Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby zapper » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 8:06 pm)

HMSendeavour wrote: All of Hitler's considerations were preoccupied with Danzig and the Corridor, not with Polish territories.


Is that why he mentions Danzig and the Corridor only once in this speech to his generals about invading a major country with the full might of the German army, in doing so possibly entering into war with the greatest European powers?

Instead he says, to quote Halder: “Trigger: Means indifferent. The winner will never be questioned as to whether his reasons were justified. It is not a question of having the law on our side, it is all about victory."

And he also says, quoting Raeder: "Providence has made us the leaders of this people and thereby given us the task of securing the necessary living space for the German people who are compressed 140 persons to a square kilometre."

I suppose we can end this here and people can make up their own mind. Hopefully Goebbels diaries will clarify a few things once I am able to track them down.

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 8:31 pm)

zapper wrote:Is that why he mentions Danzig and the Corridor only once in this speech to his generals about invading a major country with the full might of the German army


Yes. Because AGAIN Hitler's plan in a war against Poland was to defeat Poland, which is obvious. This means more than just simply taking back the territories that belonged to Germany. The defeat of Poland in a war, and securing the territories that belong to you are two entirely separate things dependant on vastly different circumstances. The circumstance in which war prevails is the one where simply taking back your own territory cannot be done without significant push-back from your enemy. If Hitler could achieve that, then he wouldn't have had to go to war with Poland in the first place, that he had to do so goes to show that the Poles for their part had no intention of just letting Germany take back Danzig and the Corridor.

Even if your assertion was true Zapper, this wouldn't precipitate a war with any other countries other than Poland.

To reiterate, it doesn't mean that Hitler desired or sought a war that was larger than just that between Germany and Poland.

The reference to crushing ‘the living daylights’ – die lebendigen Kräfte – out of Poland was misinterpreted by the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg. In fact Hitler was just stating the basic military fact that the strategic objective was to destroy the enemy, not attain some line on a map. The professional soldiers present understood this perfectly (see, e.g., Bock’s diary). Note that Hitler used precisely the same turn of phrase in his harangue to the generals before the Battle of the Ardennes, on Dec 12, 1944 (Heiber, op. cit., 721)

David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2019), Pp. 861.


What this means, is that defeating Poland was the objective, by whatever means. It was not therefore, Hitler's intention to just annex Poland. He would have to "crush her" (figure of speech) in order to achieve his aim of reclaiming lost German lands. You're making the same misinterpretation that those crooks at Nuremberg were making, because for some reason, you cannot tell the difference between a military necessity to achieve an objective, and a war-aim.

zapper wrote:in doing so possibly entering into war with the greatest European powers?


Possibly, although Hitler didn't consider it likely as he says in this speech and as he wrote in his directive for Case White:

2.) Military Conclusions


The great objectives in the reconstruction of the German Wehrmacht will continue to be determined by the antagonism of the Western Democracies. "Operation White" constitutes only a precautionary complement to these preparations. It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military conflict with the Western opponents.

The isolation of Poland will be all the more easily maintained, even after the outbreak of hostilities, if we succeed in starting the war with sudden, heavy blows and in gaining rapid successes.

The overall situation will require, however, that in all cases precautions be taken to safeguard the western frontier and the German North Sea coast, as well as the air above them.

Against the Baltic States—Lithuania in particular—security measures are to be carried out in case of a Polish march through this country.

DGFP, D, vol. VI, doc. 185., p. 225.


The rapid invasion of Poland with the full force of the German army was intended to pacify Poland as quickly as possible and forestall any possible aid offered by the Western powers in order to avoid conflict with them, hence fighting with the West was not to be seen as the logical outcome, or an expected outcome of a possible war with Poland ("It is not to be looked upon in any way, however, as the necessary prerequisite for a military conflict with the Western opponents").

