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"Today June 22 was the 75th anniversary of the start of Barbarossa the historic operation launched by Adolf Hitler which is now known to have thwarted the Judeo-Bolshevik plans to invade Europe. On June 13 (1941) Soviet radio broadcast an odd, panicky Tass announcement denying rumours that Germany was about to attack. Since April 1941, the Russians had moved rifle divisions and airborne corps under cover of darkness and camoflauge right up to their western frontier. Eight new armies were being created sixty nine tank, motorised and rifle divisions the entire Ural army district and the army's first and second strategic echelons (an operational military formation created only when an operation is imminent) were secretly brought westwards and hidden in forests near the frontier in Byelo-Russia and the Ukraine. Their target was western Europe.
They had better maps of Berlin than the Germans. By June 17 one hundred and seventy soviet divisions were secretly in place right on the frontier " it was the biggest troop movement by a single state in the history of civilisation" The due date for completion of this build up was July 10 1941. By then Stalin had twenty three armies and twenty independent corps in place to attack the Germans. But the Germans attacked first on June 22 1941. This is now confirmed by Soviet military archives seen by East German historians but still ignored by their embarrassed colleagues in the West. Millions of soldiers and airmen died in the resulting military holocaust. By October 1941 Hitler's military strike had nearly succeeded. Then Stalin regained his composure and flung the tattered survivors of his armies at the weakened enemy and with the help of Britain and the United States".
There is a link in this commentary to - http://www.fpp.co.uk/online/07/08/Stalins_warguilt.html
From: "New Insights into the Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry," by Walter N. Sanning, Inconvenient History, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2017-02-10.
Scorched Earth: The Soviet Concentration of Troops
Viktor Suvorov (pseudonym) elaborated on the 1939 Soviet concentration of troops at the border with Germany: He used to work for the Joint Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. As a high-ranking officer of the Soviet military secret service GRU, he was active as a Soviet In every major human complex endeavour there exists a critical moment at which events reach a point of no return. This moment for the Soviet Union fell 13 June 1941. After that day, masses of Soviet troops were secretly but inexorably moving towards the German border. Once 13 June had passed the Soviet leadership could no longer turn these troops back nor even halt them, for economic and military reasons. War became inevitable for the Soviet Union, irrespective of how Hitler might have acted. Finally, the composition and disposition of the forces in the frontier zone did not indicate that they were intended to remain there. Such features as the airborne corps in the first crust of the 'defences,' artillery units in the forward locations, the dismantling of the Stalin Line and the absence of any defence in depth or effort to construct one, do not point to the intention of maintaining any permanent defensive position along the border. If all this is viewed in the context of the Zhukov doctrinal framework outlined earlier, then it becomes clear that the only credible military intention which Stalin could have had was to begin the war himself in the summer of 1941.diplomat in Western Europe. In 1978, he asked for political asylum in Great Britain. He called Hitler a rabid dog, a cannibal and a criminal. (I mention this only to show what his sympathies in fact are.)
Still, he is the author of the article "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), London, June 1985, pp. 50-55 and the book Ice-Breaker: Who Started the Second World War?. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990 (Russian: LEDOKOI: Istorija tak nazyvaemoj «velikoj otečestvennoj vojny» Kratij kurs.)
Excerpts from "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?":
p. 52: "'There were in fact 170 divisions in the 1st Strategic Echelon. Of these, 56 were already deployed directly on the frontier,' 114 were deployed further back in the frontier zone, but: 'On 12-15 June the order was given to the western military districts: all divisions stationed in the interior [of those military districts] are to be moved nearer to the state frontier'. The entire 1st Strategic Echelon now began its concentration directly in the border belt. To these 114 must be added the 69 divisions of 2nd Strategic Echelon which had either moved already or were preparing to do so. Thus, on the day of the famous TASS communique, the movement of 183 divisions was in train; the biggest troop movement by a single state in the history of civilisation; a movement right to the frontier itself and conducted with maximum secrecy and concealment."
p. 53: "But this explanation is not borne out by the facts. Troops preparing for defence bury themselves in the ground, dig trenches and anti-tank ditches, construct cover and barbed wire barricades. In the first instance this is done in the most likely avenues of enemy advance, across roads and behind river lines. But the Red Army did nothing of the kind. As has been recorded earlier, divisions were hidden in woods near the frontier in exactly the same way as were the German divisions before they made their surprise attack. 'The rifle troops could have occupied and completed defensive installations, but this was not done'."
