Some comments on this speech again, which should help put it into perspective a little more.
First of all, it's extremely likely that this speech was intended to be nothing more than a pep talk in an attempt for Hitler to convince his Generals that they must resign themselves to the possibility of a war with Poland. He did this by using absolutist terms that made a conflict appear to be imminent. Most of the actual content of the speech is surrounding a wide array of possibilities, many of which contradict each other. Hitler seems to be pontificating on various points of interest and drawing conclusions about a war with Poland and it's likelihood of success based on them. There is also proof, from the testimonies of the participants of the meeting itself, that Hitler never actually intended a war with Poland, despite his comments in address, which were intended to convince the Generals of Germany's strong strategic and diplomatic position by using harsh language.
More on this in a moment.
Some people in this thread have really clung on to Hitler's alleged statement in the dubious Nuremberg version of the speech that Hitler intended to launch a war with Poland via "propaganda", such people have also latched onto the word "Auslösung" as used by Halder in his diary to confirm that aspect of Hitler's intentions:
3.) Auslösung: Mittel gleichgültig. Der Sieger wird nie interpelliert, ob seine Gründe berechtigt waren. Es handelt sich nicht darum, das Recht auf unserer Seite zu haben, sondern ausschließlich um den SiegEnglish:
3) Solution : Means immaterial. The victor is never called upon to vindicate his actions. We are not concerned with having justice on our side, but solely with victory.Halder Diary, 22.08.1939. op cit.
Their claim is that "Auslösung" doesn't translate as "solution" as in the official English translation of Halder's diary, but instead as the word "trigger" which implies an event by which the war is started. Yet, as this post will show, such an interpretation, even if plausible, or even true, actually doesn't matter at all, and says nothing about Hitler's subsequent policy after August 25th.
Halder in his diary for August 22nd, states:
1.) Auslösung voraussichtlich: Samstag Morgen.English:
1) Probable start: Saturday morning.Halder Diary, 22.08.1939. ADAP, D, VII, p. 469; DGFP, D, VII, p. 559.
Hitler, in one of the phony transcripts favoured by historians, also says this:
Überzeugung, daß die deutsche Wehrmacht den Anforderungen gewachsen ist. Auslösung wird noch befohlen, wahrscheinlich Samstag morgen.English:
Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is equal to all demands. The order for the start of hostilities will be given later, probably Saturday morning.Nuremberg Doc. 1014-PS. ADAP, D, VII, Doc. 193, p. 172; DGFP, D, VII, Doc. 193, p. 206.
What's interesting about this seemingly innocuous comment, is that Saturday morning was August 26th, the date given for the original marching orders issued on August 23rd to begin the attack on Poland. This gives us a concrete example of Hitler's speech being applied in practise. Now, I should state that it's likely Hitler with these marching orders was bluffing, and intended to stage a march on Poland in order to force the Poles to accept his demands and thus, for a war to actually be avoided. Wilhelm Keitel, a man who ought to know, explicitly attests to this being the case, and indeed, as Udo Walendy shows, this is really the only logical conclusion that explains Hitler's actions on August 25th, which I have outlined
in this thread already. I will touch back on this momentarily and elaborate. I have quoted this part (the end) of Hitler's Obersalzberg conference for a reason.
Another important factor regarding Hitler's comments in this speech of August 22, is to emphasize how he justified his musings regarding Poland on the idea that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact, which was signed the next day, would deter the West from intervening on behalf of Poland. Hitler stated according to Halder:
[The] Russians have informed [us] that they are prepared to conclude pact. Personal contact Stalin-Fuhrer, “With this I have knocked the weapons out of the hands of these gentry [Herrschaften]. Poland has been manoeuvred into the position that we need for military success.”
Halder Diary, 22.08.1939. DGFP, D, Vol. VII, p. 559.