As for the Goebbels diaries, which you seem to be making a point of bringing up. On September 1st as I've quoted numerous times before, Goebbels wrote that Hitler didn't expect any conflict with the West. This utterly contradicts your baseless assertion that Hitler had some conflict with them in mind, not to mention the plethora of other documents which clearly show your interpretation to be without foundation.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby zapper » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 9:03 pm)

HMSendeavour wrote:
zapper wrote:Is that why he mentions Danzig and the Corridor only once in this speech to his generals about invading a major country with the full might of the German army


Yes. Because AGAIN Hitler's plan in a war against Poland was to defeat Poland, which is obvious. This means more than just simply taking back the territories that belonged to Germany. The defeat of Poland in a war, and securing the territories that belong to you are two entirely separate things dependant on vastly different circumstances. The circumstance in which war prevails is the one where simply taking back your own territory cannot be done without significant push-back from your enemy. If Hitler could achieve that, then he wouldn't have had to go to war with Poland in the first place, that he had to do so goes to show that the Poles for their part had no intention of just letting Germany take back Danzig and the Corridor.

Even if your assertion was true Zapper, this wouldn't precipitate a war with any other countries other than Poland. it doesn't mean that Hitler desired or sought a war that was larger than just that between Germany and Poland.


I never claimed he desired war against the west as an end to itself. But rather he had pragmatic appreciation that if he sought political hegemony over Eastern Europe through force and the threat of force they would eventually turn against him.

Thus Halder: "Military use of weapons is necessary before the last major confrontation with the West; testing of the instrument.”

The reference to crushing ‘the living daylights’ – die lebendigen Kräfte – out of Poland was misinterpreted by the Allied prosecutors at Nuremberg. In fact Hitler was just stating the basic military fact that the strategic objective was to destroy the enemy, not attain some line on a map. The professional soldiers present understood this perfectly (see, e.g., Bock’s diary). Note that Hitler used precisely the same turn of phrase in his harangue to the generals before the Battle of the Ardennes, on Dec 12, 1944 (Heiber, op. cit., 721)

David Irving, Hitler's War and the War Path (Focal Point Publications, 2019), Pp. 861.


What this means, is that defeating Poland was the objective, by whatever means. It was not therefore, Hitler's intention to just annex Poland. He would have to "crush her" (figure of speech) in order to achieve his aim of reclaiming lost German lands. You're making the same misinterpretation that those crooks at Nuremberg were making, because for some reason, you cannot tell the difference between a military necessity to achieve an objective, and a war-aim.


I never claimed this was the case, w regards to the Halder reference "Objective: Destruction of Poland - elimination of its living strength"

The rapid invasion of Poland with the full force of the German army was intended to pacify Poland as quickly as possible and forestall any possible aid offered by the Western powers in order to avoid conflict with them,


I agree with this.

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 1 week ago (Sun May 09, 2021 9:41 pm)

zapper wrote:w regards to the Halder reference "Objective: Destruction of Poland - elimination of its living strength"


It's "living strength" is probably a reference to the armed forces, which is Poland's strength, and in a war would need to be destroyed. Halder's reference is a brief note, not an in-depth elaboration.

And anyway, Admiral Rader himself disputed the use of this phrase:

When Raeder six and a half years later, on 16 May 1946 in Nuremberg, is confronted with the Second Version of the aforementioned Hitler speech (798-PS), he immediately says that many of the phrases in this "protocol" are incorrect. Words-so Raeder says-such as

Annihilation of Poland in the foreground. The goal is the elimination of the living forces, not the attainment of a certain line" or "close the heart to pity, brutal action"


were not used. He argues that the German Commander-in-Chief would never have accepted the mention of such a war aim at the war's beginning.

Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, 1939 - The War that Had Many Fathers (Olzog Verlag, George F. Held English Translation, 2011), Pp. 408.



Zapper liked to quote this comment from Halder quite a lot:

zapper wrote:Instead he says, to quote Halder: “Trigger: Means indifferent. The winner will never be questioned as to whether his reasons were justified. It is not a question of having the law on our side, it is all about victory."


Zapper insisted that this comment should be taken in conjunction with a quote from Raeder-27:

zapper wrote:Raeder: "The conflict will be set in motion by appropriate propaganda. The credibility is unimportant hereby, the right lies in the victory."

