Bombing Dresden to save one Jew

Read and post various viewpoints or search our large archives.

Moderator: Moderator

Forum rules
Be sure to read the Rules/guidelines before you post!
User avatar
Haldan
Valuable asset
Valuable asset
Posts: 1371
Joined: Thu Apr 24, 2003 9:56 pm
Location: <secret>
Contact:

Postby Haldan » 1 decade 4 years ago (Fri Feb 18, 2005 3:21 pm)

Sheldon Richman in Killing Noncombatants, writes:

In May 11, 1940, Great Britain made a fateful decision in its approach to fighting the second world war. On that night, eighteen Whitley bombers attacked railway installations in the placid west German province of Westphalia, far from the war front. That forgotten bombing raid, which in itself was inconsequential, has been called "the first deliberate breach of the fundamental rule of civilized warfare that hostilities must only be waged against the enemy combatant forces" (See Advance to Barbarism [1953] by F.J.P. Veale). J. M. Spaight, who had been principal secretary of Britain's Air Ministry, wrote later, in his book Bombing Vindicated (1944), that "it was we who started the strategic [i.e., civilian] bombing offensive" with the "splendid decision" of May 11, 1940. "It was," wrote Spaight with horrifying honesty, "as heroic, as self-sacrificing, as Russia's decision to adopt her policy of 'scorched earth."' Note that the German attack on Coventry, which is often cited as the first strategic bombing in the war between Germany and Britain, occurred six months later (on November 14, 1940). Note further that part of the British bombing strategy was apparently to provoke German attacks on England in order to stimulate support for total war against the Third Reich. As the official Air Ministry volume, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945: The Fight at Odds (1953), stated:

"If the Royal Air Force raided the Ruhr, destroying oil plants with its most accurately placed bombs and urban property with those that went astray, the outcry for retaliation against Britain might prove too strong for the German generals to resist. Indeed, Hitler himself would probably head the clamour. The attack on the Ruhr, in other words, was an informal invitation to the Luftwaffe to bomb London."

[...]


-haldan
<?php if ($Holocaust == false ) {deny_repeatedly(); } else { investigate(); } ?>
Homage to Catalin Haldan

kk
Valued contributor
Valued contributor
Posts: 451
Joined: Sun Mar 21, 2004 11:24 pm

Postby kk » 1 decade 4 years ago (Wed Feb 23, 2005 8:09 pm)

Whisky sodden Churchill, is right now languishing in the deepest, darkest hell, allongside his buddies in genocidal crime, Roosevelt and Stalin.


No need to feel ashamed for what Churchill ordered.
Ordinary brittons could'n have known of what that really meant.
We must just try to find out what really happened, so that we' ll never make the
same mistakes again.

The greatest crime during WW2 was the Casablanca edict of "unconditional
surrender".
It has propably cost the world 15 m deaths, 2 more years of war and the
destruction of Europe.

You' re absolutely right about "whisky sodden Churchill",but the real
criminal was FDR.

Sushicotto
Member
Member
Posts: 62
Joined: Fri Sep 12, 2003 8:14 am

Postby Sushicotto » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sat Feb 26, 2005 7:58 pm)

I listened to the Juergen Graf interview that FREE ZUNDEL NOW brought up on another thread:
http://forum.codoh.com/viewtopic.php?t=1837

About 56 minutes into the interview, Graf mentions a German document from March 1945 stating that 202 000 bodies had so far been counted in Dresden. Because the counting had not been completed, Graf believes the total deaths from Dresden was “at least 250 000, if not more”.

Does anyone know about this document or the validity of these numbers?
"Those unaware are unaware of being unaware." (Merrill Jenkins)

User avatar
Hannover
Valuable asset
Valuable asset
Posts: 9914
Joined: Sun Nov 24, 2002 7:53 pm

Postby Hannover » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sun Feb 27, 2005 1:05 am)

Perhaps the police documents are what you are referring to. The US Armed Forces' own Stars & Stripes' gave this story.