"This failure to erect defensive works is all the more curious since, with the signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Treaty and the subsequent "partition" of Poland between the two states, Soviet and German forces now confronted each other across a common frontier with no "buffer state" between them. Moreover, while common prudence might have dictated the strengthening or at least the retention of the Stalin Line fortification along the old frontier, the opposite was happening. This powerful protective system was dismantled and, in many places blown up or earthed over; minefields were disarmed and over a distance of thousands of kilometres 'the barbed wire had been removed'. Partisan detachments which had been created in case these lands were occupied by the enemy, were disbanded; explosive charges were removed from thousands of bridges, railway stations and industrial complexes which had been prepared for destruction in case of invasion. In short, colossal efforts were made to destroy everything connected with defence. At the same time, while prior to the treaty's signature only divisions and corps had existed in the Soviet frontier districts, formed armies now began to assemble in the newly extended border zone. Between August 1939 and April 1941, the number of armies on the Soviet Western border increased from zero to 11. Three more joined them during May together with five airborne corps. If Hitler had not attacked first, Stalin would have had 23 armies and more than 20 independent corps facing him. This took place before general mobilisation."
p. 54: "The 1st Strategic Echelon which was forming up on the Soviet border in June 1941 was, by virtue of its organisational structure, deployment and military preparedness, clearly offensive in nature. So too was the 2nd Strategic Echelon which began its secret movement towards the German frontier on 13 June 194 1. Many Soviet marshals and generals do not acknowledge these facts directly and, of course, both echelons were overwhelmed in the German surprise attack and had perforce to fight defensively."
"It seems certain that the Soviet concentration on the frontier was due to be completed by 10 July. Thus, the German blow which fell just 19 days earlier found the Red Army in a most unfavourable situation – in railway wagons […and] stuck helpless in open fields."
"The more closely one studies Stalin's actions during this critical period the more apparent it becomes that they were not a reaction to Hitler's moves. Stalin acted according to his own plans, and these foresaw a full concentration of Soviet troops on the frontier by 10 July."
"Certain conclusions are incontrovertible. First, the mobilised divisions could not have returned to the distant districts from whence they came. Such a move again would have absorbed the entire resources of the rail network for many months and would have resulted in economic catastrophe. Secondly, these gigantic forces could not have been left to spend the winter where they were hidden. So many new divisions had been created and assembled in the frontal belt that many of them had already had to spend the winter of 1940-41 in dugouts. As early as 1940 there had been insufficient training centres and artillery and rifle ranges in the newly-acquired western frontier zone even for the existing divisions. Troops who cannot train rapidly lose the capacity to fight."
"In every major human complex endeavour there exists a critical moment at which events reach a point of no return. This moment for the Soviet Union fell 13 June 1941. After that day, masses of Soviet troops were secretly but inexorably moving towards the German border. Once 13 June had passed the Soviet leadership could no longer turn these troops back nor even halt them, for economic and military reasons. War became inevitable for the Soviet Union, irrespective of how Hitler might have acted. Finally, the composition and disposition of the forces in the frontier zone did not indicate that they were intended to remain there. Such features as the airborne corps in the first crust of the 'defences,' artillery units in the forward locations, the dismantling of the Stalin Line and the absence of any defence in depth or effort to construct one, do not point to the intention of maintaining any permanent defensive position along the border. If all this is viewed in the context of the Zhukov doctrinal framework outlined earlier, then it becomes clear that the only credible military intention which Stalin could have had was to begin the war himself in the summer of 1941."
 Viktor Suvorov, "Who Was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), London, June 1985, pp. 50-55.
 Istorija Vtoroj Mirovoj vojny (1939-1945) (English: History of the Second World War, Berlin (East): Deutscher Militärverlag), Vol. 4, p. 25, and Vol. 3, p. 441.
 V. Khovostov, Maj .-Gen. A. Grilev, "Nakanune Velivoi Otechestvennoi voini", Kommunist 12 (1968), p. 68.
 V. A. Anfilov, Nachalo Velicoi Otechestvennoi Voiny (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1962), p. 44.
 Maj.-Gen. S. Iovlev, "V boiiykh pod Minscom", VIZ 9 (1960), p. 56.