Halder: "Trigger: Means indifferent. The winner will never be questioned as to whether his reasons were justified. It is not a question of having the law on our side, it is all about victory."


However, Zapper was taking the latter quote from Halder out of context, and using a faulty translation which perverted the meaning of the text. If you read it like this, as Zapper presented it, then it does appear to show that Halder was talking about the "trigger(ing)" of a conflict, by constructing a false pretence (which wouldn't matter anyway, because the Germans already had plenty of valid reasons to go to war with Poland). That Zapper thought this is admitted by him here in his comments immediately proceeding the aforementioned quotes:

zapper wrote:In your view these quotes are nonsensical. But in another view the ‘appropriate propaganda’ was the public reasons given for the invasion. Assuming these reasons were valid, Hitler/Halder/Raeder wouldn’t need to talk like this. The law would be on their side, the innate credibility of their actions would be very important. So what we’re talking about is a manufactured casus belli.


Zapper blatantly misinterpreted this quote from Halder, thinking it supported Raeder-27.

If you read Halder's notes of the August 22nd conference in the Documents on German Foreign Policy volumes, he isn't referring to a "trigger" as in providing a propaganda "trigger" for the war, he's actually referring to "The Führer's demands on his military chiefs" in terms of conduct pertaining to how the war would need to be fought, and what the mental attitude should be in fighting it in order to achieve the German aim of victory over Poland. The 'solution' (Auslösung) according to Hitler, in the words of Halder, was to be "immaterial" (meaning that it didn't matter how Germany won, only that she won; when she did, no questions would be asked because the victors write history etc. that seems to be the sentiment Hitler was going for):

German:

2.) Ziel: Vernichtung Polens - Beseitigung seiner lebendigen Kraft. Es handelt sich nicht um Erreichen einer bestimmten Linie oder einer neuen Grenze, sondern um Vernichtung des Feindes, die auf immer neuen Wegen angestrebt werden muß.

3.) Auslösung: Mittel gleichgültig. Der Sieger wird nie interpelliert, ob seine Gründe berechtigt waren. Es handelt sich nicht darum, das Recht auf unserer Seite zu haben, sondern ausschließlich um den Sieg.


English:

2) Aim: Annihilation of Poland—elimination of its vital forces. It is not a matter of gaining a specific line or a new frontier, but rather of the annihilation of an enemy, which must be constantly attempted by new ways.

3) Solution: Means immaterial. The victor is never called upon to vindicate his actions. We are not concerned with having justice on our side, but solely with victory.


For the English, see: DGFP, D, vol. VII, Appendix I, p. 559. For the German, see.


So the word, if you use google translate, does turn Auslösung into 'trigger', but in the official English translation it's translated as 'solution', like when we refer to the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" in German it's the "Endlösung der Judenfrage", not the "trigger (or endtrigger) of the Jewish Question", which makes no sense.

However, even if this wasn't the case, in context Halder's note of Hitler's demands of his chiefs isn't in reference to propaganda, it's in reference to how the Polish campaign was to be won, which was essentially by "any means" necessary. Failure, obviously, wasn't an option. Which is of course just something we humans tell ourselves when we want to achieve a task that's of immense importance.

Thus Halder's version of Hitler's speech on August 22nd 1939, doesn't support the idea that Hitler was manufacturing some casus belli, Halder doesn't make any mention of such a thing.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby gl0spana » 1 month 2 days ago (Thu May 20, 2021 9:58 pm)

HMSendeavour wrote:
So the word, if you use google translate, does turn Auslösung into 'trigger', but in the official English translation it's translated as 'solution', like when we refer to the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question" in German it's the "Endlösung der Judenfrage", not the "trigger (or endtrigger) of the Jewish Question", which makes no sense.

However, even if this wasn't the case, in context Halder's note of Hitler's demands of his chiefs isn't in reference to propaganda, it's in reference to how the Polish campaign was to be won, which was essentially by "any means" necessary. Failure, obviously, wasn't an option. Which is of course just something we humans tell ourselves when we want to achieve a task that's of immense importance.