The official OKW war dairy kept by Helmuth Greiner, also contains a short, and far less sensational transcript of this address by Hitler, and he confirms in nearly all points the affidavit by Bohem, minus the silly comment about "propaganda" which is probably still a leftover from the preferred forgeries used by most historians. This entry states:
A non-aggression treaty had just been concluded in Moscow with Soviet Russia, on which the Western powers had hitherto placed their hopes after the possible defeat of Poland by Germany. The impetus for this had come from Soviet Russia. He (Hitler) had been convinced for some time that Stalin would not accept any English offer. For Stalin had no interest in the preservation of Poland and also knew perfectly well that if war broke out between Germany and Soviet Russia, his regime would be over, regardless of whether he won or lost. The German-Russian non-aggression pact had now knocked the card out of the hands of the Western powers, which would be of great psychological importance for their decision. For Germany, the treaty meant not only a tremendous economic strengthening but also a complete change in her foreign policy, and it marked the beginning of the destruction of England's supremacy. Having thus made the political preparations, the way was now clear for the soldier.
Helmuth Greiner, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Percy Ernst Schramm (ed.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 1940-1945, Volume 1 (Frankfurt/Main, Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965), Pp. 949.
Greiner's entry also refutes the oft-quoted comment made in the other transcripts that it was apart of Hitler's intention
to destroy, through war, England's supremacy:
Another protocol, the fifth in the numbering of this book, is found in the war diary OKW, written by the supervisor of this diary, Helmuth Greiner. This protocol confirms Boehm on almost all his points. It corrects the Admiral only to the extent that Hitler apparently spoke of a destruction of the supremacy of England, but not - as suggested in the 2nd version (1014-PS) - as [an aim of] Hitler's political program, but only as the mentioning of a fact.
Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, George F. Held (trans.), 1939 - The War that Had Many Fathers (Munich: Olzog-Verlag, 2011), Pp. 413.
So what do we know so far? Hitler on August 22nd justifies his new aggressive approach to Poland on the back of the pact with Moscow. He declares that the start of this conflict will be on Saturday, August 26th. Hitler in his marching orders on August 23rd confirms this, and the invasion of Poland is indeed slated for that Saturday. So what happened between August 22 and August 26th? Because according to Hitler's Obersalzberg speech the war should've started then. So where was the alleged "trigger" event? Non-existent. No such event occurred in those few days. And this is why the mention of "Saturday" August 26th is important, and I think makes or breaks the importance of this alleged speech; and actually the events of August 25th is what determines how important this speech to Hitler actually was. This can be indicated by the fact, as stated already, that Hitler in this alleged speech, justified his entire policy on his pact with the Soviet Union which Ribbentrop was currently in Moscow to settle, and thus Hitler did not believe that a conflict with the Western powers was all that likely, as the mainstream historian Stephen G. Fritz admits:
The imminent prospect of a deal with Stalin had persuaded Hitler that the risk of a larger war was minimal, but there still remained his generals to convince. In an effort to bolster their confidence in his actions, on 22 August he gathered fifty top military leaders at the Obersalzberg for a pep talk. His generals harbored mixed emotions: apprehension at the prospect of a two-front war mingled with anger at the Western powers’ effort to contain Germany and support for an isolated war with Poland to regain Danzig and the Corridor. Some also believed that Hitler’s actions were all a bluff, and that, as in September 1938, at the last moment he would pull off a diplomatic triumph. The Führer quickly put an end to those illusions. He had, he stated bluntly, decided on war against Poland. The relatively favorable military and political situation, as well as his own limited life- span, compelled him to act quickly. If war was unavoidable, as Hitler knew it was, then there was little reason to wait. “We have nothing to lose,” he asserted; “we have everything to gain . . . Our economic situation is such that we can only hold out for a few more years.
Stephen G. Fritz, The First Soldier: Hitler as Military Leader (Yale University Press, 2018), Pp. 77.
Fritz makes the mistake of taking Hitler's speech too literally, and succumbing to that fatalistic impression probably without much original thought put into the speech itself, let alone the various contradictions within it, and the dubious nature of some of the existing transcripts.
It's interesting that Fritz seems to agree that Hitler had little reason to wait and that a war was unavoidable. He doesn't attempt to make any excuses and claim Hitler wanted a war with Poland because he had any other choices. This seems to be a case of what's not said actually saying a lot more than what is said.
Although Fritz does his best to impress on the reader who has already drunk from the poisoned well that Hitler would've been wrong to make this move against Poland. But in any case. The important part of this quote is that Fritz admits Hitler's intention was to impress upon the Generals that a large war wasn't imminent if a war with Poland did come, and he did this by claiming he resolved upon a war with Poland, when in truth he probably expected it, but didn't put all his eggs into that single basket. It seems more likely to me that Hitler was attempting, as Fritz states, to reassure his generals that his decision to ally with the Soviet Union had some strategist sense, and that in a likely war against Poland, there was good reason to suspect it would be isolated and the West wouldn't get involved.