 VIZ, 8 (1981), p. 89.
 I.T. Starinov, Miny żdut svoego časa (Voenizdat, Moskau, 1964), (English: The Mines Await their Hour), p. 186.
 S. P. Ivamov, Nachalnii period voiny (Voenizdat, Moskau, 1974), (English: The Opening Phase of the War), p. 211.
 M. Mackintosh, Juggernaut, (Secker & Warburg, London, 1967)
 Col.-Gen. L. M. Sandalov, Peregitoe (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1966), (English: Experienced), p. 48.
 K. S. Moskalenko, Na Jgo-Sapadnom Napravlenii (Nauka, Moscow, 1969), (English: On the Southwest Front), pp. 18-20.
Was it a tip off? Or was it a German interpretation of something that was said? Did they have a spy there?
What did the British know, exactly? Remember, the British attacked Germany for invading 50% of Poland, but gave the USSR trucks and supplies, when they attacked the other 50%. They were colluding; but how far with respect to Stalin's planned invasion?
Depth Charge wrote:What did the British know, exactly? Remember, the British attacked Germany for invading 50% of Poland, but gave the USSR trucks and supplies, when they attacked the other 50%. They were colluding; but how far with respect to Stalin's planned invasion?
Viktor Suvorov discusses this on page 220 of The Chief Culprit - Stalin's Grand Design To Start World War II :
http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/chief-c ... 008308143/
He relates how there was a meeting on June 13 1941 in London between Soviet ambassador I M Maysky and British foreign secretary Anthony Eden. They discussed British aid and military assistance if war broke out between the USSR and Germany. It made no difference if the USSR struck first or if Germany struck first. At this same time Eden was meeting with the Soviet ambassador discussing war plans Stalin was professing friendship for Germany.
Churchill had rejected Hitler's peace proposal for Britain to withdraw from the war with no territorial loss or occupation of territory.
Therefore the entire British Empire under Churchill's leadership of the mother country which had claimed to be fighting for democratic principles willingly and happily entered into an alliance with the totalitarian, one party dictatorship of Josef Stalin.
http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hitler/1977/ ... er/17.html
Stalin had obviously laid immense plans for an offensive into Europe. The Red Army was far stronger than Hitler’s experts had believed. Its air force had some eight thousand aircraft, and Soviet industry was turning out tanks at a rate which Hitler would have dismissed as impossible—had his Intelligence agencies so advised him. On July 15, Jeschonnek’s deputy, touring the conquered territories, wrote in his diary: “The Red Army’s equipment staggers us again and again.... They had laid out enormous fortifications, mostly still incomplete, to guard their Lemberg [Lvov] salient. In this region, sixty-three huge airfields alone, each with two runways and all still incomplete, bear witness to the Russian attack preparations.” The next day Stalin’s son Jacob, a lieutenant in a Soviet tank division, was captured near Vitebsk. Among “other proof that the Russians were just waiting to get at the Germans” was, according to the Luftwaffe’s General von Richthofen, the huge booty of artillery and tanks taken at Dobromysl. “In part they come from the young Stalin’s tank division. He has admitted that they were standing by for the big offensive and were smashed to pieces by my squadrons’ surprise attack.” Hitler learned that on Jacob Stalin there had been found a letter from a friend mentioning that before their “outing to Berlin” he was going to see his Anushka one more time. Interrogation of Stalin junior and the dictator’s captured former secretary revealed that Stalin planned to exploit the German intelligentsia to improve the Russian population’s caliber; Europe and Asia would then become the invincible bastions of bolshevism, and the victory of the Communist world revolution would be assured.