- Hannover
http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/General/Dr ... 50545.html

Stars & Stripes
London Edition, Saturday, May 5, 1945, Vol. 5, No. 156

Air Raid on Dresden Killed More Than 300,000

by Dan Regan
Stars and Stripes Staff Writer

With the 1st Army, May 3 (Delayed) -- The Allied air raid on Dresden on Feb. 13-14 killed 300,000 persons, according to a report by Dresden police to a group of 600 -- British and French -- prisoners who were given passes by the Germans to enter the American lines.

Nine British PWs were working in Dresden during the raid and said the horror and devastation caused by the Anglo-American 14-hour raid was beyond human comprehension unless one could see for himself.

One British sergeant said,

"Reports from Dresden police that 300,000 died as a result of the bombing didn't include deaths among 1,000,000 evacuees from the Breslau area trying to escape from the Russians. There were no records on them.
"After seeing the results of the bombing, I believe these figures are correct."

"They had to pitchfork shriveled bodies onto trucks and wagons and cart them to shallow graves on the outskirts of the city. But after two weeks if work the job became too much to cope with and they found other means to gather up the dead."

"They burned bodies in a great heap in the center of the city, but the most effective way, for sanitary reasons, was to take flamethrowers and burn the dead as they lay in the ruins. They would just turn the flamethrowers into the houses, burn the dead and then close off the entire area. The whole city is flattened. They were unable to clean up the dead lying beside roads for several weeks," the sergeant added.
If it can't happen as alleged, then it didn't.

User avatar
Haldan
Valuable asset
Valuable asset
Posts: 1371
Joined: Thu Apr 24, 2003 9:56 pm
Location: <secret>
Contact:

Postby Haldan » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sun Feb 27, 2005 1:10 am)

Hannover,

I recantly saw those documents but cannot remember where, they were the original German documents, reproduced online. But couldn't find them, as I say.

However, I'm looking into this, may take a day or two.

-haldan
<?php if ($Holocaust == false ) {deny_repeatedly(); } else { investigate(); } ?>
Homage to Catalin Haldan

Radar
Valued contributor
Valued contributor
Posts: 505
Joined: Sat Feb 26, 2005 2:25 pm

Postby Radar » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sun Feb 27, 2005 2:05 pm)

I believe the casualties at Coventry were 300 dead. The targets were factories. The target at Dresden was the town itself and its population although many lies are being promoted currently trying to cover this up. There were almost no military casualties and within days the rail traffic was moving again.

As for the dead at Dresden we will of course never have accurate numbers. The city was packed with refugees from the approaching Red Army who were never properly accounted for and many victims were burned beyond identification and other bodies were burned in pyres as a health measure. Today we are seeing a determined effort by some writers to minimize the number of dead. Numbers as low as 25,000 are being quoted in the news media. They are obvioulsy too low as anyone with knowledge of the facts would see. The correct numbers are probably in the hundreds of thousands. But the question I ask myself when I read these recent downward revisions is what is the motive? Hatred of Germans? It seems that this may be the case and often can be traced to the same people who promote "the Holocaust". Hatred is their meat.

kk
Valued contributor
Valued contributor
Posts: 451
Joined: Sun Mar 21, 2004 11:24 pm

Postby kk » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sun Feb 27, 2005 8:35 pm)

Some ten days after the triple blow Hanns Voigt, directing the VNZ dead persons’
section, was summoned by the squad leader of one SHD unit to a building near
Pirnaischer Platz: a group of Romanian soldiers was refusing to go down into one of
the basements. They had freed the steps leading to it, but clearly something out of
the ordinary had happened inside. The workers clustered sullenly around the basement
entrance as Voigt, wishing to set an example, marched down the steps to the
cellar, an acetylene lamp in his hand. He was reassured by the lack of the usual smell
of putrescence. The bottom steps were however slippery. He took a pole and stirred
the darkness of the cellar entrance. The cellar floor, he found, was covered by a thick
liquid mishmash of blood, flesh and bone. A small high explosive bomb had penetrated
four floors of the building and exploded here in the basement. Voigt instructed
the SHD officer not to attempt to recover any of the victims, but to spread chlorinated
lime over the inside of the basement and leave it to dry out. An interview with
the Hausmeister (superintendant) of the building yielded the information that there
would have been two to three hundred people down there on the night, there had
always been that many during previous air raid alerts.21