This indeed had the intended effect on some of those present, for example Generals Salmuth and Rundstedt:
Others (e.g., Generals Salmuth and Rundstedt) did not need to be convinced of the sense of a German-Russian alliance anyway and took the whole thing as an occasion to relax: "This agreement has satisfied us soldiers from the old Seeckt school to a high degree, I would almost like to say, made us happy, " Rundstedt later testified. "This pact with Russia was, in our opinion, a strong threat to the Poles, so that we believed it would never dare to wage war now. We left the Berghof with the feeling that it would be a flower war. "
Stefan Scheil, Logik der Mächte: Europas Problem mit der Globalisierung der Politik Überlegungen zur Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1999), Pp. 198.
Even Halder recognized that Hitler was not being serious:
Halder, for his part, explained: "Nevertheless, many drove back (from Obersalzberg) without having taken Hitler's remarks seriously in the full sense. People were used to this jargon - as an essential part of the war of nerves - from the Sudeten crisis and from the Sports Palace, and generally assumed that things would take the course of the 'flower wars', should an armed confrontation occur at all."
Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Wollte Adolf Hitler den Krieg? 1939: Generalprobe der Gewalt (Preußisch Oldendorf: Verlag K. W. Schütz, 1971), Pp. 311, note 4.
So, the question now is why would Hitler need to convince his Generals of a war with Poland? The answer as we'll learn from General Wilhelm Keitel, was because the other Generals were concerned that a war with Poland would mean a two front war with the West and thus didn't want to commit to it, even if they saw it (as they did) as justified. This is the fear which as mentioned, Hitler attempted and seemingly successfully dissolved on that day.
Keitel notes in his memoirs that Hitler repeatedly told him that he had no intention for a war with Poland:
As early as April 1939 I became with increased frequency the target for comments by Hitler to the effect that the Polish problem was imperatively demanding a solution. What a tragedy it was, he said, that the sly old Marshal Pilsudski - with whom he had been able to sign a non-aggression pact - had died so prematurely; the same might happen to him Hitler at any time. That was why he would have to try as soon as possible to resolve this intolerable position for Germany's future whereby east Prussia was geographically cut off from the rest of the Reich; he could not postpone this job until later, or bequeath it to his successor. You could now see, Hitler added, how dependent reasonable policies were on one man's existence: Poland's present rulers were anything but inclined to follow the path the marshal had laid down, as had become abundantly clear during the talks with the Polish foreign secretary, [Colonel] Beck. Beck, said Hitler, was pinning his hopes on England's assistance, although there was not the least doubt that, as Britain had no economic interest in these purely domestic German affairs, she had no vital political interest either. Britain would withdraw from Poland her outstretched hand once she saw our resolve to remove this aftermath of the Diktat of Versailles - a condition which would be quite intolerable in the long run. He did not want a war with Poland over Danzig or the Corridor, but he who desired peace must prepare for war: that was the basis of all successful diplomacy.
Wilhelm Keitel, David Irving (trans.), Walter Görlitz (ed.), In The Service of The Reich: The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel (Focal Point Publications, 2003), Pp. 96.
Keitel mentions how he learned little of the actual negotiations between Berlin, Warsaw and London, but would nonetheless be told by Hitler that he didn't intend a war whenever Keitel would come to him and express the fears of the army:
I learned next to nothing of our negotiations with either Poland or London, and of their bearing on the Danzig Corridor question, except when Hitler himself took the initiative during my conference visits to him, or when I brought it home to him how deeply worried the army and I were about the possibility of an armed conflict with Poland when our army's re-equipment programme was still at such an unsatisfactory stage. Again and again Hitler reassured me that he had no desire whatsoever for war with Poland - he would never let things go as far as that, even if France's intervention in the spirit of her eastern commitments really was likely to occur. He had made to France the most far-reaching offers, he said, and even publicly disavowed his interest in Alsace-Lorraine. That was probably a guarantee which no statesman other than he could ever have justified to the German people; only he had the authority and the right to make such an offer.
