That German judicial authorities examined the document’s authenticity not only stands to reason (given that the document might be used as evidence in indictments and challenged by defense attorneys, especially on grounds of its having been provided by the Soviets), but is also borne out by the means available to do such examination, which beside the context of other evidence (including without limitation Jäger’s deposition that will be addressed in the next article of this series) included at least three documents handwritten and hand-signed by Jäger that could be compared with each other and with the 2nd Jäger Report. One is a report that Jäger submitted on 9 February 1942 in response to Order Nr. 1331 from the BdS in Riga, instructing the commanders of EK 1 A in Reval, EK 1 B in Minsk and EK 3 in Kaunas to immediately submit information about executions carried out, broken down into A) Jews, B) communists, C) partisans, D) mental patients and E) others (to be specified), furthermore information about how many of the total were men, women and children. [25] The other two documents are farewell letters that Jäger wrote (before his suicide while imprisoned on remand) to the family of his son-in-law and to his interrogator Aedtner, in which he claimed that he had committed no crimes and heaped no guilt on himself, furthermore lamenting the "terrible fate" he had met. [26] It would be easy for a handwriting expert to establish that the handwriting and signature on these documents and the signature on the 2nd Jäger Report had been made by one and the same person.
With little to offer by way of arguments against the 2nd Jäger Report’s authenticity, [27] Mattogno turns to the "no less important" question of the report’s veracity. Mattogno’s arguments in this sense will be examined in the next articles of this series.
[27] On page 182 of his book, Mattogno makes another insinuation in the "forgery" direction, by pointing out, "without wanting to draw a particular conclusion" from this "anomaly", that the report’s heading "
Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD" should, as said
Befehlshaber would be Jäger’s superior SS-
Brigadeführer Dr. Stahlecker (the commandant of Einsatzgruppe A), have read "
An den Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD". While it is true that Jäger as
Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (KdS) was subordinated to Stahlecker as
Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS), Mattogno overlooks the fact that the supposedly misworded heading is followed by "
Einsatzkommando 3", suggesting that the document was meant to be a read as a report by the
Einsatzkommando 3 "subsidiary", subordinated to the BdS, of the BdS organization.
The 1st Jäger Report, dated 10 September 1941, contains the following remark below the date (YVA, O.53-3, p. 82): "
Nur zur persönlichen Uebergabe an SS-Brigadefuehrer Dr. Stahlecker" ("Only for personal delivery to SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Stahlecker"). What seems to be the cover letter of
the 2nd Jäger Report, dated 10.12.1941 (YVA, O.53-3, p. 87), also bears the letterhead "
Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD Einsatzkommando 3", and is addressed "
An die Einsatzgruppe A SS-Brigadeführer Dr. Stahlecker in Riga". So there is no "anomaly" here. "
Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD Einsatzkommando 3" was Jaeger’s letterhead. Between the 1st and the 2nd report, as the YVA collection shows, Jäger also got himself typewriters that had the German Umlaut characters ("ä", "ö", "ü"). He furthermore managed to have "
Der Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei u. des SD" printed in
Deutsche Schrift on his letterhead.
5 comments:
Hans Metzner said...
Thanks, Roberto. Just some addition to your footnote 27:
Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 146 of 15 December 1941 has Jäger's "Einsatzkommando 3" crossed out and replaced by "K. d. Sipo u. d. SD f. d. Gen.bez. Weißruthenien[!]". Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 149 of 22 December 1941 refers to Jäger finally as "Kommandeur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD für den Generalbezirk Litauen". This suggests that the structure of commanders of Sipo and SD in the Ostland was only created in December 1941. This is why Jäger did not report to Stahlecker as KdS Kauen yet on 1 December 1941 (or 10 December).
Wilhelm, Die Einsatzgrupe A der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, p. 121 cites others docs Jäger sent in August/September as BdS/EK 3 or BdS Kauen from Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Fb 101/29.
Jäger writing as Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD Einsatzkommando 3 was a proper way before he got his KdS office. So the letterhead actually supports the authenticity of the Jäger report.
Saturday, August 18, 2018 10:46:00 pm