "2." sounds like something that would be at the top of every document, not a continuation of what would be #1 (or "section 1" referred to in point 3). There's a good chance they had a summary or table of peace offers and dates in the full report somewhere.

Image
mirror: http://archive.fo/hbaJO

HIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
SECRET. Copy No. 8

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL PEACE FEELERS
SEPTEMBER 1939-MARCH 1941.

THIS memorandum contains a summary of the chief peace-feelers which have been received by His Majesty's Government, the terms suggested where these were defined, and the reply returned where such was considered necessary or desirable.

2. It will be seen that these feelers occurred, generally speaking, at certain clearly defined periods and corresponded to the progress of German operations in the military sphere. The most substantial and forthcoming offers were received during and after the lightning campaign in Poland, when the German Government hoped that the Allies would recognise the accomplished fact and agree to a settlement before fighting began in the west. Even after Mr. Chamberlain's speech on the 12th October, 1939, which made it clear that the door was closed to all compromise on the German model, further less definite overtures were received until the outbreak of fighting in the spring. The suggestions began again after the collapse of France, when they were represented as a last offer before the invasion of England. Understandably, the terms offered were even less favourable than those advanced after the war in Poland. Though they were decisively rejected, feelers continued in a desultory fashion throughout the autumn of 1940 and the spring of 1941, but no serious basis for negotiations was suggested.

3. In nearly all these overtures Göring was alleged to be either the prime mover or at least an interested party. It was he who, according to the Swede, Dahlerus (section 1), hoped to negotiate an honourable settlement after the fall of Poland and offered to replace Hitler as the real ruler of Germany once peace was signed: and his name has constantly recurred. The other alleged to be in favour of peace was a section of the German Army. These gentlemen were said to fear the outcome of the pact with the Soviet Union and to favour a peace of compromise, accompanied by the removal of Hitler and his replacement by a more moderate Government. They never suggested, however, any detailed basis for discussion and they never afforded any evidence of their ability to carry out such terms as might be agreed upon or to bring about the promised change of Government; while they gave no proof that the new Government would be any more trustworthy than the old.

4. It is not easy to decide precisely how genuine these different approaches were. It is no doubt true that certain sections of German opinion hoped before the outbreak of war that a more moderate handling of the situation would produce a compromise with England which would still satisfy the bulk of Germany's aspirations. After the war had begun this section may still have hoped that peace on the same basis was possible. It seems clear, however, that their influence was greatly overstated by the emissaries who approached us on their behalf, while the terms suggested, in so far as they were ever defined, did not ever offer a theoretical basis for negotiation. All the proposals amounted to suggesting that we should purchase peace at the sacrifice of the cause for which we were fighting and of the Allies with whom we had taken up arms. In fact, if the various moves are considered together and not in isolation, they appear suspiciously like elements in a grand propaganda design, aimed principally at testing the strength of the peace school in England and at sowing the seeds of doubt in our minds and in the minds of the less stalwart neutrals, through whom the overtures were mostly directed.

5. The policy adopted by His Majesty's Government in 1939 and 1940 was to ignore the less serious approaches and to answer more authentic on the model of Mr. Chamberlain's statement in Parliament on the 12th October, 1939. At the same time the President of the United States was made aware of the suggestions which we had received and of our attitude towards them, in order that there should be no doubt in the United States of our

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PDF: http://web.archive.org/web/2020/pdfview ... 9-1941.pdf | http://web.archive.org/web/202007092206 ... 9-1941.pdf

I think that the German people would have supported the peace even if it meant Hitler was to be replaced by Goering. The fact is, they didn't try. Diplomacy is negotiation. Hitler's proposals often have a list of demands, but I am sure he would have settled on certain thing. Example:
Image

That's how diplomacy often works. You ask for 10 things, the other side says "no" to half of them and offers replacements. After enough back-and-forth, the finally agreed-upon proposal has changed by 80%.

