Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"

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Re: The War Guilt Question of World War II

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 9:12 am)

Hektor wrote:I wonder if the British or French would have been that amicable, if Northumbria or the Provence was cut of from their country.


They surely would have. Look at how Britain reacted during the Falkland crisis. It may not be a perfect example, but the point is that the British were eager to go to war over territories of theirs that were threatened, Germany had every right to do the same. That Hitler was "mean" to statesmen like Hacha and Schuschnigg is hardly contemptable considering war was avoided on both occasions.

In the case of the Czech remnant Hacha really had no choice, so even if you disapprove of Hitler's behaviour towards him, the outcome really couldn't have been any different. Czechia was in the German orbit anyway, and eventually it wouldn't become a protectorate regardless of whether or not Hacha requested to go to Berlin and seek German support for an independent state.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.

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Re: The War Guilt Question of World War II

Postby zapper » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 6:17 pm)

HMSendeavour wrote:
In the case of the Czech remnant Hacha really had no choice, so even if you disapprove of Hitler's behaviour towards him, the outcome really couldn't have been any different. Czechia was in the German orbit anyway, and eventually it wouldn't become a protectorate regardless of whether or not Hacha requested to go to Berlin and seek German support for an independent state.


What happened with Hacha? Is there any truth to the orthodox interpretation:

" Finally, at 1:30 a.m., on 15 March 1939, Hitler saw the President. He told Hácha that as they were speaking, the German army was about to invade Czechoslovakia.[1]

Hitler then gave the Czech President two options: cooperate with Germany, in which case the "entry of German troops would take place in a tolerable manner" and "permit Czechoslovakia a generous life of her own, autonomy and a degree of national freedom..." or face a scenario in which "resistance would be broken by force of arms, using all means."[8] Minutes of the conversation noted that for Hácha this was the most difficult decision of his life, but believed that in only a few years this decision would be comprehensible and in 50 years would probably be regarded as a blessing"

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Re: The War Guilt Question of World War II

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 6:30 pm)

zapper wrote:What happened with Hacha? Is there any truth to the orthodox interpretation:


Yeah, I've read the documents and indeed Hitler made such a threat. But it was a bluff for the most part, although the German army was set to invade anyway. To be fair to Hitler though, the Czechs had it coming due to the fact that Hacha had illegally dismissed the Slovakian cabinet and invaded Slovakian territory with troops declaring marshal law. Hitler was entering Czechia on the side of the Slovaks. So Hitler's threat wasn't totally unjustified, and even if he hadn't made it, it's unlikely the outcome would've been any different. Hacha as A.J.P. Taylor and others have written, was seeking conciliation from the Germans and believed the Czech state would be in good hands, and he was right.

Although it should be noted, the threat was not premeditated. Hitler had to recall Goering from his holiday in Switzerland, as Goering noted at Nuremberg, he thought Hitler was being a bit hasty and it wasn't something that necessarily needed to be solved right away. It was very much a last minute opportunistic decision. There's probably more that could be gone into regarding the topic, but this is the roughest outline.

Hitler in 1942 described the affair like this:

I'm convinced that the Czechs will end by regarding Hacha as one of the greatest political figures in their history!

In 1939 I gave them an ultimatum by the terms of which they had until six o'clock to accept my proposals—otherwise German aircraft would be over Prague. I would have irremediably lost face if I'd had to put this threat into execution, for at the hour mentioned fog was so thick over our airfields that none of our aircraft could have made its sortie. At three o'clock the meeting with Hacha was over. He informed his Government, and three-quarters of an hour later we were notified that the order had been carried out. German troops would enter Czechoslovakia without striking a blow. The Czechs had their army well under control. The order sent by Hacha had been framed by my advisers. Hacha's visit caused me concern, for he was a very fragile old gentleman. Imagine the uproar in the foreign press if anything had happened to him! In the morning he was animated by a spirit of resistance that contrasted with his usual behaviour. He especially opposed the idea that his Minister of Foreign Affairs should countersign our agreement. I said to myself: "Look out ! Here's a lawyer I have facing me." Perhaps there was an arrangement in Czechoslovakia giving the force of a law only to an agreement of this sort if it was countersigned by the Minister in question?

