The most people ever put into concentration camps during this period was 100-200,000. They were always Communists, Social Democrats or Socialist and whatever Jews got caught up in was because of their harmful ideology. It should be kept in mind that 200,000 people in 1933 who were subsequently released was less than 1% of the German population as a whole. Violence didn't ever characterize NS Germany until after the war and the birth of the Holocaust storyline. It's an utter lie to pretend actions like those taken against Gilges was commonplace whatsoever. I cannot help but notice how the sources in that section seem to be anecdotal, quoting his daughter isn't a particularly objective measure. But it doesn't matter, these historians love to quote whoever they can to support their views, but as soon as a National Socialist informs the public on the countless academic lies he's suddenly 'not to be trusted'.
Many concentration camp survivors report that it was only the earliest generation of SA guards that tortured prisoners for pleasure. The SS guards who followed them tented rather to be 'businesslike'. - David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, pp. 287
For the Gestapo read this article https://inconvenienthistory.com/8/3/4172
From the above article.
A harsh calling to account of opponents in the first few months of Nazi rule was unleashed on the Communists with the sanction of Göring, not by the Gestapo or the SS but by the SA, and it proved “difficult to contain.”20 However given that the National Socialist assumption to government was a social revolution, it was one of the more bloodless in history in comparison to the revolutions that ushered the modern democratic era, such as the Jacobins with their extermination of the Vendee, and the Bolshevik revolution with its tens of millions of victims.
While Gestapo chief Rudolf Diels, an opportunist, claimed at Nuremberg that up to 7,000 political opponents were killed by the SA during in the first year of Nazi rule, McDonough lowers the figure to 1,000.21 He also points out that most of the Gestapo were veteran civil servants who tried to restrain the SA.22
There are several issues here: (1) This autonomous action by the SA, in conflict with other sections of the party and state, is an indication of the manner in which the Hitler regime was not as totalitarian as supposed and was plagued by factionalism with the personality of Hitler holding disparate elements together even throughout the war. (2) Diels’s testimony at Nuremberg as to the number of SA victims, disputed by McDonough, is an example of the flawed testimony of the proceedings. Why then believe any of it without subjecting the whole lot to scrutiny and doubt?
The Communist Party had its own stormtroopers, the Red Front Fighters League. The fighting between the Nazis and the Reds was a bloody affair. Even the police casualties (1928-1932) from Communist violence resulted in 11 dead and 1,121 injured. Over the same period the Nazi casualties from Red violence were 128 Nazis killed and 19,769 injured.23 That SA vengeance resulting in perhaps 1,000 dead Communists seems remarkably restrained given the years of conflict.
Perspective is a sobering thing my friends.
Beginning in early 1933, the police and Nazi Storm Troopers started cracking heads, and new concentration camps were established, but not much more than a mini-wave of terror swept Germany. By and large, terror was not needed to force the majority or even significant minorities into line. By mid-1933, or the end of that year at the latest, power was already secured, and the brutalities and violence that are identified with the so-called Nazi ‘seizure of power’, began to wane.5 Terror itself does not adequately explain how the Third Reich came to be, nor account for its considerable staying power. [...]. Under the circumstances, there was an obvious political incentive for Hitler’s regime to act decisively against democratic and liberal activities of all kinds, to outlaw opposition parties beginning with the Communists, and to combine that with a crackdown in the name of law and order. - Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler, (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 2
In Prussia, for example, the Interior Ministry (Göring) and the Gestapo (Diels) were successful in closing the SA prisons throughout the fall and even pressed charges against SA goons for egregious mistreatment of prisoners. But in Bavaria efforts by the Nazi state authorities to investigate charges of torture in Dachau were thwarted by the SS and SD (Himmler, Heydrich) and the SA (Röhm), who maintained that charges of abuse and torture were fairy tales and, anyway, what right did the Bavarian Interior Ministry have to be snooping around for atrocity stories? Hitler, as usual, did nothing. - Thomas Childers, The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, (Simon and Schuster, 2017), pp. 269
During the early years of the Third Reich, there was no concentration camp system. Camps sprang up across the country, some run by the SA, some by local Nazi governments, some by the regional police, some by the Gestapo. Each camp operated according to its own procedures, its own administration. These camps were not intended to be permanent installations. No long-range plans were made; no thought given as to whether they would continue to operate once the wave of mass arrests of Socialists, Communists, and other outright opponents had passed in 1933. Their purpose was to incarcerate political prisoners; they were not intended to hold Jews unless they were engaged in resistance or anti-Nazi activities. Göring, as head of the Gestapo in 1933, began closing many of the smaller, unregulated camps, and Himmler continued the process in 1934. [...] But the future existence of camps was still uncertain. With camps closing and the number of prisoners falling, the SS system was a rather small-scale operation. Only five camps were still operating in the summer of 1935, and the number of their prisoners had dropped to 4,000. They were dwarfed by the official prison system, which held more than 100,000 inmates, 23,000 of them political prisoners. At this time Hitler even considered closing the camps. Were they really still necessary? Himmler talked him out of it. - Thomas Childers, The Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, (Simon and Schuster, 2017), pp. 320-321
Unfortunately with some very important truth admissions comes lies to make up for it. Ones that are unfounded and emotional on Childer's part.