(From D. Irving's book "The Destruction of Dresden")

Such were the ways of assesing the true number of victims of this horrible crime.
Note: The above quote could well be used as an argument in a previous
thread concerning the use of high explosives as a mass extermination
tool.


grenadier
Valued contributor
Valued contributor
Posts: 251
Joined: Fri Oct 01, 2004 9:07 am

Postby grenadier » 1 decade 4 years ago (Fri Aug 19, 2005 9:22 am)

Sushicotto said:
About 56 minutes into the interview, Graf mentions a German document from March 1945 stating that 202 000 bodies had so far been counted in Dresden. Because the counting had not been completed, Graf believes the total deaths from Dresden was “at least 250 000, if not more


Others on this thread have mentioned as many as 500.000 dead. That is a gross exageration. It is likely that the death toll will never be known accuratly. In the new edition of his book about Dresden, D.Irving says 60.000 or more(p.263). The counting stopped according to a police report at around 25.000. One has to take into acount nazi and soviet propaganda.

Apart from this, it is clear that the bombing was criminal and worse, it did not even contribute in bringing the war sooner to an end, not by one day. I feel disgusted that 'historians' like Frederick Taylor can still dish out crap like "Dresden : Tuesday, February 13, 1945 ", seeking to justify this monstrosity.

I love the part where F.taylor says "It is rarely mentioned that almost exactly the same number of Soviet citizens died as a result of bombing during the Second World War as Germans: around half a million", and goes on to describe the german air attacks on STALINGRAD! What an dishonest man! Stalingrad was a battlefield, heavily defended by an entire soviet army! Besides, where did he get hsi half a million figure from?

By Taylors account, one gets the feeling that the civilians at Dresden had it coming! A review by R. H. Eggleston summarizes my own feelings about this apologist piece of crap of a book. Read on. comments invited:

The crux is this: in light of the war situation known to exist in February 1945, did Dresden's contribution to Germany's war economy and did its status as a rail center justify selecting the city as the target of a major air attack?

The first key to answering these questions is to consider what information Allied decision-makers had about these subjects - war situation, war economy, rail center - at the time they planned the air attacks for February 1945. The second key is to frame one's response within the context of Allied war ethics, as they existed in wartime 1945. In discussing the attacks, it's important to assess whether they were justified by what Allied commanders knew at the time; and then clearly differentiate that assessment from facts (and analysis) that emerged later.

WHAT ALLIED COMMANDERS KNEW ABOUT THE WAR SITUATION: Commanders knew that, on any given day, scores of Allied soldiers and airmen were dying in combat. On the other hand, they knew that hundreds, often thousands, of allied aircraft flew sorties over Germany daily, virtually unopposed. On many days, the Luftwaffe was effectively grounded, without fuel. They knew, too, that Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS combat formations had become effectively static because of critical fuel shortages. When road and rail transport could move, it was exposed to relentless air attack, visibility permitting. U-boats had declined from a dangerous threat to virtual impotence. Soviet forces had entered Reich territory. Refugees from the east were pouring into Germany, in full flight. Berlin would be physically overrun very soon. The war would be over - soon.

WHAT ALLIED COMMANDERS KNEW ABOUT DRESDEN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR ECONOMY: They knew that Dresden was Germany's sixth (or seventh) largest city and that Zeiss-Ikon manufactured high-tech optical equipment there. They also assumed that Dresden manufactured other items of military value. They knew there was lot rail traffic through Dresden. That's about it. Taylor doesn't indicate they actually knew anything else.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS THAT GUIDED ALLIED COMMANDERS: When Allied forces overran Reich territory, they did not systematically uproot, rape, or murder the population. When they took German prisoners, they did not systematically murder or abuse them. That said, there were no ethical standards to speak of. Cities were manufacturing centers to be destroyed. City residents were perceived to contribute to the war effort in some measure, so the policy was to burn down the cities to de-house and disrupt them. It was no secret to Allied decision-makers that unrestricted, massive incendiary attacks on German cities effectively carried out this policy. The resulting deaths of thousands of civilians was a side-effect.
________________________________________

Taylor concludes that the February air attacks were amply justified in light of knowledge available to 1945 planners and from information that came to light after the event. The framework he constructs to support this viewpoint is explicitly or implicitly based on the following hypotheses, in order of importance: Dresden was (1) an important center for arms-related production;(2) an important rail hub and transit point for German soldiers;(3) an armed camp; (4) pro-Nazi; and (5) anti-Semitic.