Indeed, he even went so far as to entreat me not to tell the War Office of how his mind was working, as he feared they would then cease to apply themselves to planning for the Polish contingency with the gravity and intensity which were such a vital element of his diplomatic charade, as the "concealed" war preparations being made in Germany could not be kept wholly secret from or unobserved by the Poles.
Ibid., p. 98.
This is absolutely vital, because Keitel goes on to explain that Hitler while using harsh language was indeed bluffing, and he took this course of action in order to keep his own Generals working on military contingencies, and also allowing such preparations to put pressure on the British and the Poles.
Not only was Hitler stressing his desire to diplomatically avoid a war with Poland to Keitel, but he said much the same thing to the Grand Admiral of the Navy Erich Raeder. Immediately after Hitler's speech on August 22nd, Raeder approached Hitler about whether a war was imminent:
But Hitler, who had now shot all his powder, wanted to end the day in a conciliatory tone:
"Calm yourself," he said to the commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, "I will know how to overcome these difficulties without war, only by diplomatic means. For the moment, negotiations continue. I will send you my final orders in due course."
Benoist-Méchin, op cit., p. 311. See too, Max Klüver, War es Hitlers Krieg? (Leoni: Druffel-Verlag, 1984), Pp. 144.
Raeder is affirmed by the testimony of Halder at the OKW trial, where he subsequently recalled a similar comment by Hitler at the end of his address:
Colonel General Halder, former Chief of the German Army General Staff:
“The meeting ended with Hitler saying that Poland was isolated and that negotiations would be continuing…Udo Walendy, Who Started World War II? (Castle Hill Publishers, 2014), Pp. 462. See too: Rolf Kosiek und Olaf Rose (ed.), Der Grosse Wendig: Richtigstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte: Band 1 (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 2006), Pp. 585-586.
Here [within the circle of those present] we were of the impression that the famous war of nerves would continue amid the favourable conditions created by Poland’s isolation; no decision was made.”
Before quoting Keitel again, it's worth noting that Hitler's speech on August 22nd was not conducted in secrecy, and indeed could not have gone unnoticed, and indeed it didn't go unnoticed. After the speech was concluded was when the phoney L-3 document was leaked by the German resistance to the world press (Scheil, op cit., p. 194.)
It has been claimed that the generals were ordered to appear in civilian clothes so as not to attract attention. This is not true. If the words spoken at this military meeting were to be kept secret, no secret was made of the meeting itself. Thus, Field Marshal von Küchler remarked before the Nuremberg Tribunal: "The arrival of such a large number of generals in uniform at Obersalzberg, that is, in an area teeming with tourists at this time of year, could by no means go unnoticed."
Benoist-Méchin, op cit., p. 305, note 1.
Thus far we have from Raeder, Halder and Keitel, a string of proof that shines some light on Hitler's actual intentions regarding his Obersalzberg speech, which was to convince the generals of a few of his tactical and diplomatic convictions, but also, by not hiding the meeting, to hopefully impress on the world his willingness to go to war over Poland, and indeed his imminent intent to do so. But as he revealed, which we know now, he had no such intentions and was still aiming at a diplomatic triumph. All of this is proven definitively by what comes next in those few days.
I had deemed it my duty during the course of that summer to leave Hitler in no doubt that both the General Staff and his leading generals shared the gravest anxiety about the possibility that a war might break out. [...] It was for this reason that early in August 1939 he conceived the idea of addressing his ideas to the various army chiefs of staff by themselves - in other words without their commanders-in-chief - at the Berghof. From the shadows I was probably in the best position to study its effect. . .
All the more remarkable was his Berghof speech delivered on 22nd August to the generals of the eastern armies ranged against Poland - a speech delivered with the finest sense of psychological timing and application. Hitler was an extraordinarily gifted orator, with a masterly capability of moulding his words and phrases to suit his audience. I would even go so far as to say that he had learned his lesson from the ill conceived meeting with the chiefs of staff and had realised that trying to set them at odds with their commanders-in-chief had been a psychological error. Other versions of this particular speech have been subjectively distorted, as the minute taken by Admiral Boehm, who must be regarded as absolutely impartial, clearly shows.
Keitel, op cit., p. 99, 100.