On the following day, in Prague, Hacha asked me what we had done to make such a different man of him. He was himself astonished to have suddenly shown such obstinacy. It was probably the result of the injection Morell had given him to build him up again. His renewed energy turned against us!

At present I receive from Hacha the warmest messages of sympathy. I don’t publish them, so as not to create the impression that we need the support of an underdog.

Adolf Hitler, 13th January 1942, Hitler's Table Talk 1941-1944: His Private Conversations (New York: Enigma Books, 2000), Pp. 204-205.


This basically accords with the facts, so it can be regarded as reliable.

It was simply not in Germany's interests to maintain a totally independent Czech state. It had only existed for 20 years, and was by no means considered a pillar of Europe, it was if anything, a buffer to Germany in the east used to enforce Britain's balance of power policy, it was a dagger into Germany's hinterland. It's only natural that Hitler, or any other German statesmen, would wish to remove such a threat. Nothing about the Czech state was sacred, and she couldn't exist on her own at that time.

You mustn't forget either, Bohemia and Moravia had been apart of Germany for over 1000 years prior to her independence:

Before tackling this topic, it is worthwhile to remind those little familiar with European history that the region of Bohemia and Moravia had been an integral part of Germany and/or Austria for more than a thousand years before the end of World War I. To underscore this fact, a timeline of this rule is given first before we turn to the issue at hand:

1113 Years of German Rule in Bohemia-Moravia/Czechia

Czechs 1.PNG
Czechs 2.PNG


Seen from that perspective, reintegrating this part into greater Germany merely 20 years after it had become independent with the aid of Germany’s enemies, is not all that much of an outrage as it is usually portrayed nowadays.

Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II? (Castle Hill Publishers, 2014), Pp. 123-124.


Germany, clearly, had much more of a claim to Bohemia and Moravia than is often mentioned.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.

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Re: Hitler's 26 September 1938 claim Sudetenland "last territorial demand in Europe" a lie? // "Appeasement"

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 1 week ago (Mon May 10, 2021 6:55 am)

The claim that Hitler allegedly "broke" the Munich agreement - which has been covered already - is an bald-faced lie. Yet sometimes historians who wish to accuse Hitler of breaking a promise don't mention the Munich agreement per se, instead they allude to a conciliatory "agreement" signed between Hitler and Chamberlain at Munich on September 30th 1938, which stated to the effect that as representatives of Germany and Great Britain, they would consult each other on any further "questions that may concern our two countries". These "questions" were left undefined, and it's by no means clear that Czecho-Slovakia (now hyphenated) was any of Britain's concern, nor was it clear that this last minute agreement suggested by Chamberlain, was anything more than a piece of paper which served the purpose of declaring good-will in a gentlemanly manner between the two countries. Nonetheless, Hitler is accused of "breaking" this "agreement" (which was too short and vague to really be deserving of such a title). This has already been shown to be nonsense, but it must be reiterated, and will be momentarily...

It's also said, particularly at the time when Hitler turned the Czech state into a protectorate after the secession of Slovakia on March 14, that Hitler had "broken his promise at Munich that the Sudetenland would be his last territorial demand in Europe". This was also a lie, one that was kept out of the eye of the Anglophone public around the world and remains largely in-tact today.

The reality is that the British knew full well that Czechia was going to be brought further into the German orbit, and that she'd probably become a protectorate. They knew, because they had initiated it by suggesting that Hacha go to Berlin:

On March 14, in the morning hours, Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine placed themselves under the protection of the German Reich as independent states, following declarations of independence and decisions of their new governments. HITLER assumed the protection of Slovakia, not Ruthenia, to which Hungary also laid claim. Still on March 14, Hungary invaded Ruthenia after a 12-hour ultimatum to Prague. In view of this worsening situation of the breakup of Czecho-Slovakia, the British Ambassador in Berlin, Nevile HENDERSON, on March 14, 1939, urgently suggested to the Czech Envoy in Berlin, MASTNY, that he see to it that the Czech Foreign Minister, CHVALKOWSKY, come immediately to Berlin and discuss the situation with HITLER. The British Ambassador in Prague, NEWTON, supported this. HACHAS's later visit to Berlin with his Foreign Minister was thus at British suggestion, not initiated by HITLER.