On page 319 of his book he has this very long and lie filled polemic about how Germans supposedly felt, describing Germany as if it were Russia.
But behind the elaborately constructed facade of social solidarity and enthusiastic support for the regime there lurked a more complicated—and uglier—reality. With each passing year, the sinister reach of the Gestapo extended deeper and deeper into the private lives of the population. The Gestapo seemed to be everywhere, always listening, always watching. One might be arrested for “subjective crime,” what one thought, in addition to “objective crime,” public actions, or for being “anti-community-minded.” A prisoner might be released after an hour or so, but the effect was chilling. Since arrests often occurred in the dark early-morning hours when, the Gestapo understood, people were at their most psychologically vulnerable, rumor and fear mounted. It didn’t take many of these nighttime arrests to convince the public that the Gestapo had eyes and ears in every house, every apartment, in every bar and public place. One didn’t dare ask too many questions or express disappointment, not to mention disapproval, too openly. Neighbors and family members were prodded to inform on one another; each building, each city block had its Blockwart (monitor) who made sure that residents of his assigned area put out the flag on the Führer’s birthday, contributed to the Nazi charities, and listened to the Führer’s speeches on the radio. Children were encouraged to report on their parents—had they heard anything subversive at home, anything disrespectful of the regime, its policies or its leaders? A torrent of anonymous denunciations flooded Gestapo offices, as people quickly learned how to instrumentalize the system, settling old grudges by denouncing a rival in love or at work or a troublesome neighbor. The Gestapo, in fact, was quite small—much smaller than the East German Stasi of postwar years—and relied heavily on such denunciations.
This whole section is rubbish. From the article earlier.
he American historian Robert Gellately showed in his 1990 book The Gestapo and German Society, that they relied on public support, and that the “Gestapo posed no real threat to law-abiding citizens in Nazi Germany.” American historian Eric Johnson in his 1999 book The Nazi Terror, based on court files from Cologne and Krefeld and from interviews, showed that loyal Germans were treated with “kid gloves,” and that “most Germans did not fear [the Gestapo] at all.” He did differ from Gellately in considering Gestapo officers as more proactive and brutal. While these studies were limited as to localities, McDonough sought a broader study of Gestapo files. [...] The Gestapo relied on the public for information on state enemies. The assumption that denunciation to the Gestapo meant torture and concentration camps is wrong. The Gestapo spent “an exhaustive amount of time” on cases; “most ended up being dismissed, with no charge, or a surprisingly lenient punishment.” The maximum duration allowed for protective custody was 21 days, but the Gestapo tried to resolve matters before that time. Releases from custody were “the norm, not the exception.” McDonough states that the Gestapo followed “very strict legal guidelines.” The Gestapo had a great deal of autonomy within its own structure. Some cases that carried the death penalty “were often dismissed, without charge,” while some that seem trivial might receive harsh punishment. All cases were investigated with thoroughness. [...] McDonough estimates that 26 per cent of all Gestapo cases started with denunciation from a member of the public, and 15 per cent as a result of Gestapo surveillance. Most denouncers were working-class, 20 per cent were women, and a lot of the latter involved domestic issues, many resulting from a personal conflict with a neighbor, relative or husband. The Gestapo became “adept” at discovering the motive. The denouncer was seldom prosecuted for making false accusations.77 So far from meaning a sentence of death, McDonough states that sentences for anti-Nazi slurs were one to six months’ imprisonment.78 “Contrary to the popular assumption, there was not a flood of denunciations.”79 The Gestapo handled accusations against normally law-abiding individuals “with professional diligence and often surprising compassion.” “It was not even unusual” for individuals to formally complain if they regarded Gestapo actions as “high handed.” 80 Civil complaints could be heard in court. Conditions became stricter with the advent of war. Although one might be jailed for up to two years for listening to a foreign broadcast, one might instead be named and shamed in the local press. Again cases came usually from public information, not Gestapo surveillance.81 McDonough refers to a case where the Gestapo officer acted with “understanding and compassion” in persuading an informant to drop a complaint prompted by someone’s drunken bravado.82