Thus Keitel confirms that indeed, as revealed to him, Hitler's intention was not to seriously attack Poland if it could be avoided, but simply to push his generals to make the planning of such an attack a serious part of their considerations, and to do so, he had to dispel their worries. Keitel specifically cites in this connection the August 22nd Obersalzberg speech which is incredibly significant.
All of this comes into focus once you take into account the events of August 25th, which I will let Keitel describe to really emphasise how, as Hitler told Raeder, his diplomatic means were intended to have been successful:
Toward noon on 25th August I was summoned for the first time to the Reich Chancellery to see the Fuhrer. Hitler had just received from [the Italian] ambassador Attolico a personal letter from Mussolini, a few paragraphs of which the Fuhrer proceeded to read out to me. It was the Duce's reply to a highly confidential letter, written by Hitler from the Berghof a few days before, in which he had told him about the planned clash with Poland and about his determination to resolve the undecided issue of the Danzig Corridor by military action should Poland - or England on Poland's behalf - refuse to give way.
Hitler had for various reasons named a day several days later [i.e., later than had actually been planned] for his operations against Poland. As he told me himself, he was counting on the contents of his letter being immediately forwarded to London by his so "reliable" Foreign Office, and this, he imagined, would make it plain that he really was serious in his intentions, without on the other hand divulging the true timetable of his military operations. So even if the Poles were forewarned, the planned element of tactical surprise would not be lost to the attackers. Finally, by bringing forward the announcement of the date, Hitler hoped to rush the British into precipitate intervention to prevent the outbreak of war. This he certainly expected them to do, and for this he was banking on Mussolini's support.
Only now did the real reason for Hitler's disillusion at Mussolini's "treachery" come to light. In effect he said: "There's absolutely no doubt that London has realised by now that Italy won't go along wit us. Now Britain's attitude toward us will stiffen - now they will back up Poland to the hilt. The diplomatic result of my letter is exactly the opposite of what I had planned." Hitler's irritation was painfully obvious to me, although outwardly he put on a great show of composure. He added that London would clearly take its Polish treaty off the shelf an ratify it now that there was no prospect of support for us from the Italian side.
Early that afternoon [25th August] I was summoned to the Reich Chancellery again, this time urgently. Hitler was even more agitated than he had been that morning. He told me a wire had reached him from the Reich press chief [Doctor Otto Dietrich] according to which the Anglo-Polish Treaty was to be ratified that very day. There was still no confirmation from the Foreign Office, he said, but experience showed that diplomats moved more ponderously than telegraphic agencies. He believed the telegram on hand to be substantially true and asked whether the army's troop movements could be stopped, as he wanted to win time for further negotiations, even though he could no longer count on Italy's support. . .
Keitel, op cit., p. 100-101, 102.
That Hitler's plan failed is due to the fact that the Italians had made no secret of the fact that they were unable to go to war over Poland, what annoyed Hitler was not that the Italians were unable, it was that they were too scared to call Britain's bluff and instead blew Hitler's plan wide open in a moment when they admitted their weakness (Walendy, op cit., p. 388)
. Hitler, as he said to Keitel, knowing what such an admission would signal to the West, thus ordered the preparations to be made for the attack on Poland the next day to be halted, Keitel also testified to this at Nuremberg:
The first thing which was very surprising to me was that on one of those days which have been discussed here repeatedly, namely on the 24th or 25th, only a few days after the conference at Obersalzberg, I was suddenly called to Hitler at the Reich Chancellery and he said to me only, "Stop everything at once, get Brauchitsch immediately. I need time for negotiations." I believe that after these few words I was dismissed.
IMT, Vol. X, p. 514.
Goring also testified to the exact same thing:
"Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August but on the 24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?'
"Answer: 'Yes.' "
IMT, Vol. III, p. 248-249.
Goring said much more during his interrogation:
"When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end of March or the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?"Goring:
"Yes, it seemed impossible according to my conviction. . . but not according to the convictions of the Fuhrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuhrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia, nothing happened; and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, the Fuhrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary, or for good. He said, 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.' So, then I asked him, 'Do you think that it will be any different within 4 or 5 days?' At this same time-I do not know whether you know about that, Colonel-I was in communication with Lord Halifax by a special courier, outside the regular diplomatic channels, to do everything to stop war with England.Nuremberg Document GB-64, quoted in IMT, vol. III, p. 248.