It’s a mistranslation. They were sloppy here. Auslösung means trigger/catalyst in any German to Eng dictionary. Solution is just Lösung, so we can see how the mistake was made.

Indeed when we look at Raeder-27, at the exact same place in the document (immediately following description of Germany’s war “goals” or “aims”) we see the word Auslösung.

“Die Auslösung des Konfliktes wird durch eine geeignete Propaganda erfolgen. Die Glaubwürdigkeit ist dabei gleichgültig, im Sieg liegt das Recht.”

Machine translation: "The conflict will be triggered by appropriate propaganda. Credibility is irrelevant, the right lies in victory."

Nuremberg translation: "The conflict will be set in motion by appropriate propaganda. The credibility is unimportant hereby, the right lies in the victory."


Also note that in Raeder the word Propaganda is used, in reference to the war being started.

Now let us look at the second part of the Halder quote:
“Der Sieger wird nie interpelliert, ob seine Gründe berechtigt waren.”

Nuremberg translation is: “The victor is never called upon to vindicate his actions.”

Machine translation: "The winner will never be questioned as to whether his reasons were justified."


The word Halder uses is Gründe, which does not mean actions but ‘reasons’.

https://www.dict.cc/german-english/Gr%C3%BCnde.html

So upon quick review it's pretty obvious the machine translation is more accurate, at least for this section.

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Re: Hitler's Obersalzberg Speech // DOCUMENTS 1014-PS, 798-PS and Raeder 27

Postby HMSendeavour » 1 month 2 days ago (Fri May 21, 2021 6:58 am)

gl0spana wrote:So upon quick review it's pretty obvious the machine translation is more accurate, at least for this section.


Yes, I am now inclined to think you're right about that. I've checked with a few friends of mine and it does seem to be mis-translated. Nonetheless, the speech isn't important, nor is it incriminating. The entire document, in summary, can be taken to be a resolution that in a conflict with Poland it will be an isolated border incident in which the Germans must act with haste and hardness to achieve a decisive and swift victory, which makes total sense.

The document doesn't pretend to be a verbatim transcript of Hitler's words, only a summary of his ideas.

Ultimately, Raeder-27 is a 13 page document, which mostly discusses the military situation of Germany's potential adversaries, and lists reasons why Hitler doesn't think the Western powers will intervene in a potential conflict with Poland if one were to ensue, and also why Germany had a better advantage at that time, rather than a few years later.

It discusses how in 1938 there was war of nerves, and Germany won because she held out and was actually willing to come to blows against the Czechs if necessary, while the British weren't. That Germany would have to be just as courageous in the confrontation with Poland is also a sentiment expressed in this document all the way through. Which of course, makes perfect sense.

The first 3 pages of the document primarily discuss why Germany had a geopolitical advantage, pages 4-5 mention that the situation with Poland was intolerable and the British were getting in the way of an agreement being made; referenced in this regard is Hitler's proposals in late 1938 early 1939 for a cession of Danzig and the establishment of a transit route through the corridor, an offer which the Poles refused, thereby making it quite clear that the only solution in the long term was going to be a physical conflict. This is obvious. Hitler's preparedness to fight for Danzig and not back down in the war of nerves was thus not unexpected, nor unjustified. These pages then finish with the affirmation that Hitler had been right before in his belief the risk was worth taking (eg. Rhineland), and it required determination: "there was a great risk that could only be mastered by iron determination" (Auch jetzt bestuende ein grosses Risiko, das nur durch eiserne Entschlossenheit gemeistert werden koenne.) This, still, is not an affirmation that a conflict must arise as the be all end all of the solution to the Danzig and corridor problem.

Pages 6-12 discuss why it would be silly to expect Britain and France to get involved in a conflict, especially considering that they failed to get support from the Soviets, in this respect Hitler quotes Lloyd George as (cynically) remarking on how he hoped that Britain had support from Russia before giving a blank check to Poland. They didn't of course.