As a self-professed weapons expert, Hitler was particularly awed by the new Soviet armored fighting vehicles that crawled out of the forests like primeval monsters of whose existence his experts had breathed no word to him: here was a tank of fifty-two tons, its armorplate so thick that only the Luftwaffe’s 88-millimeter antiaircraft guns made any impression on it; and here, south of Dubno, were tanks weighing a hundred tons. On July 4, OKW war diarist Greiner—who again stated that in fourteen days they would be in Leningrad and Moscow—confidently asserted : “The Russians have lost so many aircraft and four thousand six hundred tanks that there can’t be many left.” But by mid-July Hitler’s weary gunners had knocked out eight thousand Russian tanks and still they came. At the end of July twelve thousand tanks had been captured or destroyed. Visiting Army Group Center on August 4, Hitler wanly admitted to his panzer commander General Guderian: “Had I known they had as many tanks as that, I’d have thought twice before invading.”
Stalin’s Plans for World War II
we can find much very credible evidence from sometime friends of the Soviet side to show that Stalin made the Pact, or at least tried to use it, for offensive purposes.
FDR wanter war
The only explanation for Mr. Roosevelt’s intervention in the Munich episode which would seem to accord with facts, logic, and reason is that he felt that a military attack on Hitler in September, 1938, would lead to so rapid a termination of the war (in the defeat of Germany) that he would not have time to involve this country in the great conflict. By the end of August, 1939, with the Czech army immobilized and Russia aligned with Germany, it looked like a long war, well suited to Mr. Roosevelt’s interventionist program. We now know that the powerful German generals opposed to Hitler had given top-level British statesmen and diplomats definite and reliable information before the Munich crisis that an army revolt would take place in Germany against Hitler if he risked war in the autumn of 1938.
Assessment of the Enemy, 20.5.1941:
"The Red Army stands with the mass of its units in the European part of the USSR, i.e. with about 130 rifle divisions - 21 cavalry divisions - 5 tank divisions - 36 motorized – mechanized tank brigades, along the western border from Czernowitz to Murmansk. The fact that hitherto far more advantageous opportunities for a preventive war (weak forces in the East, war in the Balkans) have not been taken advantage of by the USSR, furthermore the political condescension that has made itself especially felt more recently and the apparent endeavor to avoid possible points of friction, let the possibility of an attack seem improbable... Tough defense near the border, combined with partial attacks at the beginning of the war and during the operations as counterattacks against the enemy who has broken through ... are what in the face of the political situation and the so far recognizable order of battle seems most probable."
(Source: BA-MA [Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv = Federal Archives-Military Archives of the FRG], Freiburg, RH 2/1983)
That source you gave seems to be obsolete. Here is another one:
Feindbeurteilung vom 20.5.1941:
"Die Rote Armee steht mit der Masse der Verbände des europäischen Teils der UdSSR, d.h. mit rund 130 Schützendivisionen - 21 Kavalleriedivisionen - 5 Panzerdivisionen - 36 mot.-mech. Panzerbrigaden entlang der Westgrenze von Czernowitz bis Murmansk...Die Tatsache, dass bisher weit günstigere Gelegenheiten eines Präventivkrieges (schwache Kräfte im Osten, Balkankrieg) von der UdSSR nicht ausgenutzt wurden, ferner das gerade in letzter Zeit fühlbare politische Entgegenkommen und festzustellende Bestreben der Vermeidung möglicher Reibungspunkte lassen eine Angriffsabsicht unwahrscheinlich erscheinen... Grenznahe, zähe Verteidigung, verbunden mit Teilangriffen zu Beginn des Krieges und während der Operationen als Gegenangriffe gegen den durchgebrochenen Feind...erscheint aufgrund der politischen Verhältnisse und des bisher erkennbaren Aufmarsches am wahrscheinlichsten."
(Quelle: BA-MA Freiburg, RH 2/1983)
I assume those are authentic materials, although we aren't even shown a facsimile.
Well, they obviously cherry-picked reports that seem to contradict a preventive strike-thesis. But not so fast. Within the general staff you always require dialectical argumentation to judge the behavior and intentions of your enemies or other role-players. So some officers will built arguments in favor and other against a certain thesis. Perhaps Mr. Benz should consider doing that himself.
The fact that the Soviets massed up troops and the type of troops they massed up at their Western borders would have convinced me that they prepared a westward invasion. There is other evidences as well. If their intentions were defensive, they'd have structured their positioning of armed forces differently.
Here is some Russian collection with documents:
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941 ... prilozenia
A surprise attack on Germany, with 30,000 state of the art tanks and millions of men (Suvorov says there were plans for 18 million (!) reservists) would mean that Germany could not prevail. Then, on the other side of Germany, France had already been decimated. Spain too. Why stop there and leave the Portuguese coast open? Portugal is a strip of defenceless coastal land.