Moreover, even before HACHA's arrival in Berlin, the German Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, Ernst VON WEIZSÄCKER - father of the later Federal President - had asked HENDERSON how the British Government would behave if HACHA, as was to be expected, placed the rest of Czechoslovakia under a German protectorate. HENDERSON, therefore, knowing the German intention of the future of Bohemia and Moravia, immediately informed London of it and was authorized by the British Foreign Secretary, HALIFAX, to declare that Great Britain had no desire to interfere in matters which directly concerned other countries. HENDERSON assured the Germans that London would not interfere in their Czech policy.

Rolf Kosiek und Olaf Rose (ed.), Der Grosse Wendig: Richtigstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte: Band 1 (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 2006), Pp. 566-567; David L. Hoggan, Der Erzwungene Krieg: Die Ursachen und Urheber des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, Vierzehnte Auflage 1990), Pp. 336. In English: David L. Hoggan, The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed (Institute for Historical Review, 1989), Pp. 248.


This was also confirmed by Francis Neilson as I previously quoted in this thread:

The report that Hitler had acted entirely on his own in this matter is quite untrue. The British documents show that Sir Neville Henderson was informed of everything that took place. His dispatch to. Halifax in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Third Series, Volume IV (1951), No. 256, is conclusive proof of the correct diplomatic procedure. There is, also, in the same volume the dispatch of Mr. Newton from Prague to the British Foreign Office (No. 262). We learn from them:

. . . The Czecho-Slovak President declared that in order to serve this purpose, and in order to secure final pacification, he placed the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the hands of the Führer of the German Reich. The Führer accepted this declaration and expressed his determination to take the Czech people under the protection of the German Reich and to guarantee to it an autonomous development of its national life in accordance with its particular characteristics.


Francis Neilson, Some Political Issues in the Background of World War II, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Jul., 1959), Pp. 384.


A few things are made clear from this.

1. The gentleman's agreement signed by Hitler Chamberlain - even if applicable - for Germany and Britain to "consult each other" was not violated due to the fact that Halifax on part of Great Britain had reupdated any British interest in the Czech affair because it wasn't her concern.

2. The agreement couldn't have been violated because the British government had been consulted, if not integrally involved in bringing the Hacha-Hitler conference about, therefore they had been consulted.

3. The British couldn't pretend that it was unlikely that Czechia would be absorbed by Germany.


Chamberlain on March 15, 1939, initially confirmed the line Halifax had laid down, by justifying the German "invasion" of Czechia, effectively saying that it was none of Britain's business because the Czech state no longer existed in it's previous form:

Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons on 15 March 1939 there has been no breach of the Munich Convention. The the British Government is no longer bound by its commitment to Czechoslovakia because "the state whose borders we intended to guarantee from within and thus came to an end".

Annelies von Ribbentrop, Verschwörung gegen den Frieden (Druffel Verlag, Zweite erweiterte Auflage 1963) Pp. 304.


And on March 17th in a speech at Birmingham Chamberlain admitted that there was nothing Britain could've done anyway:

. . . Nothing that we could have done, nothing that France could have done, or Russia could have done could possibly have saved Czechoslovakia from invasion and destruction. Even if we had subsequently gone to war to punish Germany for her actions, and if after the frightful losses which would have been inflicted upon all partakers in the war we had been victorious in the end, never could we have reconstructed Czechoslovakia as she was framed by the Treaty of Versailles. . .

Neville Chamberlain, March 17, 1939. See: Neilson, op cit., p. 384.



The point of this post was just to compile some of the information already posted, along with some confirmatory new information.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.


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