Upon closer examination, it's apparent the facts (or more frequently anecdotes) Taylor adduces to support his conclusions were either unavailable to Allied decision-makers at all, were not relevant to target selection, or cannot be proved to be true today, even with the benefit of hindsight. Following is a comparison of the reviewer's own observations (which do benefit from hindsight) about these subjects with what Taylor writes:

1. DRESDEN'S IMPORTANCE AS AN ARMAMENTS PRODUCTION CENTER. To prove the contention that Dresden was highly important, Taylor devotes a full chapter to anecdotes. But that's all they are - anecdotes with little or no supporting substantiation. He provides no statistics. Examples: one anecdote is a self-congratulatory phrase that appeared in an official city publication in 1942, citing Dresden's contributions to the Reich war effort. Another anecdote describes a phone conversation between Taylor and a woman about her experience making cartridges. Yet another refers to one facility that manufactured machine guns. If Dresden was a significant site for producing machine guns or cartridges, however, we don't hear any more about it.

Taylor's major focus is on Dresden's role in producing higher technology items, such as Zeiss-Ikon optical products, radios, fuses, electrical components, and other engineered elements of complex weapons systems that required assembly for use in conjunction with other components. Taylor accepts the proposition that this production was critical to Germany's war effort.

It would be very useful to inquire about the contribution of these products to Germany's actual military requirements in February 1945. For example: Were the military organizations (Wehrmacht, Navy, Luftwaffe, and Waffen-SS) and weapons systems for which Dresden's output was intended actually capable of using the weapons at that point in time? Were they being effectively transported, distributed, and assembled? And after assembly: What was the value of in destroying bomb fuses if the planes supposed to drop the bombs cannot fly? Or a high-quality lens used in a submarine periscope, when the submarine literally can't come to periscope depth? Or communications equipment, if the military unit that uses it has been destroyed, with its operators dead, wounded, or captured?

The foregoing questions are important if one is justifying decision-makers' actions by including hindsight information that was unavailable or irrelevant to them. At the time of the February attacks, Allied planners knew only that Dresden produced arms-related materials. We still have no idea how much was made or what practical value these materials had. Taylor doesn't inquire.

2. DRESDEN WAS A MAJOR RAIL HUB FOR THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS, MUNITIONS, ETC. Taylor provides solid statistical data about rail movements to support his argument that Dresden's marshaling yards were a legitimate target. Let's assume these yards were critically important. But Allied planners did not consider them to be sufficiently important to include them as a target in the RAF's crushing attack of February 13th - which concentrated on the city's residential quarter. When the USAAF attacked rail facilities the next day, there was no follow up then or later, even though the yards were quickly returned to full operation. It's apparent that much of the "communications hub" argument was added later on as a justification - after the attack took place.

3. DRESDEN WAS AN ARMED CAMP. Literally true, but not too important to planners selecting targets. By mid-February 1945, virtually every German male over the age of 14 was in uniform and carried a weapon, if one was available. Certainly there were thousands of soldiers and airmen in Dresden at the time of the attacks. But there's a major distinction between unorganized bodies of military age men in transit, on leave, or recovering from wounds (such as were found in every major German city) and soldiers organized into cohesive, effective combat formations. Although enemy forces of any kind are always a legitimate target, attacking unorganized groups of soldiers in Dresden would have been a low priority. The "armed camp" argument for attacking Dresden seems to be an ex-post facto justification.

4 DRESDEN WAS A PRO-NAZI CITY. It's highly unlikely that Allied decision-makers would have considered this as a relevant factor in target selection if they had known it. Moreover, it's debatable whether Dresden was more or less pro-Nazi than other cities. Pose this question: if Dresden had been anti-Nazi, would the Allies have skipped the attack? For example, if there had been a free election in January 1945 and the Nazi candidates had been defeated, would Dresden have been removed from the target list?