Once an individual (*cough* NFrNJ *cough*) told me that if Hitler wanted peace he should have just stopped fighting the war :roll: :lol:
"There is a principal which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principal is contempt prior to investigation."
-- Herbert Spencer

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby HMSendeavour » 3 weeks 4 days ago (Thu Jul 09, 2020 10:37 pm)

Lamprecht wrote:I think that the German people would have supported the peace even if it meant Hitler was to be replaced by Goering. The fact is, they didn't try. Diplomacy is negotiation. Hitler's proposals often have a list of demands, but I am sure he would have settled on certain thing.


Hitler's "demands" amounted to the minimum Germany deserved in any fair negotiation over these lands lost, cutting out any other bullshit. It would be wrong to be demonized by your employer if they wanted to negotiate how much money you deserve to be payed after having already worked a certain amount of hours, but they refused to pay you in full for all those hours. If they told you they wanted to negotiate, that you shouldn't "make demands" on what you're owed, I'm sure you'd feel pretty damn frustrated too.

Germany didn't owe Poland or Britain anything, but they still held on to what was stolen from Germany as if they had the right to do so. Wasting Germany's time and goodwill towards them on purpose. Inciting a war by dragging out the negotiations, presumably to build up military power on their own side. They did this and blamed Germany for the war when they should have either allowed Hitler to take Danzig and the corridor, or after Poland fell, make peace.

But this isn't what the British wanted, they wanted total victory, to avoid making any fair concessions. The proof is in the pudding, after multiple German attempts to make peace the answer was "no" every single time.

I am not sure what you mean by "they didn't try", they clearly did and the British weren't receptive to it as you can see in this document. There would've been no point in Hitler stepping down and appointing Goering if it wasn't going to secure the desired outcome, it only would've made Germany look weak and probably make the British and Poles even more secure in their desire to incite a war after having witnessed Germany's desperation.

Hitler's 16 points as found in The Newcastle Sun, Friday, September 1, 1939:

Hitler's Sixteen Points

Herr Hitler's Sixteen point plan sets out:

(1) Danzig, on account of its purely German character and the unanimous will of its population, shall return to the Reich unconditionally and forthwith.

(2) The Polish Corridor shall decide for itself whether it desires to belong to Germany or Poland, for which a plebiscite shall be held. Polish police, military and other authorities must leave the Corridor at the shortest possible notice except Gdynia, which unconditionally remains Polish. THe exact German-Polish frontier between Gdynia and Germany muc be determined by agreement between Berlin and Warsaw.

(3) Those entitled to vote in the plebiscite will be all Germans and Poles resident in the Corridor since January 1, 1938, or born therein. All Germans expelled from the Corridor or forced to leave will return in order to vote.

(4) In order to guarantee free voting. An international commission will be constituted similar to that in the Saar plebiscite. Its representatives shall be from France and Britain and the commission will exercise sovereign rights in the territory.

(5) THe plebiscite is not to take place before a lapse of 12 months.

(6) During that period Germany's lines of access to East Prussia and Poland's access to the sea is to be secured by rail and road.

(7) The plebiscite is to be determined by a single majority.

(8) Irrespective of the results of the plebiscite, there is to be an extra-territorial traffic zone. For instance, the Reich
would have a motor road and a four track railway line connecting it to East Prussia, but if the plebiscite went in favor of Germany, Poland would have extra-territorial and rail connection with Gdynia.

(9) In the event of the Corridor being returned to the Reich, there would be an exchange of populations.

(10) Any special rights claimed by Poland are to be compensated for by similar rights given to Germany in Gdynia

(11) Danzig and Gdynia are to be purely commercial towns and not fortified.

(12) There is to be a settlement of complaints of the German and Polish minorities by submission to an International Commission.

(13) Germany and Poland will mutually agree to repair and recompense all economic damages caused by their respective minorities since 1918.

(14) Minorities remaining in their country after the plebiscite will, by mutual agreement be exempted from military service and enjoy full social and cultural freedom.

(15) For the settlement of possible complaints among the German and Polish minorities, both contracting parties agree that these complaints should be submitted to the International Commission, which will investigate each case on its merits.

(16) In the event of acceptance of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to oder and carry out immediate demobilisation of their respective armies.

https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/167317882


In this same Newspaper article you can even see the British obstinacy:

the settlement should be one safeguarding the essential interests of Poland


When asked about the points a "spokesman at the German Embassy in London said":

There is no time limit of acceptance of the 16 points.