In light of these facts, much of which is never quoted by mainstream historians in connection with the speech - even though there's a direct connection to it - shows us that Hitler's speech on August 22nd was apart of his plan to bluff the Poles and the Allies into giving up Danzig and the corridor, and thus forcing them to accept his offers to the Poles without war. This all went "belly up" on August 25th, as soon as it seemed like the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact would not dissuade Britain from her insistence on war, and that the Italians wouldn't commit to the war against Poland. At that moment Hitler stepped back from the brink and ordered all preparations for war to be stopped immediately despite his apparently steadfast statements on August 22nd. Hitler's subsequent actions do not line up whatsoever with the speech, and thus a new interpretation is needed.
Richard Overy notes that Hitler's decision to halt the march on Poland has no other explanation other than a sincere attempt to limit a possible war with Poland:
Yet left to himself the decision seems to have been difficult to make. He recognized that a war with the West was one of the possibilities, but no sense can be made of his desperate efforts to break the Polish–Western alliance unless his preferred solution was the local war he planned for. All these imponderables proved too much on the day war should have started, but the initial hesitation then made it almost impossible for Hitler to risk humiliation in front of his military leaders by backing down again when a decision had to be made a few days later.
Richard Overy, 1939: Countdown to War (New York: Viking Penguin, 2010), Pp. 40.
Udo Walendy concurs with him, but goes further by calling out the very obvious insincerity in Hitler's marching orders slated for invasion on August 26th:
There was no cause for Hitler to call off on 25 August the marching orders of 23 August, had these been meant seriously; after all, the stance of the opponents had not changed from 23 August. If only a few days before he was prepared to march, then he should still have marched on 25 August. Since he did not march, the political sincerity of the marching orders from 23 August has to be disputed.
Walendy, op cit., p. 389ff.
Walendy is 100% correct. If Hitler was not sincere about avoiding war, and if his intentions to march had been genuine, then he would've done so. Therefore it needs to be explained why he didn't follow through with this apparent aim of his as stated on August 22nd. The answer is unpalatable to mainstream historians, but the answer is unavoidable. It's because Hitler did not actually intend a war at that moment, despite his statements to the contrary. These statements, like the August 22nd speech, can only be interpreted and make any sort of sense if seen as a piece in Hitler's gamble to bluff his way to victory once again.
That the speech, at the very end, mentions the date of August 26th, and nothing beyond that clearly shows that it isn't an open ended "plan" or declaration of intent by Hitler, but a speech which was intended to play a part in the events of the subsequent days as we've seen.
Even if the alleged "trigger" as mentioned by Halder was intended - as some in this thread have insisted - to be some excuse to start a war, it never came. So seeing as no such "trigger" or "propaganda excuse" materialised on or before August 26 as defined by the parameters of Hitler's speech, then the speech cannot be taken to represent any such intention by Hitler to "trigger" an event after that date. If the Obersalzberg speech can at all be taken to reflect Hitler's motives, then it can only be used to asses them up to August 26. This document therefore, cannot be used to discuss Hitler's intentions, or asses his motives past August 26th, when actions taken by Hitler himself on August 25th not only contradict this document, but actually abrogate it.
The conclusion of my post is this. The Obersalzberg speech strictly pertains only to the events preceding the outbreak of the war up to August 25th and no further. From August 26th, the speech has no relevance, because the basis of the speech, and Hitler's intentions surrounding the speech were attempted to facilitate diplomatic pressure on Poland to get them to concede by August 25th and this failed.
The speech had two objectives, first, for Hitler to impress certain ideas onto his generals; and second, to arouse the foreign press and British foreign office into thinking
that Hitler seriously intended to strike Poland, when in fact he had no such intention. His plan to force the Poles to concede, and thus end the German/Polish conflict didn't work because the British weren't persuaded by the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and still insisted on war if Germany made any move against Poland.
Historians therefore, have failed to comprehend Hitler's true diplomatic manoeuvres, and have instead falsely interpreted his tactics as an intent on war, rather than the avoidance of it. In doing this they've been forced to omit testimonies from relevant German sources which contradict their fatalistic interpretations of Hitler's foreign policy. My interpretation in this post is able to account for all the evidence, and therefore, in my opinion is closer to understanding the truth.