One of the most bizarre cases was that of an unemployed alcoholic laborer, Adam Lipper, who in 1940 walked into a Gestapo office and asked to be interned for six months, to cure his alcoholism. He wanted to be a valuable member of the national community. He was released after seven weeks, having assessed himself cured.83
As the war entered the phase of German defeat, the situation became harsher, with some rather trivial cases of “looting” bombed-out houses resulting in death sentences, yet only a minority of cases went to court, and of those only a minority succeeded in conviction. “Gestapo brutality is almost entirely absent” in cases of denunciation of ordinary citizens. The Gestapo was an organization “that the law-abiding public felt it could trust.”
Childers has straight out lied to the readers of his book. People who would never have known if they didn't read articles or other longer books on the topic.
Historian Eric Johnson has also written another book that is largely statistical and shows us what Germans and Jews felt or experienced during the Third Reich. An article on this book has been written before here http://www.inconvenienthistory.com/10/2/5504 which mainly centers around the recollections and the relation to the Holocaust. I however, want to quote from the sections which had conclusive survey data. This will further cement Childers and those who lie about 'terror' as untrustworthy, for they think it possible to portray some truth surrounded by obfuscations. This will never go unnoticed to those with a keen eye. After all, they only need to hoodwink the public, that has been done already without the publications of these books.
From Eric Johnson's book "What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder, and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany (Basic Books, 2006)"
In general, the early concentration camps existed only a short time; nonetheless, several thousand people fell victim to all kinds of violence as the Nazis consolidated power in 1933. Around 100,000 people were arrested and temporarily jailed. - pp. 346
And here's the table.our survey evidence shows that most Germans had little contact with either the newly established Gestapo or the other organs of Nazi terror [...] The evidence provided in the table shows that only 47 of the 2,601 people who answered this question in the four cities we surveyed were ever arrested or interrogated by either the Gestapo or the regular police during all the years of the Third Reich. This means that an average of less than 2 percent of the non-Jewish people in these cities--even though many of them hailed from former left-wing backgrounds and most (as will be shown below) had broken the laws of the Third Reich in the course of their daily lives--were ever accused of wrongdoing in Nazi Germany, much less punished for such activity [...] If this evidence calls into question the long-held notion that terror was ubiquitous in Nazi Germany, the evidence in the table showing that most survey respondents did not personally know anyone who had ever been accused of committing an illegal act calls it further into question. Only in dresden, which lies in Saxony, where communist and socialist activity was perhaps more pronounced than in many other regions of Germany, did more than 30 percent of arrested or interrogated. Thus, in the other three cities, over 70 percent of the respondents knew nobody at all who came afoul of the Gestapo or the police. - pp. 348
And lastly childers lies about the children who were supposed to snitch on their parents.
On page 141 of Johnson's book he's published a testimony from a man called "Hubert Lutz".
Born in 1928 and raised as the son of a mid level Nazi Party functionary and former truck driver in Cologne, Hubert Lutz was a member of the Hitler youth from the age of seven to seventeen. A physicist by profession, he emigrated to the United States in 1959
Lutz tells us that "In my Ten years in the Hitler Youth, I never heard anybody suggest that you spy on your parents or that you spy on anybody else."
And this should tell us quite a lot. One, this evidence is most certainly as good or better than Childers who no doubt has employed similar stories from those in the Hitler youth, or even just academic hearsay. If this did happen then it happened outside the confines of the Hitler Youth and system in general. In other words, it wasn't policy and there's no document which tells the Hitler youth to do this.