5 DRESDEN WAS A CITY THAT TREATED JEWS POORLY. This has the same validity for target planning as the "Dresden was pro-Nazi" rationale. It's highly unlikely that Allied decision-makers would have considered treatment of Jews as a relevant factor either, if they had known it. It would be difficult to prove any German city treated Jews much better or worse. Ask yourself: if Dresden had had a reputation for treating Jews nicely, would Dresden have been removed from the target list?

Daniel Saez Lorente
Member
Member
Posts: 131
Joined: Thu Jun 16, 2005 6:26 am

Postby Daniel Saez Lorente » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sat Aug 20, 2005 3:07 am)

Reviso wrote:Spaigth goes on, it's very interesting, but it would be better to quote the original english words. I don't find them on Internet.

Reviso.


The whole book is on line at jrbooksonline.com or look up on google. Spaight was crazy. I have 5 books by him. He wrote about 15.

Daniel Saez Lorente
Member
Member
Posts: 131
Joined: Thu Jun 16, 2005 6:26 am

Postby Daniel Saez Lorente » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sat Aug 20, 2005 3:10 am)

horsa wrote:Ajax and Hannover,
When you consider the number of refugees fleeing the advancing Soviet hordes who had poured into Dresden, combined with the nature of the attack, then it is not unreasonable to estimate the number of casualties as being as many as half a million.


I agree. Half a million is merely the upper figure in a range of estimates based on various sources and calculations: 35,000 identified bodies, 135,000 unidentified bodies, etc. etc. and on and on.
Personally I have become suspicious of large numbers of all kinds. To me 300,000 just means "a lot". All you can do is guess. Compare this to 15,000 British civilians killed by boming during the entire war.

Daniel Saez Lorente
Member
Member
Posts: 131
Joined: Thu Jun 16, 2005 6:26 am

Postby Daniel Saez Lorente » 1 decade 4 years ago (Sat Aug 20, 2005 5:03 am)

http://www.jrbooksonline.com/spaight.htm

This is the link to BOMBING VINDICATED. If you think that's bad, you should read what Spaight wrote about Dresden in the 1948 edition of AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS. The British have a long (1000-year) history of acts of unprovoked brutality committed against enemies, neutrals and even allies to convince their enemies that they are "serious". They always argue that this shortens wars and saves lives. But underneath it all there is always an ill-concealed sense of smugness, of self-satisfaction. Spaight is a perfect example of this.

Mkk
Valued contributor
Valued contributor
Posts: 566
Joined: Fri Oct 14, 2011 4:00 am

Re: Bombing Dresden to save one Jew

Postby Mkk » 6 years 1 month ago (Wed Oct 23, 2013 11:31 am)

Sorry to bump the thread, but it came up here recently:

grenadier,
Besides, where did he get hsi half a million figure from?

The figure is mentioned in Overy's Russia's War

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Russias-War-Ric ... 0141049170

Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): "an estimated 500,000 Soviet citizens died from German bomb attacks."
http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm
"Truth is hate for those who hate the truth"- Auchwitz lies, p.13

User avatar
Hektor
Valuable asset
Valuable asset
Posts: 3386
Joined: Sun Jun 25, 2006 7:59 am

Re: Bombing Dresden to save one Jew

Postby Hektor » 6 years 1 month ago (Wed Oct 23, 2013 3:38 pm)

Haldan wrote:I found an interesting article from a german newspaper.
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zei ... 21094.html
...

The article doesn't load anymore. Takes me to another page.

User avatar
hermod
Valuable asset
Valuable asset
Posts: 2076
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 10:52 am

Re: Bombing Dresden to save one Jew

Postby hermod » 6 years 1 month ago (Wed Oct 23, 2013 6:37 pm)

Haldan wrote:I found an interesting article from a german newspaper.
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zei ... 21094.html

" Only a big attack can save us "


Henny Brenner, a Jew from Dresden, survived the third empire. She survived because Englishmen and Americans bombed the town on the Elbe


Or maybe they could have used those bombs to destroy and disable the Auschwitz alleged 'gas chambers' and/or the rail lines and bridges leading to Auschwitz-Birkenau? Except if they knew the Holocaust was just atrocity propaganda like the human soaps, Austro-Bulgar gassings in Serbia, crucified Canadian soldiers and mutilated Belgian babies during WW1. :twisted:

Why Wasn't Auschwitz Bombed?