They are not a demand, but merely a basis of negotiation but the attitude of the Poles in not sending a delegation to Berlin amounts to a refusal to negotiate.

It they do not come soon it is not known what will happen.

We are still waiting a definite reply from Poland. We are willing to negotiate and are prepared to accept the result of
a plebiscite if it goes against us.

Whatever happens, we much have free communication with East Prussia just as the Poles have with Gdynia
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby Lamprecht » 3 weeks 3 days ago (Fri Jul 10, 2020 8:43 am)

HMSN: Whether the demands were modest or not isn't the point I am making. Either the British turned them down because they wanted war or because they didn't agree to the points. In the latter case, they could have engaged in "negotiation" - a process all politicians are supposed to be good at. And taking away some of the points would not be the only way to negotiate; the British could have added additional demand to the agreement if they were interested in peace. Clearly, they were not. If that document you posted is genuine (I really wish we had all the pages) they were not even ready to accept peace if it removed Hitler from power.
"There is a principal which is a bar against all information, which is proof against all arguments, and which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance -- that principal is contempt prior to investigation."
-- Herbert Spencer

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby HMSendeavour » 3 weeks 3 days ago (Fri Jul 10, 2020 12:42 pm)

Lamprecht wrote:HMSN: Whether the demands were modest or not isn't the point I am making. Either the British turned them down because they wanted war or because they didn't agree to the points. In the latter case, they could have engaged in "negotiation" - a process all politicians are supposed to be good at. And taking away some of the points would not be the only way to negotiate; the British could have added additional demand to the agreement if they were interested in peace. Clearly, they were not. If that document you posted is genuine (I really wish we had all the pages) they were not even ready to accept peace if it removed Hitler from power.


Yes indeed. I agree entirely. There's no way the British in this situation look like the good guys. As they say, action speaks louder the words. The British had a ton of words, and they're taken at their word all the same, if not only judged by them. The appeals to peace mean nothing when your actions speak as if you don't want it. Even after when it was being pushed into your face.

The document is probably genuine. I would be very surprised if it wasn't. I am curious as to where the picture came from, and indeed, if there is somewhere the entire folder or number of pages as to the details of these peace offers.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference

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Re: [Video] A Last Appeal To Reason - Hitler's various peace offers

Postby HMSendeavour » 2 weeks 2 days ago (Sat Jul 18, 2020 2:01 pm)

Remember, historians don't want peace, they want warmongers.

In a review of the biography of Winston Churchill written by Andrew Roberts, we're given Churchill's achievements summarized:

In the balance, Roberts convincingly demonstrates that Churchill got it right more times than he got it wrong. "The important point about Churchill in 1940 is not that he stopped a German invasion that year," Roberts writes, "but that he stopped the British Government from making peace." So yes, Winston was often wrong. But when he was right, well, my God.

https://archive.vn/R045E


Historians don't hate warmongers. They love them, they idolize them, and they write glowing biographies about them. In reality, the only people these people hate are German Nationalists, as Hitler was in its purest form.

Historians also have a soft spot for Communists. You don't need to go very far to find these people gallivanting their exaltations upon the "heroic Red Army" while ignoring the essential part played by the Soviet Union in also invading Poland. The hypocritical historian hysteria regarding their aberrations and abhorrent treatment of Hitler should be classed as some kind of mental disorder. They just cannot make sense of him because of their heightened senses looking for unique evil and sinister motives in everything. To the point where peace with Hitler would mean there's no alleged deaths of 6 million Jews, no Second World War; these undoubtedly positive things are seen as absolute evil. Why? Because they wouldn't get to see Hitler and his Germany destroyed and humiliated.

This shared mental deficiency among "historians" goes unnoticed all the time. They preach war, they want war, they probably love the Second World War more than any of the National Socialists they lie about. Yet they manage in the same breaths to claim to detest the war and the Germans who they falsely claim triggered it. We have all seen it, their obsession with the wars "necessity". A claim they make to justify to themselves why they can feel pride in it, without feeling guilty that they had a large hand in starting it. In fact, it was this attitude of "necessity" on the side of the Allies against Hitler that started the war to begin with.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference


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