The rest of page 12 and ending on page 13 is where Hitler discussed what the German attitude should be. He says again that one needs to have a "firm attitude" (feste Haltung). After this is where you get the parts most commonly quoted about how Germany in a conflict with Poland needs to smash Poland's military power: "The aim is to eliminate and destroy Poland's military force" (Das Ziel ist die Beseitigung und Zerschlagung der militaerischen Kraft Polens). However, this comes in rather abruptly, without any prior warning, which leads one to the probable conclusion that more was said in-between that isn't present in this document, because there was never a verbatim transcript of what Hitler said. It seems rather out of place because it lacks any linear relation to the rest of the document.

But not even that quote necessitates a physical conflict with Poland. The purpose is to illustrate that in a conflict with Poland the logical thing to do is destroy her military power, concluding that: "Great speed in success in the East offers best the prospect of limiting the conflict." (Groesste Schnelligkeit im Erfolg im Osten bietet am besten die Aussicht auf eine Beschraenkung des Konfliktes.). The aim therefore, is to limit the conflict, not expand it.

Next is the line regarding propaganda which is unimportant because no such propaganda was ever produced and no discussion of military details ensued. Taken together the speech largely reads like the evaluation of what the reactions would be to a German act against Poland, not the insistence on such an attack. Although it was certainly in the cards, so long as it wasn't thought the West would get involved.

The second to last paragraph in the document returns to the idea that the military leadership must keep their nerves and stay strong. The final paragraph emphasises that speed is key, adaption is also necessary and so is destroying the enemy's forces wherever they appear in order to win. It even says that the military solution is merely a "precondition" to the "narrower political goal of a later border demarcation", implying as Halder also does, of a border with a rump Polish state after Germany had won, even if she needed to advance against the Polish army into territory that wouldn't be apart of a later demarcation line. The concern was not with territory, but military considerations on how to best defeat the Poles, the answer being that Germany must hold fast and do whatever it takes to win, hence the entire point of the speech.

None of this is incriminating because it's a discussion of strategy regarding what risks Germany could afford to run. Hitler in this speech, is quite clearly discussing a coming conflict with Poland and how risky it would be to engage in it. He comes to the conclusion that it would be worth the risk, which is evident by the fact that after the pact with Russia was signed Hitler prepares to take action against Poland and orders an invasion slated for August 26th (due to limited time to solve the German-Polish crisis). That goes awry for reasons I've discussed already. This fact however, has nothing to do with war guilt, and neither does this speech, because Hitler wasn't the only one who was looking for a way to achieve his goal, a conflict with Poland was merely one solution that couldn't be off the table. And it was, evidently the only solution Hitler was left with, due to the actions of other nations like Poland who had no desire to accede without a fight anyway. Such a war with Poland then was merely the logical conclusion.

Hitler can hardly be criticised for discussing what he recognized as a necessity due to the attitudes of others. Hitler nonetheless tried to limit the conflict as much as possible, and didn't desire nor expect the war erroneously attributed to him.

Halder's view of the conference was that of many of those other Generals present, that negotiations would continue, and so would the war of nerves:

Colonel General Halder, former Chief of the German Army General Staff:

“The meeting ended with Hitler saying that Poland was isolated and that negotiations would be continuing…

Here [within the circle of those present] we were of the impression that the famous war of nerves would continue amid the favourable conditions created by Poland’s isolation; no decision was made.”


Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II? (Castle Hill Publishers, 2014), Pp. 462.


Halder, Manstein, Rundstedt and Küchler were of the impression that the speech, due to being public and not secret, was a bluff of sorts, to "apply the final squeeze" as Manstein put it, on Poland. The speech clearly left a tactical impression on its listeners, and not an imminent notion of anything to come. The speech didn't lead, as far as I know, to anything in particular, not even dates were discussed and certainly not military preparations.
Now what does it mean for the independent expert witness Van Pelt? In his eyes he had two possibilities. Either to confirm the Holocaust story, or to go insane. - Germar Rudolf, 13th IHR Conference.


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