There'd be no reason for the largest army in human history to say no to these open goals.
Then what? They had 200 submarines, with 98 more being laid - they could easily blockade Britain and Ireland. A REAL operation Sea Lion would be feasible - the Soviets had amphibious tanks, barges and airborne troops.
Then, it would be reasonable to seize the Africans colonies and move into Iraq.
Another curve ball - what if it is true that America's first nukes were essentially German? The destruction of Germany in 1941 means no nukes until at least 1946, unless of course the Soviets seize German scientists and tech, and get nukes themselves first.
These are all extremely pertinent questions.
Finally, we know Stalin had plans on Alaska... question is, why not?
However, is it not the case that the Germans only captured the smallest of Soviet oil fields, Maikon? And that no oil was extracted out of the ground in Maikon before 1943, if ever?
Therefore I would presume that the 'invade for oil so we can continue' theory is questionable at best. Some points;
a) The Autumn 1941 deadline did not include the massive use of fuel required for Barbarossa, correct? Therefore in theory, this would push the deadline further back and into the summer, surely?
b) The deadline came and went, despite burning more fuel than ever, and without extracting any oil
c) Committing to such a huge invasion, under the presumption that 'all will be fine if we take Maikon, Baku etc' sounds extraordinarily hokey. First, even the most myopic person would see that the Soviets would not leave working drilling equipment and refineries... they'd destroy them, and they did.
d) You can't just take oil out of the ground, then fill your vehicle up with it. It has to be extracted, then refined. After scorched earth, assuming you're not attacked, and assuming you can extract it, you have to transport all of it back to Romania for refinement, then move it back out to the front.
So let's play devil's advocate for a minute and take the History Channel view these people like to hold - that the USSR had a rickety army and was not preparing to invade. And that Hitler is in dire need of oil - why not keep it a one front war, send your 150 divisions to Africa, seize the Suez canal and take over Middle Eastern oil?
You're probably going to have no more difficulty extracting or refining it there than in the USSR. And you will be in friendly Arab countries in a one-front war. It seems to me that there is a more pressing and urgent motivation for going into the USSR instead, and that is to pre-empt a Soviet invasion.
In that sense, the Germans are killing two birds with one stone. They're preventing an invasion of Europe and, if not in mortal need of oil like some say, there is major booty to be gained... since the problem is already existential before oil even comes into the discussion.
In my opinion, the best recent book on the topic was written by a former Communist General of the East German Army who was trained in the Soviet Union, Bernd Schwipper. It is called "Germany in Stalin's vizor", or "Deutschland im Visier Stalins".
Unfortunately, the book is out of print. If you can get a used copy and read German, then I highly recommend it. The evidence is so overwhelming that it is mindblowing how this truth can be hidden from the general public.
https://www.amazon.de/Deutschland-Visie ... er+stalins
Pia Kahn wrote: it is mindblowing how this truth can be hidden from the general public.
It's interesting to me how people can spend thousands of hours researching Barbarossa, writing books etc, and miss the elephant in the room. Particularly authors. Especially historians and amateur historians who openly admit they've digested the evidence, but still deny it.
Cognitive dissonance on a level that is barely understandable.
Revisionist wrote:Overwhelming sounds very interesting... Did he also deal with the knowledge of the germans? Since a lot of the soviet movements were very well hidden.
The book is clearly focused on the Soviet side. Pages 350 to 351 deal with this. He quotes from Halder's "Kriegstagebuch"; diary of the war. On June 21, 1941 it states that they assumed that 213 "Divisionsverbände" and 5100 aircraft were mobilized by the russians. A division comprises around 15 thousand soldiers.
On the same day, the "Kriegstagebuch" of the German high command of the Wehrmacht states: "English flights into the Rhineland and Ruhr area as well as Holstein. Fuehrer made the following remark in the Reichs chancellery: English-Russian agreement, Russian military deployment in order to bind the German forces, relief for England, danger recognized, ..."
So Hitler knew that the Russians were planning to attack but Hitler underestimated their forces. The Soviet troops were not supposed to merely bind the German forces.
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