Did Missing 1944 Military Studies Conclude Auschwitz-Birkenau Not Death Camp?


From 1944 to 1993 the Holocaust lobby's story was Auschwitz-Birkenau wasn't bombed because the 3,000 to 10,000 daily mass murders were kept secret through a circle of fences one kilometer (0.6 mi) from Birkenau so noone outside the camp knew about the mass executions until an April, 1944 prison escape, and the camp was out of range for bombers until late 1944.

In 1993 Air Photo Evidence published air photos proving the Germans made no attempt to hide the Birkenau Cremation buildings which had no outer fence and only one wire fence close to the buildings so mass executions would have been visible, and Birkenau was not out of range as American planes bombed the Monowitz industrial complex 6 km (4 mi) east starting in August, '44.

The photos sent shockwaves through the Holocaust lobby which hastily organized a 1993 Auschwitz Bombing convention in Washington, DC, to change their story and agree to new reasons why Birkenau was not bombed. The new story was the British and American governments knew about the Birkenau mass executions from early '43 to November, '44, but didn't order that Birkenau or rail-lines leading to the camp be bombed for a number of reasons. The Holocaust Lobby's 4 main reasons are in black text, and the truth according to Air Photo Evidence is in red:

1. Requests for bombing in 1944 by U.S. President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill were over-ruled by the military who knew about the mass murders, but were indifferent to the plight of the camp inmates. The truth is that in 1944 the American and British military completed independent studies using air photos and spy reports about whether it was neccessary to bomb Birkenau, and although both studies disappeared after 1944, they must have concluded that no mass murders were occurring at Birkenau because bombing was not ordered by Roosevelt, Churchill, or the military.

2. Jewish groups in America, Britain, and Jersualem asked the U.S. and British governments to bomb Birkenau during 1944 but they were rebuffed by military and political leaders. The truth is that although a few individual members of Jewish groups who had heard the mass-murder rumors, sent letters to other members of their groups to consider bombing, not one official Jewish organization anywhere in the world asked that Birkenau be bombed, because they knew from escaped inmates and spies, and from contacts with the highest levels of the U.S. and British governments, that mass murders were not occurring.

3. The War Refugee Board knew about the daily murders but did not have enough political clout to command the attention of President Roosevelt. The truth is that Board member Henry Morgenthau knew of the unsubstantiated stories of Birkenau mass murders, but he acted like he did not believe them because he did not even discuss the possible bombing of Birkenau or any other camp during his many meetings with President Roosevelt.

4. Bombing would have killed inmates and there was no guarantee bombing would have stopped the slaughter. The truth is rail-lines and bridges together with the Birkenau Cremation buildings could have been bombed with a minimum loss of life the same way two other areas were bombed. From June, 1942 to August, 1944, 12 groups of B-25 long-range bombers and P-38 Lightning fighter-bombers , flew long distances from airfields in Egypt to pin-point bomb at low elevations the Ploesti oil refinery 55 kilomters (35 miles) north of Bucharest, Rumania, and on August 24th, '44, the Gustloff-Werke armaments factory 150 m (500 ft) from Buchenwald detention camp in Germany, was destroyed by B-25 bombers without a single bomb hitting the Buchenwald camp.

In 1944 the Americans and British had the ability to pin-point bomb the Birkenau cremation buildings or rail-lines leading to camp, but after military studies of air photos and spy reports concluded that inmates were not being executed, no American or British leader ordered bombing of Birkenau because they believed executions were not occurring.

http://www.air-photo.com/english/reasons.html
"But, however the world pretends to divide itself, there are ony two divisions in the world to-day - human beings and Germans. – Rudyard Kipling, The Morning Post (London), June 22, 1915


Return to “'Holocaust' Debate / Controversies / Comments / News”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: HMSendeavour and 11 guests